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ABSTRACT 
Soil infertility and concomitant low levels of food security under conditions of population 
pressure and land scarcity have been, and still remain, one of society’s most daunting 
challenges. Over time, societies have tried to maximize the yield from the available land 
through the use of various fertilisers. In the 19
th
 century in the midst of an environment 
infertility crisis, guano (bird dung) from the Peruvian coastal islands became, through a 
combination of factors, the international fertilizer of choice for most commercial farmers. As 
a result, a combination of natural factors, monopoly control and price manipulation 
contributed to the relative scarcity of the product. Nevertheless, strategic manoeuvring 
between the major players prevented any significant change in the supply regime.  
News of discoveries along the African coasts in the 1840s, some inside the territorial waters 
of the Cape Colony, introduced a new dimension to the trade. Both established merchant 
houses and new contenders strategised in an attempt to gain monopoly control. These events 
created new policy crises for the Cape Colony, the closest legal authority, and led to new 
policy and other initiatives in the absence of imperial precedents. The trade in guano also 
impacted on constitutional, political and scientific developments in the colony. Key amongst 
these was the struggle for monopoly control over both the Cape- and Ichaboe-based supply, 
which pitted individuals, family members and businesses against each other. The process 
became intertwined with political developments such as the transfer of political control from 
the Imperial authorities to the colonies. In addition, a coercive labour system developed under 
the colonial administration and colonial farmers struggled for fair access to the fertiliser, 
which added another dimension to the trade. 
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OPSOMMING 
Daar is ‘n noue verband tussen bevolkingsgetalle, oesopbrengs, voedselsekuriteiten die 
beskikbaarheid van voldoende bewerkbare landbougrond. Waar samelewings probleme 
ervaar met die gehalte van hul landbougrond, is daar heel dikwels ook lae vlakke van 
voedselsekuriteit en word daar gewoonlik ook ‘n onsekere van-die-hand-tot–die-mond 
bestaan gevoer. As ‘n teenvoeter vir hongersnood as gevolg van lae oesopbrengs, het 
uiteenlopende samelewings met verloop van tyd en na gelang van hulle natuurlike 
omstandighede, bepaalde bemestingstradisies ontwikkel in ‘n poging om ‘n volhoubare 
opbrengs te verseker.  
Gedurende die 19de eeu, het ghwanobemesting te midde van ‘n wêreldwye grondgehalte 
krisis, ongekende gewildheid onder winsgedrewe landbouers bereik en voorts ook daarin 
geslaag om ander vorme van bemesting soos beenmeel en kraalmis as voorkeur produkte te 
vervang. As gevolg van ‘n kombinasie van natuurlike faktore, monopoliebeheer oor die 
eiland-gebaseerde ghwanobron en prysmanipulasie, was die produk wataanvanklik net vanaf 
Peru in Suid Amerika ingevoer is, dus nie vrylik beskikbaar nie en moes belangstellende 
boere hoë pryse daarvoor betaal. Vanselfsprekend het dit tot groot frustrasie en ontsteltenis in 
die geledere van diegene wat ‘n belegging in kommersiële landbou wou maak, gelei. Die 
onderlinge politieke intriges, knoeiery en pogings van plaaslike en oorsese sakemanne om 
mekaar te uitoorlê in die soeke na alleenbeheer oor die beskikbare ghwanobronne, het sake 
nie juis verbeter nie. Inteendeel, die situasie het net vererger toe alternatiewe ghwano bronne 
langs die wes- en ooskus van Afrika sowel as op ‘n reeks ander eilande in die Atlantiese 
Oseaan ontdek is.  
Die ontdekking van ghwano binne die Kaapse gebeidswaters in die 19de eeu, het die 
owerhede met ’n beleidsdilemma waarvoor daar nie enige presedente in die Britse Ryk 
bestaan het nie gelaat. Daarbenewens was die kolonie te midde van heelparty konstitusionele 
en ander kwessies en het die toevoeging van die ghwanohandel die maatskaplike en politieke 
lewe van die kolonie wesenlik beïnvloed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
FOLLOWING GUANO TRACKS – A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
1.1           Introduction 
The study of the historical uses of guano or the excrement of certain seafowl is a fascinating 
topic. Research by a variety of scholars has unearthed a surprising array of uses that range 
from the whimsical periphery to the economically key in both the distant past and the present. 
Guanine crystal, guano’s most potent and active chemical component, is used in the 
manufacturing of mascara and other cosmetic products.
1
 In addition, in contemporary cultural 
references, guano provided both the backdrop and the weapon for killing the fictional guano 
entrepreneur and main character, Dr. Julius No, in the 1962 James Bond movie, Dr No.
2
 
Similarly, the 1964 Stanley Kubrick movie, Dr. Strangelove, dramatised an evil character, 
Colonel “Bat” Guano. Beyond the whimsical, guano played a historically significant role in 
the social, political and economic lives of a range of societies in the 19
th
 century world. These 
included Peru, the United States of America, Australia and South Africa. Indeed, the history 
of guano’s political impact resonates today. For example, Gregory T. Cushman, a leading 
scholar of the Peruvian guano trade, recently detected efforts to use precedents from the 
guano past to justify the controversial American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Oil in the 21
st
 
century, like guano in the 19
th
 century, is a strategic commodity. Unilateral occupation based 
on the principle of right of use is therefore self-serving and an important example of 
inconsistent policy application that may have unintended consequences.
3
 The historical 
record also revealed the use of guano in the manufacturing of gunpowder and murexide,
4
 its 
application as a possible cure for malaria
5
 and as a source of ignition in the aerial 
                                                          
1E. Cram, “Re.: How is bat guano used in the production of cosmetics, particularly eye make-up,” MadSci 
Network Home Page, August 9, 2000, 
 <http://www.madsci.org/posts/archives/aug2000/965793989.Gb.r.html>;( December 1, 2007). 
2Archipelago Bat Guano, “Homepage”< http://archipelagobatguano.com/6.shtml> (December 1, 2007). 
3
  G.T. Cushman, “Webster, Guano & Empire in Iraq,” History News Network, 9 (October, 2002), 
< http://hnn.us/readcomment.php> (September 25, 2007). 
4
  C. Cooksey, “The history and chemistry of the murexide dye, 1840 – 1865.” 
<http://www.chriscooksey.demon.co.uk/murexide/page3.html> 2007;( September 25, 2007). 
5
  F.D. Schwarz, “Does guano drive history?”  American Heritage.com, 
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communication systems of the Mercury and Gemini space programme in the 1960s.
6
  Indeed, 
when all guano’s various applications are considered, one revisits Schwarz’s question about 
guano as a possible driver of history and the accuracy of the old Peruvian saying that “huano, 
though no saint, makes miracles happen.” 7 
The availability of guano in a particular location depends on the presence of certain guano-
producing seabirds such as gannets, cormorants and penguins. Their geographical location is 
inextricably linked with a natural and very complex phenomenon called upwelling. 
Upwelling is caused by the interaction of coastal winds, marine erosion of the ocean floor and 
the topography of the coastline. During this process, dead plant and animal matter sink to the 
bottom of the sea where they start decaying to form a very rich layer of compost. This rich 
compost on the seabed can only be utilized once it has reached the water’s surface. The 
south-easterly wind blowing over the surface of the water causes a current to move away 
from the land and makes a deep depression in the water’s surface, which is then filled up with 
deeper-lying water. In this way the nutritious compost, which is piled up on the seabed, is 
forced up and can be utilized.
8
 This dynamic process is illustrated in Diagram 1 below. When 
this compost reaches the surface, it serves as essential food for certain pelagic fish species 
such as anchovy, pilchard, round herring and horse mackerel, which in turn serve as essential 
food for other fish, mammals such as whales, and seabirds like gannets, penguins and 
cormorants. During the breeding season in summer, vast numbers of birds congregate to lay 
their eggs and to roost their chickens on the offshore islands of locations as diverse as Lobos, 
Guanape and Chincha on the west coast of Peru, Banaba or Christmas Island, Nauru in the 
Pacific, and Malgas and Ichaboe Island in the Atlantic Ocean, within easy reach of Cape 
Town and Namibia. Upon the birds’ departure, vast deposits of guano are left behind. These 
deposits and their chemical components are a vital source of nutrients for the enrichment of 
the waters surrounding the islands, estuaries and the marine environment in general. The 
effluent from the islands resulting from the rains serves as a stimulant for the growth of 
                                                                                               
< http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/it/2004/2/2004_2_4.shtml> 2004; (December 1, 2007 
6
 J.H. Bickford, “Dung in the space race: A surprising fuel for Projects Mercury and Gemini,” American 
Heritage.com, 2004 < http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/it/2004/2/2004_2_4.shtml>; 
 (December 1, 2007). 
7
 E.F. Hatfield, St. Helena and the Cape of Good Hope or Incidents in the missionary life of the Reverend James 
McGregor Bertram of St. Helena, (New York: E.H. Fletcher, 1852), 76 
8
  P. Joubert, “Opwelling is Weskus se ‘enjin’.”Custos 11, no. 11 (1990):42. 
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phytoplankton, which serves as food for “intertidal community structures” such as mussels, 
crabs and other similar organisms.
9
  
 
 
Figure 1: The Process of Upwelling
10
 
Although the history of guano in human society has been discussed internationally by various 
historians, Southern African historians are strangely silent on the topic. This absence from the 
historical record delays integration of the various branches of the trade and frustrates attempts 
to make significant comparisons between the different contexts.
11
  It is therefore important to 
reconstruct the guano past and contextualise its impact. Whilst guano is both a commodity 
and a resource, the study of the guano trade in the 19
th
 century provides historians with a 
political, economic and a socio-environmental lens into the past. Given the prominent role of 
islands in the narrative, the study also has the potential to enrich the discourse on islands and 
to contribute to shifting the prevailing view of islands as isolated locations - devoid of 
anything significant - to one where these locations are acknowledged as age-old spaces, each 
with a distinctive heritage that is closely connected to the lives of a diversity of people living 
in the present.
12
  
                                                          
9
 A.L. Bosman & P.A.R. Hockey, “Seabird guano as a determinant of rocky intertidal community structure,” 
Marine Ecology  32 (September, 1986): 248. 
10
 Joubert, “Opwelling is Weskus se ‘enjin’”: 42. 
11
 C. Newbury, “Mammon in Paradise: Economic Enterprise in Pacific Historiography,” Pacific Studies 19, no. 
2 (June,1996): 47. 
12
 M.K. Matsuda,  “The Pacific.”  The American Historical Review 111, no. 3 (2006) 
<http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/111.3/matsuda.html>( October 24, 2007)  
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Investigating the guano past in African waters is contextualised and informed by a strong 
body of international research on the worldwide trade. Its links with local and regional events 
aid the historian’s understanding of the interplay between the trade and its different contexts. 
In addition, a very small body of secondary research is available on various aspects of the 
Southern African trade. This thesis therefore relies on the available archival primary 
resources as a basis for the completion of a proper study. Although both categories of 
resources suffer from their own inherent defects, there is much that is useful to enable the 
construction of a reliable picture of the guano past. The relative strengths and weaknesses as 
well as merits of the different secondary and primary sources form the basis of the next 
discussion. 
1.2.  Perspectives and Discourses around the Guano Trade: The Secondary 
Literature  
The Cape guano trade and its associated environmental impact on seabirds, agriculture and 
the ecology of the coastal islands locates elements of the topic in the richly textured field of 
environmental history – a field with a prominent institutional presence13 which Flores 
broadly defined as “the study of different human groups and our evolving relationships with 
‘nature’ through time.”14 It also forms an integral part of the revisionist tradition of 
historiography.
15
 Where environmental history initially had a narrow focus on environmental 
issues (e.g. the influence of ecological factors on historical events), it has evolved to a point 
where a diversity of topics such as nature conservation, erosion, medicine and history are 
covered.
16
  Worster identified the central tasks of environmental history as the reconstruction 
of the structure, functioning and historical redistribution of the natural environment and its 
                                                          
13
 S. Sörlin & P. Warde, “The problem of the problem of Environmental History – a Re-reading of the Field and 
its purpose,” (Unpublished Conference Paper, September 2005), 3. 
14
 D. Flores, “Environmental History: An Art of People and Place,” Organization of American Historians 
(OAH) Magazine of History (Spring,1996), 4 . 
15
  P. Steyn, “The greening of our past ?: An assessment of South African Environmental  
Historiography,” Lecture presented at the Meeting of the American Society for Environmental History, Tacoma, 
Washington. H-Environment Historiography Series, (2000),   
<http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/~environ/historiography>( May 14, 2007). 
16
 P. Sutter, “Reflections: What can U.S. Environmental Historians Learn from Non-U.S. Environmental 
Historiography?” Environmental History (January, 2003), 2, 
 < www.historycooperative.org/journals/eh/8.1./sutter.html> (July 15, 2007) 
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interaction with humans and technology - the so-called “agro-ecological perspective”. 17 This 
approach focussed on understanding the trophic natural process, i.e. the processes that 
determine the flow, channelling and organisation of food and energy within the economy of a 
small group of living species. In addition, it is aimed at achieving a better understanding of 
the role of myths, technology and ideology in the dialogue between individuals, groups and 
nature. The task of the historian, in this regard, is to uncover all the different areas of 
interaction to the advantage of a specific group of people, especially the rational and 
systematic reorganisation of the natural world of plants and animals through processes such 
as fertilisation and related activities. 
Powers and Dovers argue that the practice of environmental history is by its nature an 
interdisciplinary activity. As such, its practitioners actively search for “complementary ways 
of thinking about questions that span shared interests.”18 This view is supported by Mosley, 
who believes that environmental and social history is naturally and logically compatible and 
complementary.
19
 The meeting of guano scrapers and seabirds within the context of a 
coercive and exploitative labour regime marked by labour resistance, the emergence of new 
economic and racial identities such as guanopreneurs and coolies, as well as the interaction of 
imperial and colonial politics as outlined in the unfolding drama of the current study, also 
place this study within the framework of social and political history. Hobsbawn contends the 
impossibility of confining the subject matter of social history to a specific area.
20
 This 
meeting of environmental history (with its ecological focus) and social history (with its 
concern for class, gender, race and ethnicity focussing on events over a widely dispersed area 
involving humans and animals) assists the historian in developing a transnational and global 
perspective and balancing the “agency of nature” with that of humans, whilst simultaneously 
explaining change over time.
21
 
 
                                                          
17D. Worster, “Transformation of the Earth: Toward an Agroecological Perspective in history,” Journal of 
American History 76 (1990): 1090 
18E. Pawson & S. Dovers, ”Environmental History and the Challenge of Interdisciplinarity: An Antipodean 
Perspective,” Environment & History 9 (2003): 8 
19S. Mosley, “Common Ground: Integrating Social and Environmental history,” Journal of Social History 39, 
no. 3, (Spring, 2006),< http://www.historycooperative.org/journal/jsh/39.3/mosley.html> (May 14, 2007) 
20
 E.J. Hobsbawn, “From Social History to the History of Society,” Daedalus 100, no. 1, (Winter, 1971): 24 
21
  Mosley, “Common Ground” 
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1.2.1.           The International Literature 
International researchers on the guano trade produced studies on a variety of issues ranging 
from guano wage labour,
22
 its impact on urbanisation and cultural change
23
 and its evolution 
as a technological system,
24
 to the scientific management of Peru’s marine environment.25 
This has been extended by recent work, especially historical studies on the El Nino 
phenomenon
26
 and the links between the Pacific and Peruvian trade and global ecology, as 
well as on-going work around the Caribbean area of the 19
th
 century guano world.
27
 New 
insights, methodologies and approaches were developed regarding topics such as the history 
of ‘guano imperialism’ as a particular form of imperialism, the problematic of writing 
biographical and business history and the establishment of a coercive labour system with the 
features of a new form of slavery. 
There is a tendency in the international historiography to present the Peruvian guano trade, its 
accompanying chronology (1845–1880) and its effects on the local and international political 
economy, as the centre and high point of the so-called “guano era.’’28 It is also implied that 
guano extraction was of short duration and ran its course within a certain period of time and 
impacted on the political life of one particular nation only. As this thesis argues, although the 
Peruvian trade was crucial for the translocation of the trade, it represents but one episode in a 
complex narrative which also touched the lives of diverse island communities such as those 
on Banaba and Nauru, as well as the animal life on Ichaboe and other offshore South African 
and Namibian islands. The idea of a single “guano age” from this perspective is therefore 
ahistorical since the guano era did not stop with the consolidation of the Peruvian trade under 
full state control. The case of stripping the resource on Easter Island (or Banaba as it is now 
                                                          
22
 A.J. Meagher, “The introduction of Chinese laborers to Latin America: The Coolie Trade, 1847-1874” 
(Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, 1975). 
23
 W.J. Alexander, “Wage labor, Urbanization and Culture Change in the Marshall Islands,” (Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, New School for Social Research, 1978). 
24
 R.A. Wines, “From recycled Wastes to Commercial Fertilizers,” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Brown 
University, 1981). 
25
 G.T. Cushman, “The Lords of Guano: Science and Management of Peru's Marine Environment,” 1800-1973. 
(Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Texas, May 2003).  
26
 G.T. Cushman, “Enclave Vision: Foreign networks in Peru and the Internationalization of El Niño research 
during the 1920s,” Proceedings of the International Commission on History of Meteorology (January 1, 2004).  
27
 G.T. Cushman (University of Kansas), Personal Communication with H. Snyders ( April 11, 2008). 
28
 P. Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in Post Independence Peru 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).  
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known), followed by the dispossession and relocation of its original inhabitants to an 
abandoned island further in the Pacific by the British Phosphate Commission and Christmas 
Island Phosphate Commission, as well as the struggle by the dispossessed during the late 20th 
century to obtain redress through the International Court of Justice, clearly indicates 
continuity beyond the one guano era. This is also further demonstrated by the on-going 
attempts by various indigenous Pacific historians to explain the real influence of the 
extraction of guano on their history and existence as part of a larger indigenous history 
project.
29
 Newbury is therefore correct in his assessment that studies which integrate the 
various branches of the trade into a coherent and comprehensive record to allow for 
significant comparisons
 
are crucial to gain a full understanding of the importance of events of 
the past.
30
 An authoritative history of the Cape guano trade is therefore not only an academic 
necessity of value to South Africans, but also for the historiograpichal world at large.  
John Phillips,
31
 Jimmy Skaggs
32
 and Dan O’Donnell33 have argued that the guano trade was 
an integral part of the unfolding of 19th century colonialism and imperialism. This contention 
has been advanced by a previous generation of scholars such as A.J.P. Taylor
34
 and R.W. 
Bixler.
35
 Skaggs, however, specifically concentrated on the manner in which guano and the 
activities of guano entrepreneurs shaped the policy-making process of the United States to 
give rise to what he called a foreign policy of paternalistic intervention and governance. The 
latter is symbolised by active military and political support to local businessmen intent on 
monopolising all available guano resources, whether on rocks, keys or islands. O’Donnell 
agreed with the basic tenets of Skaggs’ argument and proposed that America’s acquisition of 
the offshore island and others overseas was the result of systematic rather than wayward 
policy action. Benton’s view of islands as geographical enclaves and zones of exception 
                                                          
29
 H. Waters, “Historiography of the Pacific: the case of The Cambridge History,” Race & Class 41, no.4 
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relates closely to these debates. In the 19th century scramble for distant colonies, individuals 
and groups of European origin employed various legal practices, ‘seemingly unrelated to 
conquest’, to motivate their actions.36 In order to safeguard their personal interests in the face 
of challenges by their own brethren and the communities’ residing in the occupied territories, 
they used their access to certain strategic decision-makers to secure legal and political 
exceptions to legitimise their presence. This trend has been observed in the international 
guano trade where exceptions to the rule have been used to establish yet another new frontier, 
namely the ‘guano frontier.’37  
Over the last three decades, research into the social history of the guano trade has focussed on 
the exploitation of the Peruvian and Pacific guano labour force, including the Chinese, 
African Americans and Polynesians.
38
 As a result, guano as an animal by-product became the 
arena for displaying the interplay between human emotions (e.g. greed or ambition) and 
action (e.g. entrepreneurship and monopoly control).
39
 Jerolmack’s observation, within the 
context of the actions of certain businessmen involved in the trade, also gave credence to 
Swart’s argument that in the meeting between humans (both individuals and groups) and 
animals (guano-producing seabirds in this case), a process of redefinition, and even new 
identity based on certain power relations, is bound to take place, which is directly related to 
the original encounter.
40
 During the 19
th
 century trade, certain entrepreneurs in the United 
States of America, the Cape Colony, Peru and Australia (Firth’s so-called ‘men of energy and 
persistence’41) became a distinctive group in business circles which Skaggs termed 
‘guanopreneurs’ to distinguish them from other entrepreneurs.42 Ironically, as the 
‘ontological presence’, vitality and materiality’ of seabirds in human affairs was 
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acknowledged,
43
 the repressive relationship between guanopreneurs and their labour force, 
each with a unique labour identity albeit Chinese “coolies,”44 Hawaiian “kanakas”45 or 
Polynesian “Hebredians,”46 was revealed. These racial groups were not only responsible for 
the physical extraction and collection of the commodity, but suffered abuse and annihilation 
whilst the new riches were accumulated at their expense. Due to its repressive and 
exploitative nature, Phillips correctly described this system as representing a new form of 
slavery.
47
  
The guano trade has had a destructive influence on the animal life of the various islands and 
guano exploitation has impacted particular island communities such as the people of Banaba 
(Ocean Island)
48
 and Christmas Island in the Pacific Ocean.
49
 The historical record indicates 
that animal-human relationships have long been a significant subject of study approached 
from a variety of theoretical perspectives. These included studying animals as a source of 
labour, as human companions, as well as from a symbolic-interactionist perspective.
50
 
Anderson argues that human-animal studies (like the present one) challenge the dominant 
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intellectual tradition, which insists that only humans determine history.
51
 As a result, animals 
achieved new moral and cultural meaning and became important participants in human 
affairs. It is quite obvious, therefore, that any serious study of the trade needs to take 
cognisance of the interaction between the guano bird, guanopreneur, politicians and the 
colonial society.  
1.2.2.         The Southern African Literature 
A comprehensive search of the available databases revealed that a smaller but no less 
important local body of secondary sources exists on the exploitation of the guano islands. The 
local sources consist mainly of dated, non-specialised and fragmentary literary works, 
including various contemporary accounts, bio-economical and regional studies, as well as 
some mention in the romantic-historical recreational literature. The greater majority, 
however, are academic articles published in a variety of academic journals. Constructing an 
authoritative account of the local and regional trade in the absence of other benchmark 
studies therefore poses its own particular challenges.  
The earliest published contemporary account of the existence of a substantial source of guano 
on the African guano coast dates back to 1832, namely Benjamin Morrell’s book A narrative 
of four voyages to the South Sea, North and South Pacific Ocean, Chinese Sea, Ethiopic and 
Southern Atlantic Ocean, Indian and Antarctic Ocean from the year 1822 to 1831.
52
 The 
publication owes its status to the fact that it motivated a small group of British citizens to 
investigate the veracity of claims of the existence of a substantial source of alternative guano 
on the southwestern coast of Africa. This was followed by the published accounts of 
Liverpool Master Mariner, Andrew Livingstone, in the nautical magazine, The Mariner’s 
Mirror
53
 and that of an anonymous former member of the first management committee in 
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charge of the exploitation of Ichaboe Island (1845).
54
 These were followed by publications by 
British geologist Thomas Eden
55
 and W.S. Fletcher, former scribe of the first investigative 
commission into the workings of the guano islands under the control of the Cape Guano 
Agency (1897).
56
 These contemporary eyewitness accounts provide the historian with a 
wealth of information about the living and working conditions, interaction and worldview of 
the guano labour force. Given their status as both observers and participants, some of these 
accounts are not objective. This prompted historian Robert Craig to attempt to track down an 
independent record of events based on the Admiralty Archives in Britain, especially the 
narrative of the Ex Member of the Committee of Management on the exploitation of Ichaboe 
during the first “Guano Rush.” Most of the records in question were, however, destroyed by a 
fire.
57
 Much documentary evidence (both published and unpublished) in the form of the 
proceedings and testimonies delivered in the course of various investigative commissions 
during the 19th century are available to compensate for this loss.  
In a century of low output on the topic, J.A.S. Phillips distinguished himself during the 1980s 
as the most productive researcher on the guano trade in Southern Africa.
58
 Prior to this the 
only notable works during the first seventy years were the accounts of A.C. Watson,
59
 Robert 
Craig and Deborah Webb (née Clark)
60
 on the early years and sequential exploitation of the 
islands along the Namibian coast. The only subsequent works were the largely non-analytical 
and non-scientific articles by Lisa Kondor
61
 and A. J. Nathan on the events surrounding the 
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guano rush.
62
  The much more substantive academic article by Lance Van Sittert and Rob 
Crawford, which attempted to make a historical reconstruction of a half century of guano 
production on the islands, is an exception. The latter study is strongly empirical in nature and 
attempts to use historical guano data to develop proxy indices of fish stock abundance and to 
use them as instruments to separate the effects of the environment (for example heavy rain) 
and fishing on guano production.
63
  As a result, little attention has been given to an analysis 
of the social, economic and political dimensions of the local trade. 
 
 Using the journal of the SWA Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft as his platform, Phillips spent 
much intellectual energy investigating the veracity of the historical claims of Morrell (the 
first discoverer of guano) and the involvement of the company, De Pass, Spence & Co.  in the 
broader economic history of Namibia. In addition, work has been done on the German 
colonisation of South West Africa and its subsequent effects. Phillips, like O’Donnell and 
Skaggs, strongly supports the notion of the existence of a firm link between the guano trade 
and the unfolding of the global imperialist agenda in the 19
th
 century. However, they differ 
with regard to the relative importance of guano in the history of international imperialism. 
This particular link will be further explored in Chapters 2 and 4 within the context of the 
construction of a ‘guano frontier’ and the emergence of aggressive American guano 
imperialism respectively. 
The 1983 study by Van Rhyn Greef into the structure, behaviour and performance of the 
South African fertiliser, although an economic rather than socio-political historical analysis, 
offered a fuller understanding of the impact of guano as a commodity on the historical 
development of particular societies and their associated fertiliser traditions.
64
 In addition to 
contextualising guano within particular fertiliser traditions, it also mapped the local guano 
trade within the evolution of the local fertiliser industry. G.J van der Linde, Director of the 
Fertilizer Society of South Africa (FSSA) in 2006, valued the industry at around R3 billion 
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($480 million).
65
  Guano therefore also features prominently in the historical development of 
the larger trade of fertiliser technology.  
The focus on the Namibian part of the guano trade created a critical imbalance in the local 
and regional scholarship on the topic and showcases the limited secondary research on the 
history of the Cape colonial islands. At the same time, it provides undeniable evidence of the 
interdependence and integration of the two sets of islands. The Namibian historian Bridgette 
Lau is in full agreement with this observation and as early 1985 identified various relevant 
archival groups in the Cape Archives that were effectively used during the course of this 
study to reconstruct this integrated past.
66
  
 
From the 1840s to the start of the 20
th
 century the Cape guano trade developed in conjunction 
with the beginnings of what eventually became the process of decolonisation. According to 
Ronald Robinson this process, and especially the progression from full colonial control to 
representative and responsible government, is typically characterised by the need to deal with 
a series of constantly fluctuating political challenges. Furthermore, during this process 
various interest groups (in particular elites) in the colony and mother country constantly 
regrouped in order to negotiate mutually beneficial political and economical agreements.
67
 
These trends have also been observed in the events surrounding the Cape guano trade 
between 1843 – 1910 and stand in stark contrast to Berg and Weaver’s observation, based on 
their analysis of events in Peru, where the guano industry as an economic enclave became a 
key factor in political change, but was negligible in the economic life of the country where it 
also failed to strengthen domestic economic elites.
68
 It is however closer to Gorman’s thesis, 
which argues that guano income did not only provide critical income to the state to 
consolidate its own power, but also assisted the emergence and strengthening of an urban-
based elite who used their networks and patrons to influence the state and use it as an 
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instrument to further its particular interests.
69
 These matters and the shifting social, political 
and economic relationships upon which they were based are discussed in Chapter 4 of this 
study.  
 
The period 1843 – 1910 covers the start, expansion and integration of the trade on the 
colonial and the Namibian islands as well as the unification of the various British Colonies to 
form the Union of South Africa in 1910, when the Cape guano trade effectively became the 
South African trade. During this period the Cape Colony was involved in a struggle for 
representative and responsible government, German colonisation of South West Africa, 
various guano islands commissions and disputes, as well as the promulgation of the 
“Fertilizers Act” (1907).70 The extent to which guano impacted on all of these events and 
processes, as well as their influence on the fate of guano itself, forms the core of this study.  
Little exists on the career activities of local guano personalities and their respective 
companies. This stands in marked contrast to the international situation where a range of 
studies looked at the life and times of prominent guanopreneurs such as W.C. Grace (USA),
71
 
Anthony Gibbs (England)
72
as well as the Australians J.T. Arundel
73
 and A.W.J. Crowther.
74
 
Up to the present time, only the companies De Pass & Co and J.O. Smith & Co.  received 
attention from Rebecca Walker
75
 and Lawlor
76
 respectively. Given its status as a junior 
research paper, Walker’s study naturally is characterised by a lack of in-depth analysis and 
critical engagement with all of the information. However, it gives a good account of the 
nature of the interaction between prominent individuals and groups involved in the trade. 
Walker’s study of the De Pass Family is a good example of the challenges of family history 
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or biography at work. According to Mackenzie, this form of history-writing is open to 
manipulation by its authors who either impose their own emotions and experiences upon the 
subject of their research, or manipulate the life of the subject for present purposes. Such 
histories are also often geared towards recording the successes rather than the failures of 
those under scrutiny.
77
 Although not without merit, the Walker study falls in the latter 
category. The Lawlor study is equally deficient in critical substance and merely provides 
pieces in the construction of the full picture of the life of an individual whose launch of a 
rogue guano operation and counter trade as discussed in Chapter 3 revealed both the absence 
of an Empire-wide guano policy and its complications. It forced the Cape colonial 
government to embark on a policy-writing process in order to codify its approach to the 
exploitation of the guano on islands within its territorial waters. This effectively also assisted 
other guano-mining colonies such as Australia and New Zealand, which became important 
nodes in the diffusion of the guano frontier as explained in Chapter 2 of this study. 
Whereas former chartered companies with guano interests, such as Lever Brothers, evolved 
into modern multinational entities, most of the local guano companies are defunct. Research 
into these now non-existent companies and their former structures, functions, relationships 
and failures is still valuable. Salmon in particular contends that by focussing on all of the 
aforementioned aspects, a deeper understanding of an important period in world history is 
achieved.
78
 Furthermore, by studying less successful companies, new insights with regard to 
company evolution could be gained since many of the now defunct companies used to be 
pioneers of particular trades.
79
 Through this research, which studies the life and operations of 
former entities such as De Pass, Spence & Co. and Granger & Co. new information is 
unearthed to shed light on a series of events of historical significance, both in terms of their 
impact on local events and contribution to world history. 
As mentioned earlier, research into the life and experiences of the Peruvian and Pacific guano 
labour force, including the Chinese, African Americans and Polynesians, increased to provide 
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a comprehensive literature on the difficulties associated with the exploitation of the magic 
fertiliser. Local studies in this regard are non-existent, with accounts of the local labour 
regime under successive colonial governments and private companies still largely 
unresearched. Local historians could therefore not yet offer a counter argument or support the 
observation made by Phillips that the labour practices of the guano trade in fact represented a 
new form of slavery. Given South Africa’s own history of slavery, this dimension into the 
guano narrative has intrinsic value and warrants new research, especially into subjects such as 
labour resistance and government intervention. The nature of the Cape guano labour regime 
is discussed in Chapter 6 and supports the argument offered by Phillips. 
The colonial guano trade opened a new chapter in the history of conservation of marine 
animals, including fish and seabirds.
80
 The promulgation of legislation such as the Game Act 
(1886), Fish Protection Act (Act 15 of 1893) and the South Africa Act (1910), as well as the 
appointment of officials like the Colonial Marine Biologist (1896) and the Colonial 
Ornithologist (1904) formally provided for the conservation of fish and game. In this way the 
Cape Colony took active steps to manage its environment and natural resources more 
scientifically. The Cape guano trade developed parallel to a 19th century colonial science and 
the establishment of a local scientific community.
81
  
Various bio-economic studies
82
 as well as a number of regional histories
83
 tend to replicate 
the mistake observed in the mainstream historiography of restricting the ‘guano era’ to the 
Peruvian episode. In addition, the guano trade was treated as a single event of short duration 
with little or no connection to the international trade or the 21st century world. Furthermore, 
these studies remain firmly stuck in the old paradigm of treating humans and non-humans as 
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distinctly separate entities with no interaction or reciprocal influence on each other. This 
thesis offers to redress this insularity by placing the Peruvian trade within the context of a 
shifting guano frontier with trans-national features. The events outlined during the course of 
this investigation, especially its undeniable presence in Cape, Oceanic and American history 
and politics right into the 21
st
 century, effectively countered the idea of the trade being of 
short duration. The emergence of a new category of entrepreneurs (the so-called 
‘guanopreneurs’) and the opposing labour identity of ‘coolies’ and their relationships 
effectively brings animals and birds together as co-producers of history. Given the nature of 
bio-economic studies, it also made the critical mistake of viewing the guano trade as a mere 
extension of the fishing industry. In the process, the trade’s contribution to the historical 
development of the Cape Colony and the imperial world is neglected and underestimated. 
During the course of this study, the role of guano in international and colonial politics, 
agriculture and labour history is outlined to reveal its influence beyond the fishing industry. 
The late Lawrence Green, former editor of the Cape Argus and prolific author of 42 books 
covering various local and regional topics including the guano or bird islands, is undoubtedly 
the most important writer in the leisure literary category as far as the guano past is 
concerned.
84
 Writing in the early idiom of what has subsequently became known as 
“People’s History”, he skilfully combined oral testimony obtained from former guano 
workers and archival research to reconstruct the island past and presented it in an enjoyable 
narrative form. Although he mostly succeeded in providing a factual account of the guano 
past based on actual archival research,
85
 the end-result is frequently overshadowed by a lack 
of proper referencing of primary resources and over-romanticism of events and characters. As 
a result, and notwithstanding the literary value of his work and its strong focus on the 
individual and highly romanticized collective life of its subjects, none of his publications can 
be regarded as scientific historical writing. Furthermore, most of his writing displayed 
characteristics of what Laracy called the sojourner literature which, like tourism brochures 
and coffee table publications, frequently portrays islands as earthly paradises covered in a 
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institution in the United States of America due to a lack of interest from local universities. J. Yates Benyon & H. 
Snyders, Personal Communication (January, 1995) 
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 Kaapse Argief Bewaarplek (forthwith KAB): Central Archives Division (forthwith CAD), 2/1/1/63: C14/ 117:  
Assistant Chief Archivist – R. W. Rand, 24/9/1948 
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“sexy, rosy glow”86 or as ideal places for opportunists, escapists, “explorers of the mind and 
emotions” or the ideal destinations for those individuals in search of quixotic adventure.87 As 
a result, new myths are created that tend to obscure the complex interplay of a variety of 
underlying processes and forces.  
1.3.     The Primary Sources  
Given the lack of an authoritative history of the trade, this thesis must break fresh ground in 
pioneering a socio-political perspective of the Cape trade, based largely on primary sources 
and public records housed under various archive groups such as Government House (G.H.), 
Colonial Office (C.O.), Department of Agriculture (AGR), Public Works Department (PWD), 
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Government Guano Island Service (GIS), Lands of the Cape 
Colony (LND), Treasury (T), Cape Provincial Administration: Secretariat Nature 
Conservation & Fisheries (PAN) and Native Affairs (NA)
88
 in the various main depots of the 
South African National Archive Services. In addition, much valuable information is 
contained in published contemporary sources such as the official reports of Select 
Committees of the Colonial Government and reports submitted to the colonial legislature. 
The archive group Colonial Office (C.O.) is by far the largest group and contains 
correspondence received by the Cape Governor and the Colonial Secretary from various 
departments, committees and private individuals, foreign governments, agents, missionaries 
and miscellaneous bodies. As far as the guano trade is concerned, the 4000 series in particular 
contained numerous memorials, petitions, complaints and general reports from a wide range 
of private individuals, customs officials, local merchants and ship captains. These documents 
included petitions for the right to collect guano on the Cape territorial islands, claims for 
discoverers rights, protection for their rights of occupancy against potential opponents as well 
as complaints about perceived unfair treatment from the side of the Colonial Government. 
                                                          
86P. Pirie, “Untangling the myths and realities of fertility and mortality in the Pacific Islands,” Asia- Pacific 
Population Journal (June, 2000): 8. 
87
 H. Laracy, “Quixotic and Utopian”: American adventurers in the Southwest Pacific, 1897 – 1895”, Pacific 
Studies 24 (1/2), (March/June, 2001): 39 – 40. 
88B. Lau, “Sources for the Study of Namibian History in the Cape Archives Depot, 1780 – 1910” S.A. 
Argiefjaarblad, (1985). (Provides a useful overview of some of the most important archival record groups with 
regard to the history of the guano era along the Namibian coast, see footnote 66.) 
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Given the lack of a formal Cape Guano policy, these documents form the basis of a new 
policy process that led to the promulgation of the Cape Guano Ordinance of 1845.  
The Cape Governor and the Office of the Secretary of State were primarily responsible for 
managing British policy and actual governance of the Cape Colony. Thus the archive group 
Government House (G.H.) contained the official correspondence between London (the 
metropolis) and Cape Town (the colonial outpost) and therefore serve as the best source of 
information on the relationship between the two entities concerning matters of policy and 
governance. As such, the first official communication from members of the first management 
Committee with regard to the African Guano Rush on Ichaboe and the establishment of a new 
guano frontier along the Namib coast is to be found within this particular group (GH1/161). It 
also deals with the relationship between the Cape Colony and the metropolis around key 
policy issues such as official consultation, transfer of commitments and unauthorised 
spending on guano loading infrastructure in order to provide infrastructure at the offshore 
islands within its area of jurisdiction (GH.23/15). This group also contains significant 
material on the relationship between Germany and Great Britain, especially with regard to 
issues such as the Angra Pequena Joint Claims Commission (GH 21/17 – 21/21). Claims 
related to British subjects in the territory and the future of the guano islands north of the 
Orange River (1884- 1886) and the Cape Colony and German South West Africa colonial 
authorities over issues such as the treatment of indigenous groups used as guano labour on 
the nearby offshore islands (GH 35/32). 
Prior to 1890 the guano islands within the territorial waters of the Cape Colony were 
administered as crown territories and therefore information on them resorts under the archive 
group Lands of the Cape Colony (LND). With the annexation of the islands along the Namib 
coast they were placed under the same jurisdiction. With the appointment of a Government 
Guano Agent in 1890, the islands were placed under the administrative control of the 
Department of Crown Lands & Public Works. In the wake of a negative report on the 
treatment of the guano labour force and the local farmers’ growing demand for cheap guano, 
all the islands were placed under the colonial Department of Agriculture headed by the 
Superintendent of Government Guano Islands and accountable to the Minister and the 
Colonial Legislature. These transfers and new systems created a substantial source of 
information, which enables the researcher to map the evolution of the government guano 
University of Stellenbosch http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 29 
 
system from distant dependencies exploited by private entrepreneurs to a state-controlled 
government exploitation system accountable to the colonial legislature. 
Due to the remote location of the guano islands, guano diggers and leaseholders interacted 
closely with the indigenous population, especially in German South West Africa. The 
Colonial Office therefore regularly received correspondence from a variety of individuals, 
groups and claimants about trade, interaction with local leaders, inspections and the political 
situation. A large proportion of this information is housed within the archive group of Native 
Affairs, which assisted the research on the racial dimensions of the interaction between the 
guano labour force and local people of a different ethnic origin. 
The official records of the Cape Colony, both published and unpublished, constitute an 
important additional source of information on the guano islands. The proceedings of the 
various Select Committees (1861,
89
 1896,
90
 1899,
91
 and 1907
92
) generated large volumes of 
original testimony from the ranks of guano diggers and headmen as well as civil servants and 
other knowledgeable persons. The proceedings also provide a very important insider-
perspective on life on the islands. This is further supplemented by annual reports from the 
various line departments submitted to the colonial legislature as part of the political oversight 
process. In addition, vital information is contained in resources such as the debates recorded 
in the Cape Hansard and the Votes and Proceedings of both the House of Assembly and 
Legislative Council. Equally valuable sources such as the various Government Gazettes 
carried important announcements and notices related to the guano trade (i.e. new regulations, 
tender opportunities, the state of the shipping, system arrangements or a call for witnesses to 
assist the proceedings of the various Select Committees). 
                                                          
89
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Witnesses on various occasions also wrote and published articles on aspects of the guano 
trade in literary magazines such as the Cape Literary Magazine and Chambers’ Journal. In 
addition, some of the major participants in the unfolding guano drama on occasion used 
contemporary newspapers such as the Commercial Advertiser, Ons Land, The Cape of Good 
Hope & Port Natal Shipping and Mercantile Gazette, and the Cape Times to promote their 
own causes. The ensuing polemics and public response to this correspondence constitute 
important sources of information that provided this thesis with important insights in into the 
fundamental understanding of the trade and its various dimensions. 
1.4.         Conclusion  
Southern African voices have been oddly silent in an on-going conversation about guano 
internationally. This study uses a variety of theoretical approaches such as island, frontier, 
social and labour theory and the conventional political-economical lens to draw South 
African history into this conversation. As indicated, the availability of an abundance of 
primary resource material in the local archives and a dramatic growth in the number of 
secondary studies about various aspects of the international guano trade makes it possible to 
add a distinctly South African and African voice to this international conversation. Such a 
voice, if properly attuned to the nuances of the various strands of the debate (ranging from 
guano imperialism, labour history and resistance to guano, shifting frontiers and the modern 
polity) have the potential to contribute fundamentally to the existing pool of knowledge about 
a critical period in the history of humanity in general and South Africa in particular. It also 
contributes to broadening the on-going discussion about the meaning of animals (such as the 
guano-producing seabird) in human history as well as contributing substantially to the 
exploration of human impact on the environment and recording change over time. In 
addition, this study contributes to the discourse about the nature, characteristics and 
designation of historical time. It particularly challenges the notion of the Peruvian Guano Age 
as the period of significance in world history. The evidence, as this thesis demonstrates, 
indicated that the latter merely represents a distinct period in the life of one nation and that 
the legacy of the international guano trade continues to be felt well into the 21
st
 century. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FROM PERU TO ICHABOE –THE DYNAMICS OF A SHIFTING GUANO 
FRONTIER, 1840 – 1845 
2.1.     Introduction  
Since the formulation of Frederick J. Turner’s original thesis on frontiers, and due to his 
insistence on the flexibility of the term ‘frontier’, variations on the theme  (medieval,1 
hunting
2
 and crayfish frontiers) were formulated.
3
 This has contributed to the invigoration 
and evolution of the term.
4
 Within the last decade, Stewart Firth formally introduced the 
notion of a ‘guano frontier’5, with reference to the activities of governments, guano 
entrepreneurs (guanopreneurs) and guano diggers in an area stretching from the west coast of 
Peru, via the south-western coasts of Africa and up to the north-eastern peak of Australia as 
indicated on the composite map (Map 1) below. The frontier in question is defined as an 
extra-European territory penetrated by merchants, shipmasters, shipping agents and other 
entrepreneurs intent on exploiting guano.  
The frontier as a historiograpichal term is loaded with meaning. In this chapter, the argument 
is put forward that guano production not only generated its own economical and political 
frontier but, in addition to its geographical dimensions, also changed what guano implied for 
human society. These issues contribute to a broader understanding of the notion of ‘frontier’. 
One example is the idea that a commercial frontier might not necessarily involve concomitant 
settlement given the harsh physical features and lack of life-sustaining resources on some of 
the African islands. Another idea approaches frontiers as places of exchange of sophisticated 
culture and knowledge rather than merely areas of rough ignorance. This chapter also aims to 
                                                          
1
 C. J. Bishko. “The Frontier in Medieval History.” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Historical Association, Mayflower Hotel, Washington D.C., (29 December, 1955)  
2
 R. Wagner. “Zoutpansberg: The dynamics of a Hunting Frontier.” S. Marks & A. Atmore (eds.). Economy and 
Society in Pre- Industrial South Africa, (New York: Longman, 1980) 
3
 L. Van Sittert. “Labour, Capital and the State in the St. Helena Bay Fisheries, c.1856 – c. 1956. Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, (University of Cape Town, 1992) 
4
 J. Adelman & S. Aron.“From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in 
North American History”, The American Historical Review 104(3), 1999; 
 <http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/104.3/ah000814.html>;(19/12/2007) 
5
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add to a broader understanding of ongoing studies of the ‘frontier’ as a historiographical 
concept. 
 
 
MAP 1: THE 19
TH
 CENTURY GUANO FRONTIER
6
 
 
 
                                                          
6
.  
Maps 
 prepared by Marius Mostert, Chief Information officer at Saldanha Bay Municipality.  The map of the  
    Pacific Ocean used in the composite map is taken from Barry Mcdonald  & Maslyn Williams. The 
Phosphateers: A History of the British Phosphate Commissioners and the Christmas Island Phosphate 
Commission (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1985)  
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McCrone is of the opinion that frontiers are both isolated and a meeting point of peoples, 
societies and cultures. Frontiers are therefore also characterised by “accommodation between 
invaders and indigenes and the hybrid residuals of these encounters.”7 Furthermore, all 
frontiers have forces and a “political community as a community of masters”8 to ensure 
proper interrelationships. The basic social unit of the frontier in the 19
th
 century was 
individualised organised groupings supplemented by an agent of authority to deal with 
disputes involving differences with external groups which also served as “one’s own fighting 
group” when the nearby colony could not offer frontier defence or resistance from deviants.9 
Historians Dan O’ Donnell and Christine Duffy Burnett described American actions with 
regard to the guano islands in the Pacific Ocean as actions in imperialistic border extension
10
 
and attempts at better border management.
11
 For the purposes of this study, Adelman and 
Aron’s definition of frontiers as “borderless lands” and areas of interaction that allowed for 
both mixing and accommodation will be used.
12  
2.2. From Resource Location to the Emergence of the Guano Frontier – 1800 - 1840 
The guano frontier originated as a resource location on the west coast of Peru as a result of a 
fertiliser tradition based on the use of the excrement of gannets, cormorants, penguins and 
pelicans for the improvement of land used for the cultivation of crops and staples such maize, 
potatoes, edible roots and legumes.
13
 The Peruvian Inca in particular collected substantial 
volumes of bird faeces (guano) from the nearby offshore islands of Lobos, Guanape and 
Chincha on the west coast near Lima and within its territorial waters. Using innovative 
irrigation methods and a system of guano fertilisation they succeeded in achieving high crop 
yields on land fertilised in this way and were able to enjoy a high level of food security based 
                                                          
7
  Adelman &  Aron,“From Borderlands to Borders”  
8
 M. Legassick, “The frontier in South African historiography.” S. Marks & A. Atmore (eds.), Economy and 
Society in Pre- Industrial South Africa, (New York: Longman, 1980), 50 
9
  Legassick, “The frontier in South African historiography”: 60 
10
 O’Donnell,“The Pacific Guano Islands: The Stirring of American Empire in the Pacific Ocean,” Pacific 
Studies  16, no. 1 (March, 1993) 
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Quaterly 57, no.3 (2005)  
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on a food surplus of between 3 – 7 years.14 Given the close connection established between 
food security and guano, the product became a fundamental part of the cultural and religious 
life of the Inca and the resource most closely associated with their mythical rebirth as a 
people. Central to this process were the bird gods, Waman Kantax and Urpay Huachac (“she 
who gives birth to birds”), the mystic mother of both birds and coastal people and in whose 
nests (“quillairaca” or “silver vaginas of the moon”) both are reborn.15 On the Mazorka 
Island on the coast of Huacho, north of Lima, they also built a “waka” and altars to worship 
and make sacrificial offerings of young maidens to the Bird God.  
 
Due to the centrality of guano both in its culture and religion, Inca society protected rather 
than traded the resource.
16
 To protect their way of life and the knowledge that underpinned it, 
they formulated a range of special measures, rules and an appropriate penal code to outlaw 
disturbance of the birds, egg theft, trespassing and unauthorised entry to the islands during 
the breeding season. In addition to declaring these transgressions capital crimes, a 
comprehensive management system was institutionalised in the days before Spanish 
conquest, which provided for the supervised collection, distribution and utilisation of the 
product to the benefit of all sectors of society (including orphans, the poor, widows, the 
disabled and families of conscripted soldiers).
17
 These measures were enforced with ruthless 
efficiency. Odell & Preston also labelled the general management system as imperialistic.
18
 
  
Giezen argues that myths (including those connected with guano and sea birds) such as those 
observed in different island communities, are vital mechanisms for understanding the manner 
in which identities were formed in the past and are understood in the present.
19
 Particular 
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rituals are important mechanisms for the spiritual renewal of their practitioners, their relatives 
and the earth in all its facets. This process of renewal brought about a wide-ranging feeling of 
social harmony amongst people and between people and nature.
20
 The various forms of 
religion and rituals also helped communities to give expression to the different gods, spirits 
and forces supposedly controlling the human world.
21
 Clearly, the meaning of guano for such 
societies differed substantially from what it came to mean for the 19
th
 century Western 
societies, namely a tradable commodity and a means to wealth accumulation. The Peruvian 
guano islands were therefore much more than a physical boundary, but rather an indicator of 
the means central to the survival of a whole civilisation. Within this context, Guano therefore 
also signified a distinctive people, their place, and their culture. 
 
The transformation of guano into a commodity and the resource frontier into an economic 
and political frontier is directly attributable to new advances in the science of plant nutrition 
(literally a shift in the knowledge frontier) in the 19
th
 century. Before the 19
th
 century, most 
farmers and agronomists lacked a full understanding of the chemical basis of soil depletion.
22
 
Through centuries of trial and error they accumulated a substantial body of indigenous 
knowledge on soil management techniques to prevent erosion and restore the growth capacity 
of soil.
23
 The general neglect of the soil across geo-climatic zones,
24
 coupled with centuries 
of over-exploitation, cultivation of soil-depleting single crops and the use of unsustainable 
agricultural practices (including shorter fallowing periods and fewer crop rotations) resulted 
in an environmental fertility crisis. The crisis was directly attributable to farmers or farming 
communities and providers of agricultural credit who demanded a quick guaranteed return on 
their investments. Within the context of agriculture in the South American states, Taylor 
appropriately named them the unrealistic “time-merchants.”25 With little recourse to open 
land, overexploitation led to new waves of soil erosion and the creation of extremely 
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“depauperate environments.”26 By the dawn of the 19th century and for most of the period, 
widespread environmental infertility and adverse climatic conditions (such as droughts and 
harsh winters) combined to create global “climates of hunger”27 manifested by a series of 
disastrous trans-continental crop failures and famines.
28
    
 
Driven by the emotional and social effects of famine, the pressure to produce more under the 
right conditions led to an increased demand for fertilisers. Since no ideal fertiliser existed at 
the time and progress with the manufacturing of chemical alternatives was slow, most 
societies were stuck with their traditional soil enhancement practices and fertilisers such as 
animal dung, potash, lime and crushed bone to improve farmland. Over the period 1815 – 
1842 England imported nearly 21 000 tons of bone for the manufacture of chemical fertiliser 
for crushing into a more soluble state. By the 1840s, as a result of important breakthroughs in 
the field of plant nutrition, guano replaced bones as the farmer’s fertiliser of choice. During 
the first decade of the 19
th
 century, some of Europe’s leading chemists such as Martin 
Klaproth and Fourcroy revealed the nitrogen and phosphate richness, solubility and suitability 
of seabird guano for both heavy and light soil types (based on samples provided by German 
scientist Alexander von Humboldt).
29
 Possibly as a result of inconclusive experimental 
results of the early analyses as well as a lack of understanding of the real value of the soil-
restoring properties of the product amongst farmers,
30
 this knowledge initially remained 
confined to the scientific community and the pages of its journals.
31
 After University of 
Durham Professor Johnston reconfirmed guano’s rich chemical composition in the 1840s, the 
first building block in the commoditisation of guano was positioned. For the product to 
embark on its final journey towards a saleable product and for the guano frontier to finally 
emerge, a change was needed in the meaning of the product for Peruvian society (the 
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successor of the now destroyed Inca civilisation). The dynamics of this process form the basis 
of the next discussion.  
2.3. Concessions, Shifting Meaning and the Emergence of the Peruvian Guano 
Frontier  
The Peruvian guano island group consisted of an estimated 84 islands providing a nesting 
area of approximately 8116 hectares and a home for 18 different seabird species.
32
 During the 
colonial period the Spanish colonists largely ignored guano and saw no real economic value 
for the product.
33
 Instead they preferred to fertilise their sugar plantations with the manure of 
free-range animals combined with the traditional system of crop rotation and fallowing.
34
 The 
only seemingly useful product of the guano bird was its egg shells, which were crushed for 
use in strengthening building mortar.
35
 However, knowledge of guano did leave the shores of 
Peru. Guano and related products were known in the Netherlands in the 17th century.
36
 This 
is borne out by the Dutch colonists. Soon after the colonisation of South Africa in the mid 
17th century by the Dutch, Jan van Riebeeck’s men were sent to collect guano from the off-
shore islands near the Cape coast for farming purposes, as discussed in this and the next 
chapter.  
 
The first observable shift in the meaning of guano for Peruvian society occurred during the 
era of Spanish rule when small-scale domestic trading in guano by some of the locals was 
permitted. As such it was detached from its original role and status where it was intimately 
connected with the survival of the Inca civilisation For the rest, all other trading activities 
were restricted to European-born Spaniards who were in possession of the required trading 
licences and who had access to a boat. The early guano traders were thus denied an 
opportunity to export their product and to cultivate a foreign market. By July 1830, having 
won independence, the military authorities exempted the internal trade from paying custom 
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dues in order to aid local farmers.
37
 In this way guano became merely an aid to local 
agriculture and a commodity with no connection to the cultural well-being of the nation.  
 
In the immediate post-independence phase local and foreign entrepreneurs in Peru, such as 
Barriolhet, Aquilles Allier and the British company of Gibbs & Crawley, who had long 
observed the successful domestic use of guano, recognized the potential commercial value of 
the product. This critical shift in awareness was at the heart of a process to scientifically 
determine the potential market value of a product that had never been fully tested 
commercially. In order to have guano scientifically tested, the parties in 1837 – 1838 
provided guano samples to their overseas business partners for experimentation and 
analysis.
38
 When Johnston confirmed guano’s rich chemical composition and its ability to 
stimulate plant growth, he literally formulated a new meaning for guano and began the race to 
obtain monopoly concessionary rights. This race and the political manoeuvring of the 
principal actors that characterised this phase not only hastened the full international 
commoditisation of the product, but also contributed to the shaping of the subsequent African 
guano trade that followed in the mid 1840s. It is therefore necessary to broadly look at events 
in Peru before the evolution of the guano frontier is discussed further. 
The process of obtaining a guano concession from the post-independence Peruvian 
government was fraught with difficulties. Based on their experience of exclusion under 
Spanish rule, a protectionist alliance of Consulado (shopkeepers, agriculturists and artisans) 
and Caudillos (military leaders) was severely opposed to economic liberalization and any 
further foreign control of the economy after centuries of Spanish rule.
39
 They supported 
indigenisation of the economy. The military regime of General Gammarra, however, was 
burdened by multiple challenges ranging from a crippling foreign debt of at least £1,82 
million sterling,
40
 a poor credit status, internal political divisions, and a lack of a unifying 
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national vision.
41
 The regime was also in dire need of new sources of income in order to 
consolidate the newly independent state. Despite its preference for indigenous control over 
the economy, the local business elite possessed neither the capital nor access to sufficient 
credit as a result of an under-developed banking system. The military regime itself was 
dependent on emergency loans, custom duties, and a head tax in order to keep itself afloat. To 
complicate matters, the pressure for further political reform increased exponentially. Against 
this background Gammarra’s regime had to take political action, which fundamentally and 
irrevocably changed the meaning that Peruvian society and its predecessors had attached to 
guano for centuries. 
In order to obtain the greatest advantage from a potential guano concession and appease its 
different constituencies, in November 1840 the military regime opted for a strategic 
compromise and awarded an exclusive six-year concession to a multi-national consortium of 
British and Peruvian businessmen for an estimated amount of £12 million sterling or 60 000 
pesos, payable in three instalments.
42
 This was soon extended to nine years after payment of 
an additional 30 000 pesos. The first guanopreneurs thus secured a potentially lucrative 
monopoly at a very low input cost, based on a new understanding of the potential value and 
meaning of the guano resource.  
Given the condition of the post liberation state in Peru, political instability severely limited 
the lifespan of successive governments and directly impacted on the future of state 
agreements such as the guano concession. When the Gammarra-regime was deposed, the new 
government of General Menéndes cancelled and withdrew the guano concession on 27 
February 1841. In addition, the offshore guano islands were formally nationalised in 
December 1841. This effectively brought into existence the first formal guano frontier, which 
was both geographic and political in nature. It also disrupted the regular supply to European 
countries in general and to Great Britain in particular. 
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Given the regime’s own lack of knowledge of the exploitation of the resource, managing the 
resource as a government enterprise under uncertain political conditions proved nearly 
impossible. As a result, a new short-term concession with extensive preconditions was 
awarded. In terms of the new 12 month contract, the concessionaires were responsible for all 
entrepreneurial functions (collection, shipping, marketing and sales) under a new 
consignment dispensation. Furthermore, they had to pay the bulk of their consignment sales 
over to the Peruvian state. To ensure full compliance with the terms of the new concession, 
the Peruvian authorities instituted various monitoring mechanisms, including a system of 
special consuls at harbours to inspect the cargo and to issue sailing instructions.
43
 These 
conditions added further time delays to the export and sale of the product. In return, the 
concession holders were entitled to an unlimited supply of free guano to cover their 
operational costs.
44
 Finding themselves in a situation of “obsolescing bargaining power”, 
there was very little that either guano concessionaires or commercial farmers could do to 
reverse the situation.
45
  
 
As a result of their tenuous hold on the concession, the consortium hastened the process of 
finalising the full commoditisation of guano. To build a client base, they appointed the UK-
based company MacDonald & Co. as marketer, distributed free samples to interested parties 
for experimentation and employed consulting chemists to give talks and demonstrations in 
order to lend scientific credibility to their marketing claims. As a direct result of these efforts, 
guano volumes in the period 1841 – 1842 increased substantially from 2881 tons to 20,398 
tons.
46
 However, this was not enough to safeguard the concession since it was once again 
cancelled in early 1842, much to the frustration of the commercial farming sector. Continued 
political instability also compromised the third concession, which was awarded on 18 
February 1842. Against this background, the English Royal Agricultural Society offered a 
prize of £1000 for the discovery of “an acceptable substitute” for this unsatisfactory 
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situation.
47
 Guano had clearly acquired new meaning for industrialised Great Britain and her 
commercial farming sector.  
 
The seemingly arbitrary manner in which the various guano concessions were cancelled must 
be seen in context. Given the continued domestic strife and instability faced by the various 
Peruvian governments, income from guano sales became a critical resource for the various 
successor regimes. It also freed the military regimes from dependence on a restless electorate 
and its various pressure groups. As sole owner of the islands the income derived from guano 
exploitation provided the various regimes with a firm grip on national affairs.
48
 Through this 
sectarian usage, guano was finally and firmly detached from its original roots and became a 
servant of power politics and its associated ideologies. Following the cancellation and re-
awarding of the fourth guano concession during 1842, tensions within the ranks of the 
concessionaries heightened and eventually became divisive. Gibbs, Crawley & Co. supported 
a reduction in sales prices as well as the implementation of a uniform pricing system in order 
to attract more business and to hasten the transition to guano fertilisation. The other members 
of the consortium, however, favoured price variation and credit sales at a higher rate in order 
to obtain the maximum financial return.
49
 Against this background, in July 1843 the world 
was informed that a new guano source was discovered on the island of Ichaboe on the 
southwest coast of Africa, in an area unclaimed by any sovereign nation. The geographic 
guano frontier as a production frontier with its origins in Peru and driven by the needs of 
British agriculture for a cheaper fertiliser, thus formally shifted across the Atlantic as 
indicated in Map 2 below. This illustrates that frontiers are temporary and sensitive to both 
natural and political factors.  
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MAP 2: THE SHIFTING GEOGRAPHICAL AND PRODUCTION FRONTIER 
50
  
 
2.4.  The Dynamics of the Ichaboe Guano Frontier, 1843 – 1845 
 
The discovery of an alternative guano source unsettled a wide range of direct stakeholders in 
the Peruvian trade, including the concession holders, investors in guano shares and the 
original financiers of the war of independence.
51
  They feared that this new discovery would 
undermine the still embryonic market and that an over-supply of guano of an undetermined 
quality would result in lower prices and therefore negligible returns on their substantial 
investments. These fears were justified since unclaimed territories invariably turned out to be 
anarchical. This turn of events was therefore a direct threat to their collective wealth and 
necessitated urgent action to prevent and counter the establishment of an alternative and 
uncontrolled trade. Taking action, however, proved to be extremely difficult as the discovery 
was located in “no-man’s-land”. Matters were also further complicated by reluctance and 
caution in official circles with regard to new territorial expansion and its associated 
expenditure. The British government not only followed a policy of non-interference with 
regard to monopolies, but the English Royal Agricultural Society actively supported efforts to 
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find alternative guano sources to the benefit of British farming.
52
 The guanopreneurs were 
thus in a very poor bargaining position. With few alternatives left, a desperate attempt for 
relief was launched through the courts but proved unsuccessful and left the first 
guanopreneurs with no alternative but to participate on an equal footing in the new guano 
rush.
53
 
 
2.4.1.     From Naming and Claiming to Anarchy  
 
The existence of guano on Ichaboe along the Namib coast was well known amongst British 
seamen, given their frequent visits to that part of Africa.
54
 Located on the fringes of the 
polity, this area potentially carried the seeds of an anarchic frontier where the survival of the 
strongest would prevail. The guano trade was first placed on a new trajectory when Andrew 
Livingstone, a Liverpool Master Mariner who closely followed the growing interests in 
guano fertiliser in Britain, with the financial backing of businessmen John Rae and Norman 
Macleod, initiated a secret investigative expedition to verify claims attributed to American 
shipmaster Benjamin Morrell of the existence of a substantial source of guano on the obscure 
island of Ichaboe along the Namib coast. The objective behind this venture was to secure a 
new guano monopoly free from the control of the Peruvian monopolists. Having overcome 
navigational obstacles, the crew of the ship “Ann” confirmed the accuracy of the claims in 
February 1843. The initiating parties found themselves standing on the threshold of potential 
substantial wealth. All they had to do was to transform their secret knowledge into a 
successful commercial venture. With this objective in mind, Livingstone tried to raise further 
finance by issuing shares in a public company.
55
 However, the temptation to derive 
maximum advantage and sole benefits proved too strong for Livingstone’s partners. 
  
Enticed by the possibility of securing sole benefits (by claiming first mover advantage) James 
Rae, son of one of the original financiers, and Francis Farr, one of the shipmasters in the 
expeditionary fleet, outmanoeuvred Livingston by publicly attaching their names to a newly 
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discovered island (presumably Ichaboe) as a means to establish first official claims to the 
source.
56
 The critical element in a political manoeuvre for advantage, according to Edelman, 
is the creation of meaning or the construction of beliefs about the significance of events, 
problems and persons. The act of naming and claiming is therefore a crucial and necessary 
mechanism to achieve strategic objectives or outwit the opposition, mobilise the necessary 
support and allocate of benefits.
57
 The fact that the partners failed to inform Livingstone 
about their intentions and acted unilaterally to secure the spoils for themselves, illustrates a 
classical case of anarchic frontier behaviour. These actions effectively terminated the initial 
partnership and prematurely ended the first proposed African guano monopoly. It also 
ensured that the “Livingstone Initiative” became the first victim of the new guano frontier 
before it was even formally established. This indicated that despite contextual differences, 
most frontiers contained certain anarchic features that would impact on the dynamics of a 
particular situation. The island of Ichaboe and its neighbouring islands (pictured in composite 
Map 3 below), the new node in the guano frontier, then set the scene for unfolding events that 
followed the transcontinental shift of the frontier.   
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MAP 3: ICHABOE AND NEIGHBOURING ISLANDS 
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2.4.2. Frontier Dichotomies: Anarchy, Accommodation and the ‘Lettered Frontier’  
 
Following the failure of the Livingston Initiative, the rush for guano freight from Ichaboe 
resumed in earnest. Most of the early arrivals were ill-prepared and lacked reliable 
information about the exact location of the island and its geography as well as the type of 
equipment needed for effective exploitation of the resource. They could therefore not turn 
first-mover advantage into monopoly control. The second wave of arrivals, however, was not 
only better prepared but also demonstrated an advanced understanding of the requirements 
for the efficient organisation, collection and dispatch of guano. In its ranks were shipmasters, 
supercargoes and charterers of British vessels.
58
 Whether they were members of the Peruvian 
consortium and its trading network or guano bondholders is not clear. A close analysis of 
their modus operandi, especially their actions with regard to naming the first management 
structure to control guano collection and claiming for themselves the right to speak on behalf 
of the whole island community, strongly suggested that this might have been the case. The 
establishment of a controlling structure can also be regarded as the first monopolistic action 
of the African trade and indicative of what was to come.  
 
The leader group, consisting of at least twenty shipmasters, organised themselves into a 
special management body, called the Committee of Shipmasters and Others (forthwith COSO 
or Committee) assisted by a secretary with a view to control all guano loading activities on 
Ichaboe. The committee also adopted a distinctive flag and a coat of arms.
59
 They then 
appointed two of their founding members, one Captain Benjamin Wade, the shipmaster of the 
Douglas as “arbiter of claims and injuries”, allocator of guano pits and harbour master60 and 
Captain Burnett of the Rival, as committee secretary.
61
 Wade’s first task was to establish, 
albeit without the prerequisite legal or political mandate, a new (guano) frontier on 11 
November 1843 by declaring British sovereignty over Ichaboe under the pretext of protecting 
their national commercial interests.
62
 In order to place the exploitation of the resource on a 
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sound footing, a system of special work teams instead of sailors for digging and loading 
guano and a system of supervision through supercargoes to ensure the correct loading of 
ships according to demarcated loading zones was introduced. Furthermore, the practice of a 
free-for-all collection of guano had to give way to a system of individual “guano pits.” This 
brought a sense of order to the working arrangements and contributed to a faster loading rate. 
To strengthen the system and to ensure general compliance with the new loading 
arrangements, the Committee used their superior navigational skills and strategically 
employed the natural obstacles such as the surf, ocean depth, seaweed volumes and the state 
of the ocean floor to monopolise the best areas on the eastern and northern side of the islands 
for the erection of special loading stages.
63
 They also adopted a set of rules to regulate 
loading and the assignment of pits, confident in the knowledge that Ichaboe was an island 
“untrammelled by custom-house or other regulations” other than their own, “where no lords 
of the soil could interfere to claim a purchase-money.”64   
Given the detailed nature of the actions of the Committee, the question arises as to the 
significance and political meaning of introducing a coat of arms and appointing of a harbour 
master. A Coat of Arms is a general feature of the nation state and a symbol of its political 
authority. According to Richard Mohr, the meaning of coats of arms may also best be 
understood by their history, by the political contests to which they are enlisted, and by their 
impacts within particular social settings. As such they are an important signpost to the 
interpretive framework of the time and mentality of their creators.
65
  
A close investigation of the design features of the coat of arms (such as the Latin motto “Sic 
vos non vobis guano ficatis aves”) shown in Figure 2 below, as well as the bits of information 
provided by a former member of the Committee of Management is instructive.
66
 In addition, 
the formulation of Wade’s memorandum to the Imperial authorities is equally revealing. The 
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trouble taken to craft a symbolic object that complied with the general rules of heraldry and 
that conveyed a political message is significant. The use of Latin similarly fulfils a political 
function. Most sailors were not conversant in nor understood the language and were therefore 
not able to interpret the meaning of the motto. Although a literal translation thereof revealed a 
fairly innocuous meaning (“not for yourselves, ye birds, your guano nests ye build”), its lack 
of intelligibility by the majority had a disempowering effect. In its original context, the motto 
“sic vos non vobis nidificatis aves” was a line in an anonymous praise poem of the Roman 
poet Virgil to Emperor Augustus but it was claimed by another poet, Bathyllus, as his work. 
When the situation was finally rectified, it became a metaphor for credit claimed by one 
person for work done by another as well as a reference to unselfish work (“by you, not for 
you”).67 Within the context of 19th century Ichaboe where one group appropriated the power 
to organise the work of others, the motto “Thus you labour not for yourselves, others get the 
credit” or alternatively “others profited from your labour”, assumed ominous proportions and 
may even be considered as an attempt at establishing a coercive exploitative system. The coat 
of arms was not only an object aimed at impressing those who were expected to submit to the 
power of the Committee of Management, but may also be considered a physical 
representation of the social and exploitative power vested in them. Together with what Mohr 
called “a paucity of interpretants” of Latin, the coat of arms “derives its power as much from 
what cannot be interpreted as for what can.”68  There is thus little doubt that the COSMO as 
the self-installed political masters of the island community of Ichaboe in fact mimicked the 
nation state through their actions. 
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FIGURE 2: ICHABOE COAT OF ARMS
69
 
Functioning frontiers cannot afford to operate in a political vacuum without some form of 
policing authority. Due to its natural features, its sense of isolation and its lack of live-
sustaining resources such as food and fresh water, Ichaboe Island was therefore not fit for 
human settlement and did not strictly qualify as a port of entry. Wade, in his memorial to the 
Imperial authorities, also specifically mentioned the absence of any indigenous people on the 
island as a result of this lack of life-sustaining resources.
70
 The appointment of a functionary 
with the title of Harbour Master therefore appeared incongruent with general practice. The 
position of Harbour Master was normally based on legal prescripts aimed at regulating 
shipping and crews and was therefore loaded with political and executive authority.
71
 Under 
this contemporary law, the supervisory role of the officer in quest in included the collection 
of rates of harbour pilotage, harbour dues, tonnage dues, wharfages rates, regulating the 
ballasting of vessels, payment of bonds for the observation of customs laws and the 
disembarkation of people.
72
 The new monopolists could therefore confidently declare in the 
memorial that Wade drafted on their behalf that, “we have throughout acted in a 
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straightforward, honourable and just manner to our entire approbation and consequently beg 
most respectfully to recommend him to your Lordship’s notice.”73 
These events are consistent with Benton’s argument that when parties or individuals cross 
boundaries, they travel with their own culture as well as geographical and legal knowledge 
and when it was necessary to assert legal authority, they based it on the understanding that 
“crown subjects could carry jurisdiction into distant places” and therefore could exercise the 
geographical and legal principles of “dominium” (the right to possess territory) and 
“imperium” (sovereign jurisdiction).74 Beyond the organisation of guano digging, the effort 
of a smaller group to position itself as the overarching management structure, and therefore 
as a quasi-political and judicial authority, must then also be seen as an attempt to eliminate 
the political vacuum and to establish itself as the frontier’s “political community of 
masters”75 authorised to assume, albeit without popular consent, the responsibility of 
managing relationships on Ichaboe. This effectively put paid to the traditional view that 
frontiers were “unlettered” and proposed instead that frontiers are also places of interaction 
and knowledge exchange where, when expedient, the nation state is mimicked. 
Despite the decisive nature of their actions and their acting as if the Imperial government 
were on their side, the Committee remained a group of individuals who, in line with Firth’s 
description, “seek a living beyond the legal system of their own countries”76 and who through 
entrepreneurial actions unrelated to conquest, created a new frontier.
77
 This turned the task of 
the Harbour Master into an unpleasant undertaking. Recognising the futility of their actions 
without legal backup, Wade addressed a memorandum to the Admiralty requesting the 
appointment of a resident magistrate to replace the moral authority of the Harbour Master as 
well as to investigate whether Portugal may have any claim to the island.
78
 The Home 
Government was not yet ready to act on their behalf. The “only practical step” they were 
promised was a visit by a warship from the naval station at the Cape of Good Hope to protect 
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the assembled shipping at Ichaboe.
79
 At the same time the Colonial Office undertook to 
engage the Admiralty on the matter in order to determine their views.
80
 By late March 1844, 
the latter informed the Colonial Office that the Cape Naval Station was instructed to examine 
and report on the islands as well as on the state of the anchorage. Further action would only 
follow once the investigative reports were received and studied.
81
 This only increased the 
anxiety of the Ichaboe monopolists. 
 
Unperturbed by their lack of a legal mandate or the existing policy vacuum, but bolstered by 
their confidence in their own collective ability to enforce their will, the COSO in traditional 
anarchic fashion took full control of the island and charged payment of £1 per 200 tons of 
guano plus a further five shillings for “administrative expenses” for any additional freight 
above 100 tons. In addition, all new arrivals were forced to assist with the loading of the 
ships preceding their own.
82
 Acting as a proper harbour and customs authority and 
mimicking the proper political authorities, refusal to comply was met with a denial  of both 
anchorage and freight. Those under charter from the Home Country had no option but to pay 
and assist in order to secure a load and thereby strengthened the authority of the self-made 
masters of Ichaboe. Under this regime, according to the Australian newspaper, The Courier 
of Hobart, 6000 tons of guano from Africa and Peru was imported into Britain.
83
  
 
As expected, this regime caused great dissatisfaction amongst those excluded from the 
official management structure. Initially the latter group challenged the rules by constructing 
their own landing stages, but when the loyalists thwarted their efforts, the challenge turned 
violent during March/April 1844 when the physical confrontation turned into a full-scale 
mutiny.  Given their overwhelming majority, the labourers soon got the upper hand and 
declared Ichaboe a guano republic off-limits to all officers and loyalists.
84
 According to 
Benton, such actions characterised by “rogue polities” and self-proclaimed kings and similar 
others, when directed against legal authorities, must be regarded as acts of counter-
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sovereignty.
85
 Although the “rogue guano republic” did not came into being as a result of the 
rejection of any legal authority, the fact that all crews are covered under maritime law 
transformed their mutiny into an act of defiance of the law. The dispossessed shipmasters, 
supercargoes and shipping agents, who were denied the right to load guano, then directed a 
request to the naval authorities in the Cape Colony, hoping to capitalise on the involvement 
of local businessmen in the rush.  The appeal of the Committee for protection of property, 
profit and the constraining of labour under British law against their own creation, represented 
a new shift in frontier relations. Actively seeking the involvement of a legal sovereign 
authority further emphasised the fact that though the frontier may have anarchic features, 
when it is expedient and when the authority of the controlling group is threatened, 
government authority is sought. It therefore also confirmed the current view of frontiers as 
both spaces of mixing and accommodation.
86
  
 
The involvement of the authorities in this matter was motivated by a combination of factors. 
Although guano fertilisation was introduced into Cape agriculture as far back as the 17
th 
century under the governorship of Jan van Riebeeck
87
 and Zacharias Wagenaer
88
 
respectively, a similar fertiliser tradition never developed locally. This was mainly due to the 
abundance of land for farming during that period. At the beginning of the 19
th
 century, most 
farmers still used animal dung, which was collected with a great deal of effort from a range of 
widely distributed pasturages. To compensate for the lack of sufficient volumes, farmers 
made provision for long fallowing periods.
89
 Furthermore, the Cape Colony and the rest of 
the 19th century world experienced frequent crop failures
90
 and struggled to secure a grain 
surplus as a result of soil infertility.
91
 Cultivating wheat was particularly difficult in some 
areas such as the Overberg with its lime soil, compared to the Swartland district with its more 
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sandy soil.
92
 In addition to this variation in soil quality, regular and widespread droughts 
rendered only small pockets of the colony suitable for cultivation without irrigation. 
Consequently, many farmers preferred cattle farming.
93
 Against this background, guano was 
reintroduced to the Cape Colony in January 1844 when the first two loads arrived in Cape 
Town in January 1844. Despite the agricultural demand for guano in Great Britain and the 
import of 77 073 tons from Ichaboe during 1844,
94
 the authorities failed to grant the required 
condonation and instead displayed a distinct reluctance to intervene. 
 
The initial hesitation to act despite the growing demand for guano in the agricultural 
community must be put into proper perspective. Despite posing as agents of the imperial 
government and their use of language and rituals that showed similarities to delegated legal 
authority,
95
 the Committee of Shipmasters were nothing of the sort. Given the difficulties in 
administering a far-reaching empire, uncontrolled and unsanctioned territorial expansion was 
not promoted. The British government also had no formal guano mining or trading policy to 
begin with and no need for one, given the fact that Britain had not exercised any control over 
any of the known sources of guano. The official response indicated quite clearly to others, 
especially potential challengers, that the Committee, for all its posing as a representative of 
imperial control was, as Legassick put it, “more hope than a predestined fact.”96  
Furthermore, its response was consistent with its earlier position when it declined requests for 
intervention on behalf of British investors when the Peruvian concession was threatened. 
However, the position was soon to be changed as a result of a combination of factors 
discussed below. 
 
The bay of Angra Pequena, the centre of the African rush at this time, offered Cape 
merchants an opportunity to sell provisions duty free. Guano traders were also able to 
participate on an equal footing in the provision of the growing market. In addition, a mutually 
beneficial scheme was concluded between Cape merchants and guano shippers with the latter 
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being offered provisions in exchange for the transport of fish, fresh produce and water from 
Cape Town.
97
 All the interested parties could therefore readily identify themselves, with 
attempts to remove all restrictions, irrespective of whether such measures were imposed by 
the rebels or the COSMO. When the issue of naval intervention from Simon’s Bay was 
therefore raised, those excluded from the island showed very little dissent. An emissary was 
then sent to Simon’s Bay, the naval headquarters of the local branch of the Royal Navy.  A 
warship then visited the island and reorganised work and accommodation arrangements on 
the island. This included a new division of guano pits, loading arrangements and the 
reconstitution of the management committee under Captain Owen of the Zenobia, who was 
appointed Commodore and assisted by a committee of 12 individuals with the authority to 
“exercise full power” until another warship arrived.98 In addition, new rules were adopted 
and implemented. The recognition of these rules by all on the island, and the presence of 
military force used by successive commanders of visiting warships such as the Isis, 
Thunderbolt, and Clio to enforce the new rules, established a legal standard with regard to 
ownership of the island.
99
 Although shipping crews were able to deliver guano stock 
weighing 35 000 tons to all British ports by the first of May 1845,
100
 this caused a new policy 
dilemma since additional demands were placed on the naval authorities. When the guano 
source was nearly depleted and ships increasingly failed to load a full cargo, the ship captains 
requested the naval authorities to act as a legal authority by issuing “a certificate of their 
having been there for the satisfaction of their owners.”101 
 
With depletion a reality, the focus shifted to the territorial waters of the Cape Colony and 
specifically Malgas Island where a new guano discovery was made in 1844 and a new rush 
ensued. Resource depletion therefore became the second motivator for shifting the frontier 
and creating a new point of interaction. These events form the basis of the discussion in 
Chapter 3. 
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2.5.    The Commercial and Environmental Effects of the Shifting Guano Frontier  
Despite the short duration of the first phase of the African guano trade, it fundamentally 
impacted on the further growth of the Peruvian trade. The availability of new guano types 
from Africa naturally led to an oversupply on the British market. This also resulted in a slight 
reduction in the overall price on the British market to the benefit of less wealthy farmers who 
were now also able to purchase, test and shift to the new fertiliser of choice. However, the 
lack of sophisticated knowledge about the relative quality of the various types was 
problematic. In the absence of a system of pre-sale analysis of guano’s nitrogen content, 
dishonest marketers continued to exploit the farming community and to manipulate the 
market.
102
 Some of those who were out to make easy money deliberately exploited the 
ignorance and inability of farmers to distinguish between Peruvian and other guano by 
unscrupulously selling whatever they had as the “real thing”. They also downplayed the 
rumour that the ammonia level of some of the African products was reduced over the course 
of the long sea journey.
103
 Collectively, these events increased the frustration of the 
commercial farming community who had developed an interest in the steady supply of the 
fertiliser.  
In addition to progressively advancing greater knowledge of the relative merits of the 
varieties in the market, the availability of different guano types also greatly benefited the 
science of plant nutrition. Through the joint efforts of guano merchants and farmers, 
scientists were able to make vital breakthroughs with regard to determining the composite 
elements of guano and thus dramatically advance progress towards the manufacturing of 
artificial fertilisers. In a related development, a new scholarly debate emerged around the 
blanket use of guano for all crop types. One school of thought questioned the wisdom of the 
former practice and instead proposed the appropriate use of a combination of guano and other 
fertilisers with a phosphate rather than a nitrogen base in the cultivation of certain crops. 
According to the scientific knowledge at the time, it was better in the case of crops like 
turnips to use more phosphate-based fertilisers such as bone-meal or artificial manures.
104
 As 
a direct result of these very public debates and the direct involvement of the agricultural 
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community through its organised associations, a constant flow of updated information in the 
form of pamphlets, journal and magazine articles as well as regular newspaper reports
 
 were 
available, thereby increasing public understanding of the developments in the field with 
serious implications for a future Cape industry.
105
 In most cases Cape Town-based guano 
merchants aimed to supply the same overstocked European market, instead of imitating the 
successes achieved in the West Indies and developing other potential colonial markets such 
as Natal, Mauritius and the St. Helena Island with their British-orientated plantation 
agricultural system.
106
 Targeting these potential markets would significantly reduce the cost 
of long distance shipping and ensure the effectiveness of the product. 
Guano collection had a dramatic impact on the animal life on the various colonial islands and 
Ichaboe. This included both seabirds and seals that frequented the rocks on the islands. The 
frantic human activity and physical scraping of the islands to the rocky bottom disturbed the 
very topography of the islands and the traditional nests and burrows of the guano-producing 
seabirds.
107
 Furthermore, the constant noise and movement of the labour force and the use of 
firearms made the islands more uninhabitable and unsuitable for nesting purposes. The 
frightened seabirds deserted the islands, creating the impression that the guano trade had 
come to its end. This was however not the case, given the superficial nature of the human 
disturbance. Guano collection only disturbed the natural living environment of the birds but 
had no effect on the pelagic fishing resources, which served as their main source of food. The 
presence of seabirds was associated with the availability of shoals of pelagic fish more than a 
century ago.
108
 It is therefore instinctive for these birds to return to their original habitat after 
a short absence for as long as sufficient food is available. 
Reconstructed catch series for sealing compiled by David and Van Sittert indicated that 
during the extended period of c. 1840 – 1860, which overlaps with the era of the Guano Rush 
(1843 - 1845), sealing continued unabated (though at a reduced rate) and took a backseat to 
guano collection. Based on export and import figures from the Namib islands, they concluded 
that this period contributed significantly to the export of 65000 seal skins and the killing of at 
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least 1,93 million seals in Southern Africa during the 19
th
 century.
109
 This disturbance, 
combined with guano collection, effectively rendered the island unproductive for at least one 
year. 
 
2.6. CONCLUSION 
The guano frontier originated as a geographic location for a socio-cultural resource central to 
the identity, lifestyle and worldview of the indigenous Peruvians who went to great lengths to 
protect both the resource and the knowledge underlying its use. As a result of colonisation 
and the reconfiguration of the subjected societies of Latin America by Spanish settlers, the 
resource gradually obtained a different meaning far removed from its original roots. 
Following an expansion of the knowledge boundaries of plant nutrition and progress in the 
field of fertiliser science, guano obtained significant commodity value and was therefore re-
cast in a totally different light. As a result, the geographical frontier also became an economic 
frontier. Under the influence of post-independence developments and following the 
nationalisation of the resource islands, the frontier then also became a political boundary. 
Once again this was accompanied by a change in its meaning for the new nation-state of 
Peru, the successor state to the Inca. The deliberate linking of guano with the political 
sovereignty and well-being of the nation, coupled with the constant revision and retraction of 
the collection and distribution concession, created a market shortage and instigated British 
and American farmers to find an alternative and affordable product. With the discovery of an 
African alternative, the exploitation frontier shifted and effectively began to undermine the 
value of the Peruvian concession, much to the detriment of the political regime in that 
country. The rush for Ichaboe on the southwest African coast and the subsequent battle for 
monopoly control led to all sorts of complications on the new frontier.   
Based on the events outlined in the course of this chapter, new insights were gained with 
regard to frontiers, their nature, triggers and movements. Contrary to popular belief, frontiers 
are not necessarily places of rough ignorance. Following the actions of the dominant group in 
their attempt to mimic the nation-state through symbols and symbolic actions, it is safe to 
conclude that frontiers are actually places of cultural/knowledge exchange and thus literate’. 
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Furthermore, frontiers are not necessarily anarchic, as commonly perceived. The events at 
Ichaboe in particular indicated that in order to function and to deal with uprisings that may 
occur, frontiers may attempt to regulate them by clinging to the notion of accommodation. 
Such uprisings should not be seen as acts of anarchy by speculative entrepreneurs mimicking 
the nation-state, but should rather be approached as acts of counter-sovereignty. As far as the 
movement of frontiers is concerned, the evidence also indicated that resource demand, 
depletion, extension of knowledge boundaries and the legal imperative all contributed to 
shifts and further extensions of the same. Frontier extension had environmental, socio-
political and economic effects. On the economic level, new discoveries did not only introduce 
variety into the market, it also contributed to the lowering of prices and  the capturing of new 
segments of the market, such as farmers with fewer resources and the producers of artificial 
fertilisers.  
Although the Cape Colony earned an additional amount of nearly £47 000, which was put to 
good use financing its administration and improving colonial infrastructure, the exploitation 
of the resource severely disrupted the animal life and ecology of the islands. This led to the 
departure of a large number of birds and the killing of an equally high number of fur seals, 
which left a number of islands useless for the guano, sealing and egg trade. Malgas Island in 
Saldanha Bay (within the local territorial waters) then became the centre of a new guano rush 
and created a new policy dilemma for the Cape and Imperial authorities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
“A FORTUNATE ADDITION?” -  FROM A FREE-FOR-ALL TO A CAPE GUANO 
POLICY, 1843 – 1845  
 
3.1. Introduction 
The shifting of the guano frontier from Ichaboe to the territorial waters of the Cape Colony 
brought an end to what Newbury has called “the hunter-gatherer phase of commercial 
ventures.”1 Accompanying the new discoveries was the introduction of specific guano policy 
and legislation to enable both the annexation and monopolisation of guano islands in the 
Atlantic and Pacific oceans. In comparison to the no-mans-land of Angra Pequena, the Cape 
Colony and its offshore islands were part of the British Empire and therefore fell under 
British law. Within this context, the use of violence to gain an unfair business advantage was 
not only risky but also contrary to the rule of law. Cape Town was not only an organized 
political community, but also boasted an active mercantile association, the Commercial 
Exchange. Two distinct commercial groupings: the mercantile “elite” and an emerging 
commercial middle class dominated economic life.
2
 The arrival of guano in Cape Town (and 
the discovery of guano on islands within Cape territorial waters) coincided with a period of 
intense political rivalry between the colony’s key political institutions, namely the Governor, 
Legislative Council, Cape Judiciary and the Cape Town Municipal Council. A new policy 
dilemma emerged, namely how to legitimise the local guano trade whilst simultaneously 
maintaining efficient government control over the commodity. The kind of policy-making 
inherent to this situation was a process of bargaining, competition, persuasion and 
compromise among interest groups and government officials.
3
 This chapter will show that the 
movement from policy dilemma to a formal Cape policy for the administrative and political 
management of the local guano trade manifested itself as a three-sided battle between the 
colonial authority, its citizens and foreigners for control of the product. 
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This chapter traces the evolution of the process that led to the adoption of a formal Cape 
guano policy. It began as a policy issue driven by the frustrations of interested parties and 
was amplified by a constant stream of memorials and the use of public platforms to pressurise 
the colonial authority to obtain access rights. It shows how the activities of a small group of 
well-connected and politically influential business personalities conspired to link politics and 
guano, creating a role within a larger constitutional drama. It will be argued that, while the 
new guano policy and its accompanying administrative system removed resource-poor 
entrepreneurs from the race for fair access, it simultaneously frustrated a core group of well-
connected local businessmen. The chapter will show that as the colonial authority had to 
contend with acts of civil disobedience, jurisdictional challenges and the set-up of a rogue 
trading system in direct competition with the official regime, these events placed further 
strain on the already poor relationship between the colonial state and its citizens and 
transformed the trajectory of the guano trade in the years after 1845.  
3.2.    Towards a Guano Policy Agenda 
Although the Dutch settlers at the Cape had collected guano for agricultural use from the 
offshore islands as far back as the 17
th
 century, no local guano fertiliser tradition developed. 
By the time of their departure at the beginning of the 19
th
 century their official representative, 
Commissioner De Mist, tasked with the handing-over of the Cape to the English, could still 
only recommend the constant rotation of cattle kept in small paddocks to produce dung and 
collect it for use as fertiliser.
4
 Four decades later, on the eve of the re-introduction of guano 
into Cape society, John Centrelives Chase, a prominent Eastern Cape British settler, observed 
that nothing was known about compound manures and that the time-honoured practice of 
collecting fertiliser as needed for dressing agricultural land from the nearby cattle kraal was 
still prevalent.
5
 Van Zyl ascribed the persistent struggle of Cape farmers to secure an 
adequate grain surplus up to the 19
th
 century to a limited knowledge of fertilisation.
6 
However, in August 1842, fourteen months prior to the arrival of the first guano from 
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Ichaboe, Thomas Ramsden launched the first recorded effort to initiate a guano market in 
Cape Town with guano obtained from Malgas Island in Saldanha Bay.  
 
Ramsden was most likely not acquainted with the Peruvian trade, considering the fact that he 
never registered any claim to the guano deposits on this island. Neither did the arrival of the 
product raise any particular interest from the ranks of the colonial authorities, farmers or 
merchants. This discovery only became general knowledge and entered the policy domain in 
1844 when a dispute erupted between the colonial authorities and several local businessmen 
who attempted to claim discoverer’s rights to the guano on the island. Ramsden had great 
difficulty selling his product and after months of trying to do so, was still in possession of 
half of his original shipment.
7
 Based on Chase’s remarks on the non-existence of local 
compound manures and Ramsden’s distinct lack of success in disposing of what was a highly 
sought-after product elsewhere, it is safe to assume that Capetonians lacked a sophisticated 
scientific understanding of both the growing international guano market and the progress 
made with regard to plant and fertiliser science despite the existence of the Cape of Good 
Hope Agricultural Society. This institution was established with government aid to provide 
the agricultural community with appropriate advice and was tasked with the promotion of 
local agriculture.
8
 Ramsden’s dilemma was not unusual and was a typical example of the 
struggle of 19
th
 century small businessmen who tried to launch a risky venture with very 
limited capital.
9
 Although he was a partner in a Hout Street canteen and had business 
dealings with Benjamin Norden, the future guanopreneur, his limited sales success indicated 
that he was not a member of the existing commercial or agricultural network of merchants 
and farmers with Cape of Good Hope Agricultural Society membership.
10
 Had this been the 
case, guano would have entered the policy domain earlier and Ramsden would most probably 
have had a much better chance of disposing of his stock. He also found himself in a dispute 
with some of his customers for not delivering a professional service as boatman and on 
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occasion had to pay damages after overloading a boat full of stores.
11
 Despite his distinct lack 
of sales success and his failure to elevate guano to the local policy agenda, Ramsden can still 
be regarded as an early pioneer of the Cape trade.   
 
As will become clear, the credit for sowing the seed of guanopreneurship in the Cape Colony 
belonged to Cape businessman and Ward Master of the Cape Town Municipality, Benjamin 
Norden, who actively participated in stripping the islands during the first guano rush along 
the Namibian coast during the period 1843 - 1844.
12
 According to a witness, unknown Cape 
Town personalities were active participants in the proceedings of the first management 
structure established on Ichaboe to ensure order and to secure a controlled monopoly.
13
 From 
this vantage point and oblivious of Ramsden’s experience fourteen months earlier, Norden 
landed the first load of Ichaboe guano in Cape Town in January 1844.  
 
Compared to Ramsden, Norden was far better equipped for this new venture. He was not only 
a prominent businessman but also a landowner in six districts of Cape Town as well as in 
Colesberg with property holdings worth at least £2750 in 1841.
14
 In addition to being 
described as a “prosperous merchant”,15 he was also an active member of key networks such 
as the Board of Ward Masters and the local Jewish Society and a leading activist who [in 
May 1841 together with like-minded individuals] tried to reform the Commercial Exchange 
(the single most important business association in Cape Town) to become more broad-based 
and inclusive. Based on this combination of factors, Norden had a far better chance to 
succeed with his guano venture and could therefore safely be designated the founder of the 
Cape guano trade. As a member of the colonial elite, he was also better placed to steer the 
matter of guano exploitation rights into the policy domain. This conforms to Dye’s 
observation of policy communication as “intraelite” (i.e. policy issues formulated and 
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amplified by organised interest group leaders, influential constituents, wealthy contributors 
and other influential people have the best chance of being placed on the formal agenda).
16
  
 
The arrival of Ichaboe guano unleashed a new entrepreneurial wave in Cape Town, especially 
amongst leaseholders involved in fishing and collecting sealskins and penguin eggs on the 
offshore islands within the territorial waters of the Colony. All were hoping that they would 
be allowed to exploit the guano in their areas of operation.  In February 1844, shortly after 
the arrival of the first guano batches in Table Bay, the Trustees of the insolvent estate of local 
businessman John Norton, Messrs John King & R.W. Paton, submitted a memorial to the 
Governor requesting the right to collect guano for their own account.
17
 This was followed in 
May 1844 by a further request to have the remainder of this lease transferred to the 
Trustees.
18
 Norton (who had held the six-year lease since 18 October 1841, which allowed 
him to collect penguin eggs and seal skins on the Bird- and Chuan Islands on the coast of 
Algoa Bay) owed the colonial authority £33.12s.9d for annual rent, a fine of £10 for late 
payment and an additional fine of £25 for breach of contract.
19
 Sensing an opportunity to 
redeem himself financially, his Trustees appealed to the Colonial authorities for a second 
chance. This request was however firmly declined. 
 
Norton’s request was declined firstly on legal grounds, namely that the law did not provide 
for the automatic transfer of existing leases to third parties.
20
 His Trustees therefore had to 
obtain a successful tender of their own before they could get a return on their original 
investment through their business transactions with Norton. Policy matters also played a role 
in the decision of the Colonial authorities. Since the guano trade originated in Peru, Britain 
(and by implication also her colonies) had no official guano policy. The transformation of the 
Peruvian trade into an international guano trade involving Cape colonials created a fresh 
policy issue for the administrators of the Cape Colony. This is evidenced by the Imperial 
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feedback in response to the Wade Memorandum of December 1843. The Imperial response of 
formally withholding approval of the annexation and declaration of British authority over 
Ichaboe was therefore consistent with the process of handling a policy vacuum. Under the 
circumstances, dispatching a warship from Simon’s Bay to protect the pioneers of the African 
trade was the most practical action, since it afforded the authorities an opportunity to 
investigate the matter prior to initiating a more comprehensive response.
21
  
 
When the guano question entered the public domain in Cape Town, the local colonial 
administration found itself in the midst of an administrative reshuffle, further complicating 
matters. Governor George Napier, who was supposed to lead the policy process within the 
colonial administration ex officio, was in the process of leaving Cape Town following a recall 
to Britain. A review of his original decision with regard to the Norton memorial therefore had 
to wait until a new Governor assumed office. Furthermore, he left behind a colonial 
legislature with neither the right to establish investigative commissions nor to subpoena 
witnesses to give evidence. A proper policy process, which included the drafting of new 
regulations, public submissions and debate as well as drafting a comprehensive 
administrative system to control the collection and sale of guano, was therefore the sole 
prerogative of the Colonial Governor. No mechanisms for citizen participation in the policy-
making process existed at a time that colonial citizens demanded a greater say in the colonial 
administration.
22
 The nature and location of the guano market complicated matters further 
since the market of the early 1840s was essentially an export market and was still developing. 
Based on the Ramsden experience and the location of the market, guano collection and 
trading were speculative with no guarantees of a sustainable financial return. It was also 
highly unlikely that struggling businessmen such as Norton would have the capacity to 
establish anything beyond a small-scale operation. When matters normalised with the 
appointment of Sir Peregrine Maitland in March 1844, guano was understandably low on the 
priority list of the Cape authorities.  A far more pressing issue was the constitutional deadlock 
within the colonial government.  
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3.3. The Dynamics of Guano Policy-Making  
During the course of 1844, guano forced itself onto the political agenda on the back of an 
influx of memorials and claims by individuals seeking access to the resource on offshore 
islands within the Cape Colony’s territorial waters.23 In this regard discoveries on Malgas 
Island in Saldanha Bay in particular, forced a rethink and the formal initiation of a policy-
making process. Amongst the agitators were local merchants John Bardwell Ebden and 
Antonio Chiappini, co-shareholders in the Association for the Improvement of Cape Wool 
and the later Natal Cotton Company respectively and according to George also the “main 
defenders of the rights and privileges of the Legislative Council.”24 Others included 
Benjamin Norden who was involved in the Ichaboe trade right from the beginning, as well as 
Ward Commissioner Harrison Watson, a partner in the company of Thomson, Watson & Co. 
and a member of the Cape of Good Hope Agricultural Society. These personalities 
represented social, political and economic groups in the various spheres of the Cape Colony. 
It is not hereby suggested that all of these personalities were consistently anti- or pro-
government. Watson occupied the ranks of both the mercantile elite and political 
conservative “collaborationist” group - people with close links to the colonial political 
bureaucracy and a special relationship with the Governor.
25
 Governor Maitland therefore had 
more than his fair share of political challenges in October 1844 when a guano rush for 
Malgas Island in Saldanha Bay became a distinct possibility and warranted immediate 
intervention from the colonial authorities.  
 
During the Ichaboe Rush (1843 – 1845), guano collectors initially paid very little attention to 
Malgas Island. The fact that the island resorted under the custom’s regime of the Cape 
Colony and was therefore subject to certain tariff charges may have discouraged interested 
parties. Like Newbury’s “hunter-gatherers”, most shipping crews or shipmasters had little 
intention of creating new ventures and demonstrated limited entrepreneurship, except to rush 
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to obtain a free load of guano for maximum profitability.
26
 However, with the exhaustion of 
the Ichaboe stocks and increasing competition for freight, attention shifted southwards. This 
compelled Maitland to confront guano politics as well as some of the personalities who had 
left their destructive imprint on the northern islands. With valuable naval information about 
the problems associated with the Ichaboe Rush at its disposal, the Cape colonial authorities 
acted to prevent a free-for-all. A key priority was to determine the actual size of the resource 
in order to manage it properly. Following a full survey, the Colonial Surveyor General 
reported that the total available guano on Malgas covered an area of at least eight acres and a 
depth of seven to eight yards.
27
 Based on this measurement and with the Malgas deposits as 
its point of reference, the colonial government erected staging to facilitate loading before 
formally announcing its intention to sell guano from all of its islands to all-comers 
(irrespective of nationality) at £1 per registered ton on 5
 
November 1844. This nominal fee 
was merely to cover of the costs related to the survey and to provide basic loading 
infrastructure such as a jetty at the island. In addition, these expenses still had to be formally 
approved by the Imperial authorities since there was no similar precedent within the British 
Empire for the Cape Colony to follow. It was further decreed that those interested in 
obtaining guano freight from any territorial island could only do so by purchasing a loading 
license from the Office of the Collector of Customs in Cape Town.
28
 Interested parties were 
also warned not to expect any government assistance during the loading process, except in 
cases where too many licenses for the available guano were issued and there was a need for 
loading priority.
29
 In order to police a geographically dispersed area, a follow-up notice dated 
31 December 1844 tasked all Civil Commissioners, Resident Magistrates, Peace Officers, and 
other public officials with enforcing these rules.  In this way guano was elevated from a 
fringe issue to a formal policy matter backed by its first formal set of rules.  
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These practical measures were without precedent in the British Empire. Prior to this action, 
the only official response of the Imperial Government in Peru was to place a special Consul 
on the Chinca Island for monitoring purposes. The measures announced by the Cape Colony 
were therefore significant as the first steps towards the establishment of the first formal guano 
policy anywhere within the British Empire. There was therefore no need for guano 
speculators to pretend that they possessed the required legal or delegated authority to control 
and direct exploitation as was previously the case at Ichaboe.  
 
Whilst the decision to regulate the collection of guano on the colonial islands using a system 
of licenses prevented some problems, it also created new ones, particularly for the 
relationship between the government and commerce. As the number of opponents to the 
authority’s new management system increased and transcended class and political 
boundaries, new political and other issue-alliances emerged which also found their way onto 
the policy agenda. These matters form the basis of the discussion in the next section.  
 
3.3.1. Guano Claims and Policy Contestation  
Robert Arthur Cain, an Irish shipmaster from the port of Greenock, Ireland (who visited 
Saldanha Bay in September 1844 while exploring the various coastal islands) also discovered 
guano deposits on Malgas Island. In order to establish a priority or preferential claim he 
notified the Resident Magistrate of the area, Mr George Marsh, of his discovery and followed 
it up with a memorial to the colonial government, stating that he “present himself to the 
government to prefer a claim to any benefit they may be disposed to grant him as the 
discoverer.” The basis for this claim was as follows:  
 
“...when aided by the practical knowledge of the article, he ascertained the existence and 
value of the said deposit, which but for his research he feels borne out in saying might have 
remained dormant for years.” 30  
 
 Based on a search of customs records, the veracity of this claim was refuted and swiftly 
repudiated. After establishing that the potential rights actually belonged to an unknown 
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boatman, subsequently identified as Ramsden, permission to collect guano from Malgas 
Island was refused to Cain.
31
 The message to entrepreneurs was clear: that the colonial 
authorities had no intention of awarding rights based on claims of either first discovery or use 
as a basis for a concrete policy. Being a visiting shipmaster (with Ireland as his home-base) 
Cain, like those before him, also lacked a local network and access to those with influence 
and power and could therefore not influence the policy process. Dismissing his claim was 
therefore fairly easy. The problem, however, was the extent to which this method could be 
generalised to any future claim emanating from those who were far better connected.  
 
The difficulty of sustaining this approach became clear when the colonial authorities received 
a similar claim from Antonio Chiappini, owner of the Cape Town-based company A. 
Chiappini & Co., who had multiple business interests that ranged from wool farming (as a 
member of the Association for the Improvement of Cape Wool), cotton-trading (through the 
Natal Cotton Company) and inter-colonial trade as far as Australia. In addition, he was a 
member of both the Commercial Exchange and the “collaborator group” who were by all 
accounts closely connected with most of the previous colonial government’s functionaries.32 
In a claim submitted on 24 December Chiappini refused to identify the island in question, 
except to indicate that the island in question was located north of Cape Town. He also 
indicated that he was willing to identify the island to the Collector of Customs following the 
successful conclusion of a joint venture with the colonial authorities.
33
 It is not clear whether 
this strategy was meant to test the resolve of the new Governor or was merely an attempt to 
use his long-standing and intimate relationship with the authorities to his advantage. 
Whatever his motivations were, his strategy backfired as all his proposals were summarily 
declined. The colonial authorities were not yet ready to conclude entrepreneurial agreements 
or to draft policy based on selective disclosure of information and subtle forms of 
blackmailing. In addition, claims based on discoverer’s rights were once again rejected. The 
denial of these requests, however, incurred the wrath of the politically connected and rejected 
entrepreneur. Chiappini, unlike Norton or Cain, was politically well connected. Resenting the 
rejection of his “legitimate claims” and offers of joint ventures, he declared himself in favour 
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of having the system scrapped and labelled the actions of the colonial authority as tantamount 
to open opposition to private enterprise.
34
 This dragged guano matters into an already volatile 
and polarised political situation.  
 
In December 1844 ship-owner N. Mellon attempted to obtain rights by extending an offer for 
the conclusion of a favourable public-private partnership extending beyond the terms laid 
down by the guano licence regulations. Submitting a parallel memorial to Chiappini’s claim, 
he registered a request for the bulk removal of 10 000 tons of freight at a rate of one pound, 
and one shilling additional per registered ton (new measurements).”35 This non-offensive 
approach and willingness to engage with the authorities within the parameters of the 
established regulatory procurement framework differed noticeably from that of Chiappini. 
The former evidence also indicates that Mellon was a single operator that lacked a strong 
business-support network.  Consistent with the colonial authorities’ known position, the 
Mellon-offer was also declined. Despite the consistency of its actions, refusal or half-
measures did not resolve the existing policy dilemma. Instead, it generated new and stronger 
opposition from its entrepreneurial-inclined citizens. 
 
The first direct challenge to the colonial authority’s attitude to claimants and their insistence 
on discoverer’s rights came from George Twycross, who discovered a significant guano 
deposit on Dyer Island near Cape Agulhas. Like his predecessors, he was also in financial 
difficulty and identified the discovery as a potential means to resuscitate his struggling 
business.
36
 As a result he followed the established method of submitting various memorials to 
the authorities requesting the right to collect guano freely for the remainder of his existing 
lease in January 1845. He was particularly offended by the Colonial Government failure, i.e.  
“giving no privilege as the present lessee” with no means of paying such demand.37 At the 
same time he voiced his unhappiness with the official dismissal of his “legitimate rights” 
while allowing others to introduce rabbits onto the island. Like his predecessors, he offered to 
provide the authorities with a guarantee or surety for payment of 20% for the right to collect 
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guano from the island.
38
 Both the Collector of Customs and the Secretary to Government 
failed to respond immediately despite Twycross increasing his financial offer for the right to 
remove guano from Dyer Island.
39
 Frustrated by the slow response from the colonial 
authorities, Twycross took the law into his own hands, resorting to guano theft. The Collector 
of Customs therefore impounded Twycross’ boat and equipment to show the colonial state’s 
determination not to allow wilful transgressions of official regulations. Fortunately for 
Twycross, nothing more serious happened and his boat was returned after three days.
40
 This 
inaction had little to do with the colonial authority’s feelings of benevolence, but was a direct 
result of the lack of legal standards, given the absence of a formal policy or penal code for 
transgressions of this nature. The existing guano licence system therefore had to be amended 
by the colonial authorities. 
 
As a result of the obvious profitability of the guano, the demand for substantive exploitation 
rights increased amongst Cape businessmen interested in accessing the guano export market. 
Based on its established position, the Cape authorities continued to delay the initiation of a 
proper policy debate. Instead they continued to focus on the imperial instruction to 
investigate and report on the full extent of all guano deposits within their jurisdiction. This 
attitude was supported by their own faith in the workability of the measures contained in the 
recently promulgated Guano Ordinance. Pre-occupation with imperial matters and the 
existence of an official decree, however, did not stop the constant stream of memorials and 
letters from various interested parties who continued to submit claims demanding 
discoverer’s rights. A growing sense of anger and impatience with the authorities was evident 
from the correspondence. The disregard of the colonial authorities undoubtedly reminded the 
Cape citizens of the lack of proper representation in the light of the systematic 
disempowerment of the Legislative Council by successive colonial governments and in 1841 
the Cape Municipal Council demanded full representative government after it became the self-
appointed articulator of public opinion in Cape Town.
41
 To aggravate matters, more discoveries 
were made and claims were registered from Donkin Bay on the west coast to Algoa Bay on 
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the east coast with islands such as Dyers, Dassen and Bird Island (False Bay) in between. The 
Cape’s guano frontier became a contested policy frontier based upon the actions of people 
like J.O. Smith and Antonio Chiappini who were both influential members of Cape society. 
 
John Owen Smith represents a different trajectory in the struggle for guano rights as opposed 
to Twycross and others. When the first guano arrived in Table Bay in January 1844, Smith 
was still en route to Cape Town after a visit to England.  Shortly after his arrival on 21 
January,
42
 he succeeded in obtaining the fishing and sealing licence for Bird Island, Algoa 
Bay, formerly held by John Norton.
43
 Norton, as mentioned earlier, was unsuccessful in his 
efforts to convince the colonial authority to allow him collection rights. As an astute 
businessman, Smith was constantly on the lookout for new opportunities to advance his 
economic interests (in the boating establishment, shipping, selling of gun powder, sheep 
farming and property development).
44
 When the guano craze hit Cape Town in the absence of 
any policy in early 1844, he began to capitalise on his good fortune, only to be prevented by 
the colonial authorities as his actions were contrary to the conditions of his lease. 
Furthermore, he became an interested spectator of government’s own appropriation of the 
proceeds of the trade. In open defiance of the Guano Ordinance, Smith simply went ahead 
and launched a rogue enterprise. Firstly, he sold guano for fifteen shillings per ton in direct 
competition with the official government price of £1. Secondly, he embarked on overseas 
trading by employing F. Joly in London as his marketing agent.
45
  These actions were an 
unambiguous rejection of the official policy. This also communicated a strong sentiment that 
as far as the leaseholders were concerned, the existing fishing and sealing lease were enough 
grounds for the right to remove guano from the same locality. When the government 
retaliated by appropriating the guano, Smith objected and used his attorneys to ascertain his 
rights and to position himself to be able to effectively oppose any attempt to terminate his 
hold over Bird Island. This standoff resulted in the first deviation from the official course and 
provided the first chink in an already contested policy. 
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Fearing Smith’s legal threat and following the advice from the colonial legal establishment, 
the authorities embarked on a process of negotiation to convince Smith to comply with the 
existing regulation. On the other hand, Twycross’ property had been confiscated as a result of 
his transgression. The authorities offered Smith £25 000 to abandon his rights and to vacate 
the island.
46
 Smith refused, proposing a compromise whereby he would receive 50% of the 
proceeds of all guano licenses issued as compensation for terminating his activities.  On 6 
May 1845, contrary to its official position, a formal agreement between Smith and the 
colonial government was accepted as a compromise. In terms of this agreement Smith would 
take responsibility for all entrepreneurial activities (collecting, bagging and exporting of 
guano) while the authorities would take responsibility for overseas marketing. In addition, 
Joly (Smith’s original agent) had to cease his activities or the agreement would be terminated 
as there was little room for a rogue trader competing directly with an official government 
operation. It was agreed that once operational costs had been deducted, the net profit would 
be equally distributed. It was explicitly stipulated that the agreement would remain valid until 
all the guano on the island had been removed. This particular stipulation was extremely 
problematic because it ignored the fact that guano birds are migratory (they left the islands on 
a seasonal basis and added to the existing deposits on a continuous basis). It was also 
extremely difficult to demarcate exactly where the new deposits started and where the old 
ones ended.  The source was virtually permanent and thus presented a major structural flaw in 
the Cape’s guano administrative system.  
 
The special agreement between Smith and the colonial government created an unhealthy 
precedent given the consistent rejection of similar claims. To fully understand the real state of 
affairs, it is necessary to consider Smith’s personal networks within the colonial 
administration. The attorney responsible for the management of Smith’s legal affairs, E. 
Christian, was an influential member of the Commercial Exchange, the Colonial Harbour 
Board as well as a member of the Legislative Council (1851 – 1853).47 These links provided 
him with very powerful allies with direct links to important colonial functionaries - a trend 
that was also observed in other parts of the international guano trade. In addition, Smith 
played an important part in the political and social affairs of the Eastern Province. He 
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organised a defence strategy for Port Elizabeth against a possible Xhosa attack (1835), 
provided space for a government customs office and bond warehouse, and was a 
businessman, justice of the peace, an auctioneer and agent for Lloyds.
48
 These were not the 
sole reasons for his preferential treatment as there is certainly evidence of other less 
successful clashes between him and the colonial authorities.  
 
However, when one considers the combination of his various roles and the strategic 
importance of the eastern districts for the colonial project, Smith became much more than an 
ordinary businessman and more of a valuable ally and de facto functionary in the colonial 
network. This also placed him in the ranks of the colonial political elite whose policy input, 
based on the animosity generated by the existing approach to guano collection, has largely 
been ignored. Given the key role that he and his peers played within the larger scheme of 
things and the influence that they were able to muster, it infused a certain flexibility into 
policy formulation that could only benefit those commercially and politically well-connected. 
Furthermore, Smith’s special dispensation represented the first case of a Cape Town based 
business receiving priority treatment. This was extremely significant for those who plied their 
trade from Cape Town. Understandably, concerns existed that once the colonial authority 
reported the full state of the guano resource to the Imperial Government as requested, 
London-based entrepreneurs would be able to outmanoeuvre their colonial counterparts 
because of their closer contact to the Westminster political network. Those close to the policy 
frontier in Cape Town, therefore, had more than a passing interest in the Smith Affair.  These 
events also give credence to Day’s assertion that elite political constituents influence the final 
policy outcome.
49
  
 
Policing the Cape guano trade proved difficult and resulted in alienating some citizens. These 
issues warranted serious and immediate attention to prevent the system from collapsing, 
especially in the light of cases similar to the Twycross case. The Cape Colony could not 
afford an escalation in guano thefts along its west and east coast. Income from guano 
collection during the short period of its existence proved to be very profitable. By 31 
December 1844 the colonial treasury had already accrued £1276 without any significant 
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capital layout.
50
 Maintaining this readily available income (or “fortunate addition” as it was 
described by the Colonial Secretary) from a source under the sole control of the authorities 
became a priority.
51
 Equally important was preventing lawlessness on the guano islands to 
the detriment of the Colony. It was therefore not surprising that (as the colonial authority 
developed a financial interest in the control of the guano islands) the number of failed claims 
increased and the different perspectives offered by these claimants as potential input in a new 
policy fell by the wayside. This approach was, however, not sustainable given the already 
fragile political state of the Colony and the growing division between the ruling bureaucracy 
and the citizenry. 
 
3.3.2.     From a ‘Non-judicial Opinion’ to a Formal Policy Process 
At the beginning of 1845 functionaries within the colonial bureaucracy began to question the 
legal basis of the colonial government’s guano collection arrangements. This followed a 
number of applications claiming that Judge Menzies of the Cape Supreme Court had 
expressed the opinion that “being merely or mainly the droppings of unreclaimed birds, of a 
base nature, it [guano] could not in law (emphasis in the original) [be] deemed to be 
property or to be possessed of legal value.”52 This question had serious practical and legal 
implications. If the basis of the policy and its accompanying system were in doubt, it meant 
that the requirement of obtaining a licence before collecting guano was also without force and 
effect. This indicated a return to the hunter-gatherer situation where the strongest power 
rules. The policy dilemma therefore deepens significantly. Despite doubts about the real 
reason behind the new developments, operating according to an ad hoc policy was wholly 
unsustainable. The only way to resolve the current dilemma was to formulate and promulgate 
a formal policy with sound administrative arrangements. In a sense, the earlier attempt to 
silence or at best ignore the voices that tried to influence the policy debate failed and forced 
the colonial authority to create proper measures to manage the guano resource. For a proper 
understanding of the unfolding policy process and its interface with the basic tenets of 
imperial law, this process must be considered in detail.   
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Based on the strategic considerations outlined above and with a view to prevent guano theft 
and uncontrolled collection as well as to rectify the legal deficiencies, the Colonial 
Government published Ordinance 4, (the so-called Guano Ordinance) on 1 January 1845.
53
  
According to this ordinance all guano, irrespective of location within the jurisdiction of the 
Cape Colony or its dependencies, was forthwith declared Crown property.
54
 After further 
refinement during January it was formally promulgated as law on 21 March 1845, thereby 
finally removing all uncertainty around guano collection on the colonial islands and other 
colonial dependencies. Special care was also taken to address those issues identified as 
problematic by the member of the Cape judiciary. In this regard the ordinance stated 
unequivocally that all unclaimed or non-concessionary and saleable guano was declared 
Crown property and that theft would be punishable by law.
55
 As a control measure, 
Ordinance 4 of 1845 also provided for definite administrative arrangements to streamline 
control of the exploitation of the various islands. In terms of the new regulations the Collector 
of Customs and the Secretary to Government were responsible for the overall management of 
the guano collection system pertaining to the colonial islands and dependencies.
56
 In those 
areas far from Cape Town where significant discoveries were made, the administrative 
responsibility with regard to issuing loading licenses was delegated to a number of 
functionaries, including ordinary custom officials, resident magistrates,
57
field cornets
58
 and 
Civil Commissioners.
59
 In addition to the formal administrative tasks, the various officials 
were also tasked with the prevention of guano theft.  
 
The Guano Ordinance provided for various offences and related penalties. Any offender who 
collected guano without the expressed authority of the colonial government would be liable 
for a maximum fine of £100 as well as a term of imprisonment not exceeding 3 months that 
may or may not have included manual labour. Any accomplices would be liable for similar 
punishment in addition to running the risk of having their property (boats and equipment) 
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seized. In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the system, a reward system of informants 
was also provided for. Any informants whose report led to a successful conviction would 
receive half the fine payable by the convicted offender.
60
 The fines attached to the new 
Ordinance were particularly steep and the fact that the whistleblowers could earn half of that 
revenue as reward, clearly added to the weight of the potential punishment. This is further 
demonstrated by the fact that [by the start of the local trade] someone as unfortunate as 
Norton was unable to settle his government debt of an estimated £70 that stood between him 
and economic survival. Furthermore, an analysis of property values in Cape Town in the late 
1830s and early 1840s indicated that with £150 sterling, C. McKenzie and J. Letterstedt were 
able to procure significant pieces of land in Stellenbosch and Rondebosch respectively. These 
transactions boosted their property portfolio significantly.
61
 The comprehensive new policy 
formalised and expanded the original aims contained in the early measures and strengthened 
the former system. The new measures, however, also cleared the way for those with 
substantial financial resources whilst excluding those with limited capital to invest in a 
speculative venture since it increased the operating costs associated with guano collection. 
The tone for the further development of the system and the potential dominance of the trade 
by the resource-rich was thus finally set. The policy, its status as colonial legislation and 
related issues prior to its subsequent application on Malgas and the other colonial islands, 
form the basis of the discussion in the next section. The intricacies of the policy process 
within the system are also expanded upon. 
3.3.3.    The Cape Guano Ordinance and Imperial Law  
In accordance with standard procedure in the British Empire, all colonial measures were 
subject to review by the Colonial Office to ensure full compliance with existing Imperial 
legislation, rules, precedents and procedures. In addition to complying with the 
aforementioned, the approval or rejection of any serious legislative proposal was determined 
by the type of measure, the colony from where it originated and “the attitude which the 
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Colonial Office chose to take towards its enactment.”62 The arrangements and the resulting 
cost incurred by the Cape authorities to facilitate guano collection on the coastal islands were 
undertaken without the prior approval of the imperial government. Until this matter was 
rectified, there was a real possibility that the proposed policy and its accompanying 
administrative system would be rejected. In line with the standard requirements, the Colonial 
authority communicated its actions to the Imperial authorities on different occasions. In 
February 1845, just prior to the promulgation of the Guano Ordinance, Governor Maitland 
requested formal approval for passing the legislation.
63
 Naturally the Colonial Office in the 
person of Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for Colonies, raised concerns about the expenses 
incurred in an industry which the authorities had little exploitation knowledge of.
64
 Given the 
importance attached to guano by the British farming community, the proposed ordinance was 
then handled as an act approved by the Governor and already in force.
65
 In addition, the 
Imperial Government requested more detailed information on expenditure (for staging and 
loading) and the extent of guano resources to report back to London-based merchants.
66
 By 
October 1845, with a full year’s experience of managing guano collection with the aid of a 
system of licenses, the Cape authority was able to report on the effectiveness of measures 
implemented as well as the actions taken to ensure separate and regular reporting to and by 
the offices of the Collector of Customs and the Secretary to Government.
67
 This was 
supplemented in November with further correspondence to inform the Colonial Secretary of 
all the steps taken and expense incurred in regulating the collection of guano on the colonial 
islands. All these requirements were part of the Imperial Government’s efforts to curb 
territorial expansion as well as to keep colonial expenditure within reasonable limits. 
Formal approval for the expenditure remained outstanding for a substantial period of time.
68
 
This state of affairs was not unusual, nor was it indicative of serious differences in the 
interpretation of policy. Non-approval in the domain of colonial administration was however 
considered a very serious matter, particularly since special permission could impose a 
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restriction on the powers of the local legislature and therefore had to be handled with the 
utmost care. Furthermore, approval was usually only refused when the particular act 
contained a suspension clause and action was required.
69
 The Guano Ordinance was not 
subject to restrictions or any further legal impediment to its implementation and enforcement. 
However, certain key policy matters had to be clarified prior to its approval. In May 1845 the 
Colonial Secretary, Lord Stanley, submitted the Ordinance to the Privy Council for Trade and 
requested the Lords to give their opinion as to “whether this enactment would be productive 
of any such injury of this Kingdom as should prevent the confirmation of it by Her 
Majesty.”70 Given the status of guano within British agriculture, the Privy Council did not 
object to the Ordinance except for requesting that the Cape Legislature refrain from imposing 
levies on the export of guano.
71
 This stipulation complicated matters since the requirement of 
a guano licence was similar to a special levy and could therefore be construed as an 
obstruction to the free trade.
72
 The Colonial Office therefore had to search for further 
clarification since opposing views could result in the non-confirmation of what had become a 
critical piece of economic policy in the Cape Colony. In the midst of this policy discussion, 
the Council received various complaints from guano traders about the amount charged for the 
licence and the “injurous effect” it was likely to have. In addition, the Council of Trade had 
to consider other related issues, such as the influx of different guano types of varying quality 
from all over the globe; the difficulty of determining guano’s real value; and the complex 
matter of a fair charge to levy within the context of the Imperial Government’s stated 
commitment to encourage duty-free imports to benefit British agriculture.
73
  
These various issues resulted in a long drawn-out policy debate characterised by the mutual 
exchange of briefing notes and position papers between two of the key imperial institutions 
central to determining imperial economic policy. In the end, enough common ground was 
found to enable consensus and the Privy Council adopted the position that the guano licence 
be regarded as “a certain payment by way of price paid for the article” and to redeem some of 
the cost that government incurred in providing basic infrastructure to facilitate loading at 
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certain islands.
74
 The colonial authorities also had to accept the position of the Colonial 
Office that any change in the charge for guano would result in a mandatory repayment of the 
price difference to all of the previous buyers. Such a result would “encourage the business of 
carrying away the guano to the adjacent continent, there to be stored as an article of sale and 
export” by local dealers and speculators rather than the Treasury.75 It was thus left to Lord 
Stanley and his department to decide on the best action to benefit the imperial cause. The 
Guano Ordinance was then recommended for Her Majesty’s signature and communicated for 
formal implementation. This outcome did not make it easier for Cape Town’s business elite 
to access guano cheaply, as they were now obliged to obtain rights within the framework of 
British Imperial law.  
This novel ordinance to address a very practical local problem laid the foundation for similar 
policy arrangements, particularly in Australia and the United States of America. When guano 
was discovered on various islands and rocks in the Pacific Ocean and along the coast of 
Western Australia during the late 1840s, the Cape Colony was in a strong position to suitably 
advise its Australian counterparts with regard to a proper management system.
76
 As a direct 
result of this advice, the Queensland Coast Islands Act of 1879 was promulgated whereby 
certain guano islands were claimed by the Australian authorities.
77
 More importantly, within 
two years after the Cape Colony promulgated its Guano Ordinance, the 34th Congress of the 
United States of America took similar action and adopted the Guano Islands Act on 18 
August 1856. An all-encompassing policy was drafted to ensure full coverage of American 
influence in all guano locations (including islands, rocks and keys).
78
 This legislation had 
strikingly similar features to its Cape counterpart. This aspect and its implications for the 
development of the Cape trade will be discussed further in Chapter 4.  
The mere existence of a new policy, however, was not sufficient to regulate the relationship 
between guano hunters, entrepreneurs and the colonial government. Given the geographically 
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dispersed nature of the local trade and the mounting dissatisfaction amongst local 
businessmen as a result of restrictions on free exploitation of the islands, new jurisdiction and 
policy challenges arose (such as a mutiny on Malgas Island and civil disobedience in the 
form of guano theft and rogue trading). This forms the basis of the discussion in the next 
section.  
3.4.    Policy, Mutiny and Jurisdictional Challenges  
Despite the efforts of the colonial government to prevent serious problems at Malgas Island, 
it was not humanly possible to plan for every eventuality. As soon as the official measures 
were put in place, the rush for guano started. Crews from all over the world and Cape Town 
congregated on the various islands situated in the bay, with particular attention to Malgas 
Island guano (regarded as similar in quality to that on Ichaboe). Most positioned themselves 
on the land adjacent to the islands. This brought together contracted seamen (normally 
subject to fixed wages and alcohol rations) and ordinary labourers (free agents) who were 
able to sell their labour to the highest bidder. Given the different traditions, labour disputes 
and social altercations erupted as the traditional discipline of the sea was subverted in the 
rush of ships in Saldanha Bay.  
 
In order to achieve a faster loading rate, some shipmasters approached the local Government 
Resident George Marsh to assist with the recruitment of local labour. The recruits who 
reported to Marsh were free labourers with better remuneration than the contracted seamen. 
These differences were aggravated by race and precipitated physical confrontation between 
the two labouring groups. On 13 May 1845 all work ceased and the European sailors, 
together with a significant number of their unemployed comrades, attacked the government-
recruited Malay labour force.
79
 Intoxicated by “frequent draughts of alcoholic compounds,” 
they literally chased these workers into the sea and they had to be rescued by their 
employers.
80
  To emphasise the economic and ethnic basis of their uprising, the mutinous 
sailors demanded a salary raise from 3/ to 4/6 per day with rations and also declared that they 
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would not “allow any man of Colour to work or land on the island” (emphasis in the 
original).
81
  
 
This mutinous behaviour challenged the accepted principle of the right to sell one’s labour to 
the highest bidder and thus placed the mutineers on the wrong side of colonial and maritime 
law. Furthermore, their actions also explicitly challenged the established order by rejecting 
the arrangements of the Resident Magistrate as the local representative of colonial 
jurisdiction and law, and can therefore be regarded as acts of counter-sovereignty steered by 
self-proclaimed leaders.
82
  
 
In a situation similar to the earlier Ichaboe Rebellion, the mutinous sailors seized control of 
the island and denied shipmasters access. The shipmasters then approached the colonial 
authorities for assistance in order to restore their unhindered commercial activities. While 
awaiting formal colonial intervention the Resident Magistrate, George Marsh, tried to reverse 
the tide of counter-sovereignty and restore some order with the assistance of some 
shipmasters and a group of loyal sailors who were sworn in as special constables and armed 
with rifles and short sabres.
83
 Despite their efforts, they failed to recapture the various 
landing stages needed to get onto the island. The rebels in turn used any means available, 
including dead penguins and guano, to prevent any landing.
84
 This confirmed an earlier 
report by the Captain of the bark “Abel Gower” that the local police were of no use.85 Having 
lost the fight to restore jurisdiction, a delegation was despatched to Cape Town to request 
formal military intervention. To restore order and its formal authority as representatives of 
Britain, the naval authorities dispatched a warship to Saldanha Bay. This had the required 
effect and re-established the conditions necessary for the peaceful exploitation of the island.  
 
Given their involvement in a speculative activity and fearing loss of money and labour as a 
result of possible arrests and the legal stipulations for dismissal (i.e. full payment of all the 
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wages together with a compensation), most shipmasters chose the pragmatic option of not 
laying any charges for mutiny. They were also content to accept promises of better discipline 
and productivity from their workforce.
86
 This pragmatic attitude confirmed Park’s 
observation that the mid 19
th
 century marine sector showed an increased level of tolerance of 
disturbances such as desertion and work stoppages.
87
  
 
The actions of the rebels must be seen in context. Representatives of the colonial authority 
never made provision for labour recruitment in the existing policy. As previously indicated, 
sailors were recruited at the request of local shipmasters. However, this unofficial means 
undermined the established recruitment practices (especially unofficial ones) used in most 
international ports or sailor towns. Although the recruitment of sailors in Europe had been on 
a formal footing since the 18
th
 century (culminating in the conclusion of a formal written 
work contract) in practice a far more informal regime was adhered to. In numerous 
international ports it was common practice that recruiting shipping crews was largely left to 
boarding-house keepers (or “crimps”). Crimps acted as the intermediaries between the 
official or government shipping master, the shipmaster and sailors. In this capacity, the crimp 
finalised the negotiations (including the remuneration) with the shipmaster and guaranteed 
that a recruit be present at the stipulated time.
88
 Part of this agreement included the exchange 
of advance notes for cash and other provisions, all of which saddled the sailor with significant 
financial debt prior to starting work and left him with little room for further negotiation. 
Furthermore, the wage position of seamen gradually weakened after 1815 as a result of an 
emerging international maritime labour market. An increase in the availability of more skilled 
sailors resulted in a greater availability of more training opportunities offered by private 
instructors.
89
 The European seamen’s insurrection against the use of cheap Cape Malay 
labour and their rejection of local jurisdiction must therefore be seen as an attempt to protect 
their economic interests, and cannot therefore be regarded as either a pre-meditated mutiny or 
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an action against failure of command. Viewed from this perspective these actions (in line 
with Busch’s arguments) actually represent nothing more than work stoppage.90  
 
The labour war was rekindled shortly after the departure of the naval force. Given the high 
levels of militancy, the dissatisfied labour force once again resorted to rebellion and 
prevented any work from taking place. The shipmasters again called for military 
intervention.
91
 The naval force under the command of Captain C. Wylie of HMS Cleopatra, 
with the assistance of Baptist priest and member of the Bethel Seamen’s Union, the Reverend 
James McGregor Bertram, succeeded in restoring peace to such an extent to enable the final 
scraping of Malgas Island.
92
 By July 1845 the Collector of Customs also instructed all 
colonial functionaries responsible for general administration to stop issuing guano licenses, 
given the near exhaustion of the source and the fact that the remaining quantity was not 
enough to provide for everybody that had purchased a licence.
93
  By October 1845 the last 
guano was finally removed from Malgas Island, leaving the colonial authority’s grip on the 
exploited territorial islands somewhat battered but still firm. 
 
Despite the fact that there were still adequate guano deposits on some of the other colonial 
islands they were too wet, full of feathers and regarded as inferior quality compared to the 
Malgas Island product.
94
 In addition, the colonial government had to repay the license fees of 
a number of merchants and shipmasters that had failed to collect a full load from Malgas
95
 
and Dassen Islands.
96
 Having finally stripped this resource, the first phase of the Cape guano 
trade came to its end. This did not end the struggle of various leaseholders to obtain the right 
to be allowed to collect guano from the islands under their control. They still regarded the 
Guano Ordinance as an unjust piece of legislation and increased their resistance. The 
resistance of the island leaseholders and other interested businessmen to the Guano 
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Ordinance as well as the response of the colonial government will be explored in more detail 
in Chapter 4. 
3.5.      Policy and Guano Income, 1844 – 1845 
By 1845 most of the guano on the colonial islands had been removed, with the exception of 
the remainder on locations such as Bird Island. As shown in the discussion of the labour 
problems during this phase, the Cape guano frontier was typically characterised by the 
lawlessness and absence of control typical of such newly opened frontier areas.
97
 The Cape 
Colony, however, still derived an income from the sale of guano licenses for use in 
infrastructure development and improvement. From December 1844 – December 1845 the 
actual revenue collected from the islands (based on the sale of licenses to 174 ships) 
amounted to £46 682.10s.6d. Expenses for the same period, on the other hand, amounted to 
£4200, highlighting the profitable nature of this industry. The total quarterly statistics for the 
income collected from the various islands is attached as Table 1.
98
 
 
TABLE 1: GUANO INCOME, 1844 - 1845 
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31 December 1844 £1,276-9s-9d 
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This table reflects that guano provided the Cape government with a valuable supplementary 
source of income and, as expressed, a “fortunate addition” of about £51 000.99 This resulted 
in increased optimism amongst local businessmen that the Colonial Treasury would use this 
additional income to benefit public works and colonial infrastructure in general and the 
construction of a dry dock in Mouille Point in particular.
100
 In this case the similarities with 
Peru are once again strikingly evident. Peru hoped to use the proceeds from guano to build 
railways all over the country (i.e. “guano rail tracks”). Similarly, Cape Town hoped to use 
guano income as a means to finance the building of a dry dock, (i.e. to build “guano dry-
docks”). However, given the diverse needs of the Colony, guano income had to be spread 
over a wide range of functions including public works and  infrastructure development.  
3.6.    Conclusion 
The promulgation and implementation of the Guano Ordinance policy was the culmination of 
a short but intensive process of issue-creation, amplification and persuasion driven primarily 
by a group of well-connected individuals and influential interest groups. During the evolution 
of the process, the colonial authority had to deal with diverse guano-claiming techniques 
ranging from negotiation, theft and rogue trading to the more conventional submission of 
memorials in an unstructured and informal policy process. In addition, the colonial authorities 
(despite their unwillingness to initiate a formal policy process) were provided with a variety 
of policy options such as using fishing leases as a basis for guano rights, granting 
discoverer’s rights, and the possibility of establishing joint ventures and public-private 
partnerships. The existence of a non-judicial opinion that questioned the legal basis of the 
Guano Ordinance confronted the colonial authorities with the possibility of uncontrolled 
guano collection and theft. This matter was remedied by declaring guano the property of the 
Crown.  
Although it was not its formal intention, the colonial authority finally settled on a hybrid 
management model consisting of the continuation of the guano collection license system for 
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the majority of the inshore islands and a joint venture based on the Bird Island Agreement. 
The operational aspects were handled by a private enterprise and marketing rested with the 
colonial authority. In this way, the Treasury was certain to continue to benefit from the trade 
as had been the case since opening the exploitation of Malgas Island.  
The Guano Ordinance still had to pass the test of imperial scrutiny since those who were 
denied first discoverer’s rights contested it. This started a second policy debate wherein the 
interests of both the Colonial Treasury and British agriculture in general were considered. In 
the end, the Cape Colony’s approach of selling guano licences was accepted as the only 
sound basis for managing the resource to the benefit of the Colony. This was unprecedented 
since no similar policy existed anywhere in the British Empire. With guano also being 
discovered along the Australian coast and the emergence of American guano imperialism in 
the Pacific Ocean, this piece of local, practical policy provided the basis for variations in the 
rest of the British Empire (Australia in particular) and the United States of America. It also 
effectively eliminated small businessmen from the Cape trade, leaving it open to larger 
groups with better resources and political connections. 
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CHAPTER 4 
“OBNOXIOUS AND PREJUDICIAL MONOPOLIES”1– SHIFTING GUANO 
RELATIONS AND POLITICS IN THE PERIOD, c.1847 – 1872 
4.1.        Introduction  
In the struggle for monopoly of the exploitation of a commodity, access to political, 
commercial and social networks are critical. Such networks are especially important as a 
means to discriminate between potential friends or foes,
2 
creating a climate of mutual trust,
3
 
and as a crucial mechanism to secure pro-business paternalistic government interventions or 
government-assisted individualism.
4
 The Cape Colony in the 19
th
 century has been described 
as the meeting place for a complex web of overlapping and ever-changing co-ethnic and other 
social, political and commercial networks.
5
 These networks fundamentally influenced the 
direction of the further development of the guano trade.  Those outside the established 
colonial network wanting to secure exploitation rights had to find innovative ways and means 
to either access, bypass or recast the established networks to suit their own agenda. Within 
the context of the guano trade, whether a potential partner possessed location-specific 
knowledge (especially sole or privileged information about the location of a potential guano 
resource); a sound reputation; and the ability to attract investors and potential partners was of 
critical importance.
6
 Equally important was the ability to successfully manage the interface 
between commerce and colonial and Imperial politics.  
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This chapter will argue that on the macro-level of inter-governmental relations, the already 
strained relationship between the Imperial Government and the Cape Colony worsened as a 
result of differences of opinion about the locus of control and the use of guano income for 
imperial as opposed to local purposes. This was further aggravated by inconsistent policy 
application and contradictions as well as problems that were directly connected to certain 
inherent administrative deficiencies. Collectively, these factors placed further pressure on the 
already tense relationship between the Colonial Government and its citizens. When guano 
income was threatened by the emergence of aggressive American trans-ocean guano 
imperialism, the Cape government moved to restructure what used to be an African guano 
trade into a Cape guano trade dominated by a small group of local entrepreneurs holding 
official leases from the colonial authorities. On a micro level, the struggle to secure the guano 
monopoly led to violent confrontation, which left its own particular mark on the development 
of the Cape trade. It will be argued that the involvement of key personalities within the Cape 
colonial society and the trade provided guano with a small part within the unfolding political 
drama and the struggle for self-government. The events surrounding the guano trade therefore 
added to our understanding of the self-government movement without suggesting that guano 
as a commodity, as was the case in Peru, ever became a key driver of the local constitutional 
struggle.  
4.2. Extraterritoriality, Guano Policy and Monopoly, c.1846 – 1853 
The transfer of exploitation control of a resurgent African trade from British-based 
speculative entrepreneurs to Cape businessmen during the period 1847 – 1853 placed the 
local trade on an important new trajectory. Upon discovery of substantial new deposits on 
Ichaboe in 1847, the company J.S. de Wolf & Co. (based in Great St. Helens, London and 
working from Liverpool) monopolised the island.
7
 According to contemporary sources, poor 
market conditions, caused by an over-supply of guano and coupled with the speculative 
activities of unscrupulous dealers, prevented them from fully exploiting their advantage. Poor 
financial decisions and speculative choices resulted in De Wolf’s insolvency. The monopoly 
then passed over into the hands of a loose grouping comprising the British-based companies 
of Gibson, Linton & Co., Lawrence Best & Co. and two individual shipmasters, the captains 
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Tompkins and Murray.
8
 Working from their base in Liverpool, both companies faced high 
operational and transport costs. By 1850 Gibson & Linton filed for insolvency and disposed 
of their monopoly by selling it via their partner and manager, Captain Tompkins, to the Cape 
Town-based companies A & E de Pass & Co. and Seawright & Co. of Cape Town as well as 
to Captain Carrew.
9
 Within the space of four years, Lawrence Best & Co. suffered the same 
fate and in turn sold their shares to Thomson & Watson and R. Granger & Co. of Cape Town. 
The Southwest African guano trade, dominated by local businessmen, thus effectively 
became part of the Cape guano trade. 
The relative ease with which the transfer of ownership and the structuring of the Ichaboe 
‘partnership’ took place was facilitated by the climate of mutual trust forged within the 
context of political struggle. During their collective involvement as members of the strategic 
leadership core of the Anti Convict Committee (AAC) in the 1849 “Convict Crisis” in Cape 
Town, citizens of the Colony effectively prevented the Imperial Government from 
transforming the Cape into a penal settlement. George Thompson of Thomson Watson & Co., 
Thomas Ansdell of Seawright & Co., as well as Antonio Chiappini of A. Chiappini & Co. 
served on the main committee whilst Aaron de Pass of A & E De Pass and Ansdell served on 
the AAC’s Vigilance Committee tasked with preventing the unloading of the transported 
convicts. Their success during this campaign and the bonds of trust forged laid the basis for 
the vital relationship needed to structure the formal exploitation of Ichaboe and the 
surrounding islands in the no-mans-land beyond the Cape frontier. 
The presence of Cape Town-based companies in an extraterritorial location was no 
aberration. As Legassick and Ross have shown, there had been strong local support for the 
principles of free trade and a growing interest in commercial expansion amongst the Cape 
merchant class since the 1820s.
10
 Their activity was, however, still in direct contravention of 
the Imperial Government’s strict curtailment policy issued in 1850 aimed at lowering 
government expenditure, which in itself was brought about by changes in fiscal policy in 
                                                          
8
 KAB:AMPT PUBS: CCP 1/2/1/9: S.C. A 11- ’61: Testimony of   T. Boyce, 9/7/1861: 10 
9
 KAB:AMPT PUBS: CCP 1/2/1/9: S.C. A 11- ’61: Testimony, 11/7/1861: 51 
10
 M. Legassick & R. Ross, “From Slave economy to Settler Capitalism: The Cape Colony and Its Extensions, 
1800 – 1854”, in The Cambridge History of South Africa: From Early Times to 1885 (vol. 1), C. Hamilton;B.K. 
Mbenga &R.Ross. eds  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 269   
University of Stellenbosch http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 90 
 
Britain.
11
 Legassick and Ross also suggest that the struggle for representative government, 
which coincided with the resurgence of the trade, was driven by the attempts of those in the 
merchant class to actively free funding for the further development of the Cape Colony.
12
 
The location of the Ichaboe trade in an area beyond the political jurisdiction of the Colony, 
however, made it vulnerable to attack from both local and foreign parties. This will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
4.3. Contesting the Ichaboe Monopoly, c.1850 - 1861 
All monopolies or duopolies, whether awarded by governments or not, were vulnerable and 
faced potential contestation. The Ichaboe monopoly was no exception. In the absence of 
formal British authority to regulate the trade and to protect the business operations of the 
guanopreneurs along the Namib coast, the Ichaboe monopoly (i.e. a non-government 
monopoly with open entry) made their controllers convert their foothold into an efficiency 
monopoly (i.e. where they are the most efficient producers of the product in the market).
13
 As 
an open monopoly in an open and contested frontier and field of trade where competition can 
arise over night, they also had to take steps to prevent their possible ejection from the island. 
Furthermore, with four groups working in a relatively small space, it was just as crucial to 
ensure a proper working relationship amongst the work teams of the various shareholders. 
They also had to structure their common workplace appropriately to achieve optimal results 
and to avoid potentially disruptive labour disputes of the sort that had previously 
characterised exploitation at Ichaboe and Malgas Island. 
For ease of mining, the island was divided into three distinct operational zones by the 
individual work teams supervised by a company Headman. All groups however shared the 
available landing stages.
14
 Furthermore, the traders fixed their own boundaries and drew their 
own maps to demarcate ownership.
15
 Walls were built to keep the wind and sea away and 
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timber fences erected to prevent penguins from entering the demarcated breeding areas.
16
 The 
island workforce also killed seagulls when necessary to prevent them from stealing the eggs 
of the other guano-producing birds.
17
 In addition, they had to protect the island from 
unauthorised landings by possible competitors and enemies (in accordance with the principle 
of “defence of the whole and the protection of the whole”).18 A fully armed boat was also 
kept on standby to discourage unauthorised landings.
19
 These steps, which were aimed at 
averting an external attack, were supplemented with the appointment of Captain Carrew as 
Justice of the Peace in 1854 to provide law and order on the island. As the designated peace 
officer he was tasked with enforcing regulations drawn up by Aaron de Pass of the company 
A & E de Pass for this specific purpose.
20
 These measures laid the basis for the treatment of 
guano-producing seabirds as a national resource.
21
 
As expected, the Ichaboe monopoly soon became the target for other parties interested in 
controlling the resource. Furthermore, reports of aggressive American guano imperialism 
especially a rush to annex any source of guano, reached the Cape Colony. Additional pressure 
resulted from local reports of hostile action by visiting American shipping crews (e.g. 
confiscation of a load of coal from Penguin Island and killing a Chief Officer of a Cape Town 
ship).
22
 The possibility of a new guano rush involving Americans directly impacted on the 
relationship between the Cape colonial government, the Imperial authorities and their 
citizens, which in turn influenced the further unfolding of the guano trade. 
 
4.3.1. The American Guano Islands Act (1856) and Cape Colonial Relationships  
As a result of a growing demand for guano fertiliser in the Southern states of the United 
States of America (USA), American businessmen contracted shipping crews to collect and 
import guano from the coasts of Peru and Africa. During the Ichaboe Rush (1843 – 1845), the 
American Consul in Cape Town unsuccessfully tried to convince his political principals of 
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the need to annex the main and surrounding islands within the bay of Angra Pequena.
23
 This 
prompted the local colonial newspaper, the South African Commercial Advertiser, to implore 
local businessmen to be aware of American actions and to establish a local market for the 
product.
24
 By December 1850, following a period of relentless lobbying by their public 
representatives, Southern farmers succeeded in extracting a public commitment from 
President Filmore to do everything in his power to ensure access to a cheap and affordable 
product. Prior to this, frustrated American entrepreneurs stole guano from the Peruvian Lobos 
Islands and the Spanish Isla de Mona in Puerto Rico. Only the threat of direct military force 
and the possibility of inter-state war prevented the wholesale stripping of the resource and 
illegal occupation of the islands in question.
25
   
 
Matters came to a head in 1855 after a group of Americans claimed Barker (or Nantuckett) 
Island, an offshore island outside American territorial waters. To protect their foothold, they 
made representations to the United States Congress and prayed for the extension of American 
authority to all new areas where guano discoveries were made. The U.S. Congress relented 
by promulgating the Guano Islands Act in August 1856. This measure made America the 
second country, after the Cape Colony, outside of Peru to implement a formal guano policy. 
In terms of this Act the mere presence of any American on any island, rock or key was 
sufficient grounds to regard such a location as American territory and therefore liable for 
formal annexation. By 1859, in accordance with the new Act, American citizens annexed 48 
guano islands, rocks and keys in the Pacific Ocean
26
 as well as Navassa Island in the 
Jamaican Channel within the territorial waters of Haiti.
27
  
 
As expected, American actions resonated throughout the 19th century guano world. As news 
of these actions spread locally, Cape guanopreneurs active in the area beyond the Colony’s 
northern frontier had cause for concern since they were still operating in an area that could 
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best be described as a judicial vacuum. Fear, exaggeration, and distortions were rife. Rumour 
even suggested that in the event of an American landing, the invading mob would disfigure 
the ships.
28
 Despite evidence to the contrary (i.e. a distinct lack of aggression from ships 
loading at adjacent islands) American ships like the “Ceres” were denied landing rights, a 
guano load and access to any product samples upon arrival at Ichaboe in 1859.
29
 The 
monopolists also made no secret of their readiness to defend their foothold with all the means 
at their disposal.
30
 Despite their pretence, they realised the limitations of their approach. Both 
J.D. Thomson and Robert Granger argued that as British citizens they were entitled to British 
protection. Granger, in particular, believed that only the British flag would prevent their 
possible dispossession and declared in no uncertain terms: “I say I am a British subject, and I 
consider that wherever I locate myself, whether on a barren rock or otherwise, I expect the 
protection of my Queen if asked for.”31  
 
Despite the various pleas from its citizens, the Cape government displayed no urgency in 
addressing what local businessmen perceived as the imminent danger of aggressive American 
guano imperialism. This attitude was not only consistent with its official position, but was 
also motivated by the absence of any significant hostile actions or indicative incidents. 
Official indifference caused anxiety within the local business community and stimulated new 
internal tensions and open conflict between some of Cape Town’s most prominent 
businessmen and politicians, as explained in the next section. 
 
4.3.2. Attacking the Monopoly: Pirates, Interlopers & Family  
The most sustained attack against the Ichaboe monopoly, however, did not come from the 
Americans but from the Cape Town-based firm Murison & Co, the former associates of De 
Pass, Spence & Co. This precipitated a shift in personal, business and political relationships 
and led to actions which, given the interconnectedness of the individuals involved, had 
serious political implications for the government of the Cape Colony. 
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Gordon Murison, the main protagonist in the first local attempt to seize monopoly control 
through violent means, was a brother to James Murison of the maritime and shipping 
company of Murison & Anderson, who were part of a group of interested businessmen who 
launched an effort to improve loading facilities in Cape Town harbour as far back as 1840. 
This effort was prematurely terminated when the Cape Town Municipality refused 
permission for the work to proceed because they feared the monopolisation of harbour 
facilities by a small group of the larger commercial establishments.
32
 James Murison, De Pass 
and others also attempted to establish the Cape Chamber of Commerce as an alternative to 
the Commercial Exchange dominated by larger business groups in 1850. The De Pass and 
Murison groups had a lot in common as campaigners for fair business practices and the 
general improvement of harbour facilities for the benefit of all colonial shipping. As a result 
of this shared interest and prior collective action, De Pass, Spence & Co. extended an offer of 
employment to Gordon Murison and upon acceptance placed him with their guano shipping 
crew. These good relations were short-lived and only lasted until 1859 before turning sour. 
They almost immediately added a new dimension to life on the Ichaboe guano frontier. 
Although the reason for this sudden deterioration was not disclosed, it was certainly serious 
enough to prompt Spence to send a power of attorney to his agent in Mauritius in 1859 to 
dismiss (“turn him out of ship’’) Murison as a crew member and to sell the “Meteor” on 
which he was employed.
33
  He was left behind in Mauritius while his fellow crew members 
were provided with the necessary passage back to Cape Town. Thus Murison vowed 
vengeance and committed himself to work towards the termination of the Ichaboe monopoly 
(to literally “bring down guns and blow the houses down about our ears.”)34 Although he 
acknowledged that he had no better claim to the islands than anybody else, nor could he offer 
any legal grounds for such a claim, he was adamant that he would not be denied access to a 
resource located in no-mans-land.
35
 De Pass, the other actor in the Murison-affair, was 
equally adamant not to give way to his opponent’s claim, which he described as having “no 
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more claim to them than any of your servants, leaving your employ, to claim a part of your 
property”.36 According to his opponents, Murison’s actions were nothing less than a “piratical 
attempt”37 by certain ‘interlopers.’38  
 
The deliberate use of pseudo-legalistic terminology such as ‘pirates’ and ‘interlopers’ appears 
to have been part of a deliberate effort by the parties concerned to conceal their claims and 
actions so that they appeared both valid and incontestable. It also validates Benton’s 
contention that individuals in remote locations tended to carry jurisdiction to wherever they 
were and deliberately used rituals and language to suggest delegated authority, which in 
reality was not always the case. This however does not wholly apply to merchant shipping, 
which the guano trade was a fundamental part of.
39
 
 
Despite his weak claims, Murison and his colleagues set out to claim the African guano 
frontier on moral grounds, claiming that it was an attempt to “get a living as well as 
themselves”.40 Realising the inadequacy of trying to justify their actions, Murison organised a 
fighting force equipped with cutlasses and revolvers.
41
 When this force attempted to land on 
Ichaboe in November 1860, they were held off by an armed counterforce of between 100 and 
200 men.
42
 In preparation for exactly this type of incident and to ensure sufficient legal 
grounds for its defence, the Ichaboe monopolists claimed to have solicited legal advice prior 
to the incident from the Cape Attorney-General, William Porter. Porter advised them “not to 
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shoot anyone but to keep them off in any way.” 43  To achieve this, they dispatched three  
vessels and over a 100 men to the island in addition to building sandbag fortifications 
(“batteries of sandbags”) and barricading all possible landing places. A number of men were 
also armed with rotten eggs, which they threw at the intruders. The Murison group’s attempt 
to gain control over the island failed. When both parties were confronted by the Colonial 
Government and asked to explain their actions and why firearms were used, they downplayed 
the whole affair. Andrew Murison (the aggrieved party) described the incident as nothing but 
a “scuffling” with limited loss and stated that only tents and stones were thrown into the 
invading boat.
44
 The only explanation was that neither side wanted closer scrutiny by the 
authorities. 
 
Based on the historical evolution of events in the African trade, it was extremely important 
for the guanopreneurs not to portray the guano frontier as an anarchic and dangerous place. 
Under normal circumstances such a state of affairs would have led to full government 
intervention, including the repatriation of British citizens from the potentially dangerous 
situation. This was clearly not what both the opposing forces had in mind. As Robert Granger 
articulated before the Select Committee on the Annexation of Ichaboe in 1861: “…my men 
would certainly defend themselves, the other going there would be the aggressors. 
Government does not interfere with men who may kill each other in the street; they take up 
the murderer and punish him, but do not always prevent the murder.” 45  
 
The attempt to take control of the frontier by violence also impacted on the relationship 
between the Murison brothers. As the events unfolded James Murison, a businessman and 
brother to both George and Andrew Murison, maintained his strong business links with De 
Pass, Spence & Co. In addition to chartering vessels to De Pass, Spence & Co. for the 
transport of guano to Mauritius, he maintained a safe distance from the guano trade. When 
questioned about this issue, James stated in no uncertain terms that he had always avoided 
anything to do with it, and had apparently never even questioned his siblings about their 
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activities in this regard.
46
 George, a guanopreneur with exploitation control over 
Plumpudding, Pomona and Seal Island (adjacent to Ichaboe) sided with Andrew and attacked 
the main monopoly and their exclusion from the latter. This leaves one with the distinct 
impression that the trade in guano and its downstream activities had more than a passing 
effect on business and family relationships. 
 
The failure to unseat the Ichaboe monopolists by anarchic means forced the opposing parties 
to revert to political and judicial means to achieve their objectives. This, once again, involved 
the Imperial and Cape government in guano affairs. During this process new strains 
developed in the relationship between the two political authorities at a time when the transfer 
of political power and the issues of representative and responsible government coincided 
(which included an intense debate about the relationship between the colonial state and its 
citizens around guano as a policy matter).  
 
4.4. Guano, ‘Acts of Sovereignty’ and the Challenges of Policy Transfer  
Awarding representative government to the British colonies, including the Cape Colony, in 
1854 unleashed a new campaign for a fully responsible government since most colonial 
legislatures had widely differing interpretations of the extent of their powers.
47
 Natal 
politicians, who regarded their power as theoretically defective and impractical, argued that 
“nothing short of responsible government could cure the political evils of the constitution.”48  
Political activists in Australia such as Victorian politician and attorney, General George 
Higinbotham, argued that under a system of responsible self-government, the new 
constitution in effect provided colonies with a “full instalment of responsibilities” over all 
colonial matters. According to Parkinson, this implied that the constitutions that accompanied 
responsible self-government provided a clear division of functions and could accordingly 
only work if the Imperial authority (as the ruling power) refrained from interfering in local 
matters.
49
 Any interference or obstruction could therefore be regarded as a subversion of the 
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policy transfer process.
50
 Although the Cape Colony was not yet under responsible 
government, the British Empire was awash with interpretations of the Higinbotham type. 
Cape citizens largely shared the idea that “legislatures must possess the attribute of 
sovereignty” as propounded by some politicians in Canada.51  As a fledgling representative 
government, the local authorities were eager to prove their commitment and readiness to 
handle their own affairs. The issue of long-term control over Ichaboe and neighbouring 
islands raised by the Murison brothers meant that guano became one of the first significant 
testing grounds for the debate regarding the evolving relationship between the two 
governments.  
 
Following the numerous appeals for naval intervention by various guanopreneurs Admiral 
Keppel, commander of the Cape naval station, sought direction from the Admiralty since the 
act of issuing and/or sanctioning rules as well as maintaining a physical presence on the 
islands (as was done previously) proved problematic. The practice of providing armed 
backup, for example when a warship is despatched while lacking any legal basis for 
intervention, was particularly problematic. “Such proceeding” according to the Admiralty, 
“can be considered as an act of sovereignty.”52 He therefore recommended that the islands be 
annexed as British property since “annexation would cost nothing and deprive nobody” as a 
means of preventing appropriation by France.
53
 Recognising the unintended long-term 
consequences of such actions, Sir. F. Rogers supported Keppel’s recommendation, dependent 
on the concurrence of the Foreign Ministry.
54
 In the interregnum between these memoranda 
the Ichaboe monopolists formally requested political intervention by the Imperial 
Government on 21 January 1861. They also communicated their firm commitment to resist 
any attempt to dislodge or dispossess them and the grounds for their claims. They also 
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expressed their disappointment with the no-show of the naval authorities at Ichaboe, 
especially since the threat of American guano aggression was still a possibility.
55
  
 
When the British Government finally acted in April of the same year by ordering the 
annexation of Ichaboe,
56
 the issue of colonial jurisdiction, rights and responsibilities became 
a point of dispute. After annexation on 21 June 1861 Ichaboe became a British territory and a 
dependency of the Cape Colony, and the matter was reported to the Admiralty on 20 August, 
who in turn notified the Colonial Office on the 24th. The Cape Colony (the governing 
authority) was only informed two weeks after the Colonial Secretary’s approval.57 
 
The unilateral decision to annex Ichaboe arguably had more to do with the state of the 
domestic guano market in Britain than with the need to prevent violence on the frontier. By 
1861 the British guano market was flooded by large volumes of different varieties of guano 
obtained and imported from a range of new and dispersed locations. Selling prices, however, 
remained high as a result of the low quality. To make matters worse, in addition to 
manipulating the market and its supplies, certain unscrupulous individuals and groups also 
continued to sell low-grade guano as the real thing. This motivated some of the leading 
agricultural unions and politicians to campaign to lower prices or find alternative guano 
resources free from the control of any other nationality.
58
  
 
In addition to prioritising the interests of British farmers in the mother country, the Imperial 
Government also made the mistake of engaging in a form of coercive rather than cooperative 
policy transfer at a time that local policy innovation and reinvention was supposed to be the 
order of the day.
59
 Firstly, the Government failed to timeously inform the newly installed 
representative government of the Cape Colony of its intentions with regard to Ichaboe. 
Secondly, it was particularly insensitive to the fact that the local authorities had only 48 hours 
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notice about the forthcoming events (on 19 June 1861).
60
 By the time the Cape Governor 
received the notice about the pending annexation and the Imperial government’s expectation 
with regard to the administration and policing of the island, annexation was already a fait 
accompli. The request that the Colonial legislature gave annexation its serious 
“consideration” was therefore cynical and communicated a total disregard for the local 
institution. Similarly, the request that the Cape Colony had to indicate how it planned to 
finance its management and policing, was nothing short of political disrespect. Thirdly, given 
the poor state of the colonial Treasury, following a reduction in the Imperial allocation for its 
general administration, the Cape Colony could hardly afford any new expenditure as implied 
by new extra-territorial commitments.
61
 These omissions effectively transformed the guano 
debate into a policy discussion on the features and boundaries of the new political 
relationship between the Cape and the Imperial governments following representative 
government and beyond.  
 
Colonial parliamentarians experienced the actions of the Imperial Government as 
disrespectful and indicative of total lack of appreciation for the role that they and their 
institutions played. In particular, they questioned the political motives behind the Ichaboe-
decision.
62
 In its subsequent discussion of the matter on 2 July, parliament resolved to delay 
its endorsement of the actions of the Imperial Government pending an independent 
investigation and recommendations by a Select Committee of its own choosing. They also 
resolved on 18 July 1861 that the same Committee be tasked to report on the constitutionality 
of the Imperial Government’s right to annex territory without prior consultation with the local 
legislature.
63
 These actions not only bordered on open defiance of an imperial order, but also 
demonstrated that the legislature was claiming the right to pass judgement on the actions of a 
higher authority. It is also significant that while the imperial notice represented routine 
imperial bureaucracy and authority at work, the appointment of the Select Committee by the 
Cape Parliament conveyed to the mother country an unambiguous message of local people’s 
understanding and interpretation of their constitutional mandate. In addition, it represented 
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the colonial citizenry’s insistence that the Imperial authorities acknowledge the newly 
established political relationship of granting and implementing representative government.  
 
Despite these actions appearing radical and wayward, they were consistent with events in 
Australia, Canada and Natal - the sister colonies of the Cape Colony. As indicated previously, 
the transition from representative to responsible government was essentially a process of 
policy and institutional transfer from the Imperial to various Colonial governments. During 
the interim period, legislative councils were supposed to develop their own policy 
development capacity and self-interest and act as a “filter within which the value and 
applicability of the English laws and policies were carefully scrutinised, either before being 
transferred to the colony, or, in the case of existing legislation, before being modified in ways 
the councils thought most appropriate.” 64 Following the granting of self-government and a 
greater degree of freedom ‘to determine the source of transfer’ during the mid 19th century,  
the Australian colonies and their legislative councils based their new laws on local 
conditions, English law and other applicable sources from sister colonies such as India. 
Similarly, in the midst of an economic and financial crisis during the period 1865-1868 and 
following the reluctance and inability of the colonial bureaucracy to address the situation 
satisfactorily, the Natal legislature appointed a special Select Committee to consider changes 
to the constitution in order to provide for greater citizen representation and increased powers, 
for example the right to raise taxes. The bill to this effect was, however, opposed by the 
Imperial authorities.
65
 It is clear that the colonies resisted any attempt by the Imperial 
Government to reverse the empowerment of the colonial legislature or to impose its views. 
 
The five-person Select Committee on the Annexation of Ichaboe under the chairmanship of 
the Attorney-General, William Porter, in Cape Town on 5
 
July 1861 met in an atmosphere of 
expectation, divergent understandings and growing tensions. Both the future of Ichaboe and 
the question of guano exploitation rights within Cape territorial waters were at stake. The 
proceedings would also have a direct bearing on the definition of the proper relationship 
between the Imperial Government and the representative government of the Cape Colony 
following the award of self-government. At the same time this tussle revealed the extent to 
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which economic interests created conflict between the Colonial Government and some of 
Cape Town’s most important businessmen over the issue of guano rights. This complex link 
between intergovernmental differences and government-citizen contestation created a new 
dynamic, namely guano political relations, the dynamics of which will be discussed hereafter. 
 
4.5. The Dynamics of Guano Political Relations  
The dispute between Cape Town businessmen about guano rights at Ichaboe had its roots in 
the on-going disputes between the colonial authorities and its citizens about exploitation 
rights in the territorial waters of the Colony. As such, the work of the Select Committee was 
in effect also an exercise in further policy-making under changed political conditions. Despite 
the colonial authorities’ strict adherence to its Guano Ordinance of 1845 and its consistent 
decline of applications for exploitation rights of both guano and eggs, interested business 
parties continued their lobbying campaign for long-term leases. Antonio Chiappini, a former 
member of the Anti Convict Committee, was particularly vocal in this regard and continued 
to petition the colonial authorities for nearly a decade.
66
 
Despite his knowledge of the regulations outlined by the Guano Ordinance, Chiappini 
directed several memorials to the Governor requesting the right to collect guano. A careful 
reading of his correspondence to the authorities revealed subtle sarcasm and a disrespectful 
tone. In a memorial dated 3 June 1850 he requested permission to remove guano from Dassen 
Island at his own cost in exchange for 80% of the profits and 20% of the proceeds for the 
colonial government.
67
 This was clearly outrageous and would have been unacceptable under 
any circumstances, irrespective of the political situation. As expected, the offer was rejected 
and the terms of the existing ordinance confirmed as the only basis for dealing with guano 
rights and collection requests.
 68
 Chiappini then requested the colonial government to appoint 
either a commission of neutral persons with no ties to the existing trade to act as arbitrators 
for all the conflicting claims, or a guano agent to conduct a formal survey of all islands to 
determine if any guano was present. He also suggested that failure to act on his proposals 
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might have been interpreted as the Cape colonial authorities’ downright opposition to free 
enterprise.
69
 The colonial government was however adamant in their commitment not to stray 
from their policy and formally rejected Chiappini’s suggestion of a commission of 
investigation or the appointment of a guano agent.
 70
 This response was consistent with the 
conditions under which the Imperial Government originally approved the Guano Ordinance 
and its system of licences, namely to defray the expenses connected with the provision of 
loading and docking infrastructure at islands within the Cape’s territorial waters. This 
frustrated people like Chiappini who for years not only had privileged relations with the 
colonial bureaucracy but during a period of “naked self-interest”71 had also been receiving 
and extending patronage and was therefore not willing to be excluded from the potential 
benefits to be derived from guano-mining.  The battle for access therefore continued, led by 
the rich and prominent Cape society who rightly claimed the same rights and privileges as 
their England-based brethren who seemingly benefited from the annexation of Ichaboe.  The 
Committee sittings also revealed a deep frustration of British citizens (businessmen) with 
both the Colonial and Imperial government, as well as the ambiguity of colonial-based British 
citizens who supported more political freedom but less economic control by the Imperial 
authority in colonial affairs. 
 
Although all parties in control of Ichaboe conceded that their legal claim was based on a 
questionable right, they still regarded it as beyond dispute under their particular interpretation 
of contemporary international law.
72
 J.D.Thomson, guanopreneur and a Member of the 
Colonial Legislative Assembly, argued that the Imperial government should not dispossess 
those who had legitimately ‘added value’ to the island but rather extend political protection 
(British protection) at no cost. It was especially important for them to get ownership of both 
the soil and the guano on the islands.
73
 Robert Granger, one of the Ichaboe shareholders, 
similarly argued that the British Imperial authority should be satisfied with doing its duty as a 
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paternal government.
74
 Everything else from this perspective was of lesser importance. Both 
attempted to stress the point that the valuable state of the island was solely due to their 
private initiative. Under these circumstances the colonial state’s task was to acknowledge the 
rights of those in possession and formalise the existing demarcation of production areas on 
the island.
75
 Furthermore, a demand was made for the official appointment of a Peace Officer 
from the ranks of the existing headmen, not for physical protection but to enforce regulations 
and rules of their own making.
76
 The arguments of an elected member of the Legislative 
Assembly with a direct interest in the guano trade appeared to be at odds with his colleagues 
whose actions attempted to establish clearer boundaries between the respective powers of the 
Imperial and colonial authorities. This ambivalence, especially the insistence on “paternal 
government” and British protection, also indicated the long road that the Cape Colony and its 
citizens still had to travel to establish their own identity and constitutional development. 
 
Based on the evidence obtained from key local guano stakeholders and their business or 
social networks, the Select Committee concurred with the actions of the Imperial authorities 
on 18 July 1861. It was recommended that the decision of the Imperial authorities to annex 
Ichaboe be endorsed as both expedient and necessary. It was also recommended that a public 
tender for the lease or sale of Ichaboe and eleven surrounding islands be advertised and that 
one-third of the annual rent be granted to the parties who were in possession. It was further 
recommended that compensation of £300 be granted to the opposition, Messrs. A. Murison & 
Co.
77
 On 1 August 1861 the Colonial Parliament finally adopted a motion to recommend to 
the Governor its formal support for the annexation and administration of Ichaboe. In addition, 
the Committee recommended that a special mining dispensation of seven years rent-free 
exploitation be granted to the former Ichaboe monopolists and that upon termination of this 
period the right to mine the source be leased out on a competitive basis. Furthermore, it was 
resolved that the monopolists be required to assume full responsibility to maintain law and 
order and all other matters relating to the policing of their rights as well as for the payment of 
£500 (increased from the original proposal of £300) as compensation to A. Murison & Co. 
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Parliament gave unsuccessful parties the right to appeal the final outcome of the Select 
Committee and parliamentary processes.
78
 These actions were rooted in the long-standing 
grievance of Cape Town residents as far back as the early 1840s, namely that the former 
political regime (pre-representative government) had failed to adequately develop the 
resources of the colony.
79
 Furthermore, the different elements of their settlement, which made 
provision for leases, rents, tax breaks and compensation amongst other things, represented an 
attempt to regulate an environment that would benefit local entrepreneurs. As such it 
conforms to Carroll’s observation about the importance of the economic imperative behind 
most of the actions of colonial governments under representative government.
80
 
 
Having awarded exclusive rights to mine Ichaboe to the De Pass–Granger-Thomson Watson 
group, Murison & Co. petitioned the authorities to refrain from implementing the decision 
with regard to Ichaboe on 10 August 1861. They cited the obvious losses, such as 
retrenchment compensation payable to their workforce and costs related to customised 
shipping and freight loss that would logically follow the implementation of the proposed 
monopoly.
81
 Their objections were based on the fact that: 
“all monopolies are obnoxious and prejudicial, and in the present case, extremely so, your 
petitioners and other traders seeking to earn their living in a fair trade, which has hitherto 
been open to all the world, until the efforts made recently by the combination of a few 
individuals to grasp and keep to themselves the advantages of the whole of the guano 
trade.”82  
Although these sentiments were consistent with the company’s previous attempts to 
overthrow the Ichaboe monopoly, they displayed the internal ambiguities, shifts and 
contradictory agendas of the various parties. Not only did Murison & Co. maintain a close 
working relationship and monopoly with De Pass on the adjacent islands, they also 
conveniently downplayed their own failed attempt to seize the Ichaboe monopoly.  
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As a fledgling representative government out to prove its commitment to protect the interests 
of its citizens, the colonial legislature was compelled to consider the petition. Final decision-
making was still the prerogative of the Colonial Governor. The Murison appeal however 
arrived too late for consideration by the House of Assembly and was referred to the 
Legislative Council.
83
  By November 1861, having accessed all of the constitutional means to 
prevent their final exclusion from the Ichaboe monopoly, the Murison group grudgingly 
conceded defeat and communicated their intention to accept the compensation offered to 
settle their wage bill for the island personnel they had to retrench.
84
 The matter also dragged 
on unresolved into 1862 while the Governor took additional information as well as the appeal 
from the Legislative Council into consideration (i.e. “not to take any final steps in relation to 
them (islands) until this Council has had an opportunity of expressing its opinion on the 
important matters relating hereto, with a view of protecting public interests.”)85 After nearly a 
year, on 4 August 1862, the Governor awarded the lease of the island to the original Ichaboe 
monopolists for a period of seven years without any further consultation with the Colonial 
Parliament. Furthermore, a reward of £500 was to be paid to the Murison group for losses 
sustained. Once again, those closest to the Colonial Government triumphed over their fellow 
businessmen. The Governor’s action, which failed to consider the views of Parliament, 
created new tensions between the office of Governor and the Legislative Council. It therefore 
failed to assist in shaping a new relationship and to remove some of the long-standing tension 
between the different governing institutions when the political representatives of the Cape 
citizenry insisted on being consulted prior to the implementation of important policy matters. 
The Guano question therefore remained an arena of public contestation. 
 
Since the final decision with regard to the Ichaboe lease failed to solicit the input of the 
Legislative Council as requested, Murison & Co. rejected the offer and declined to accept any 
money from the authorities. They also questioned the impartiality of the Select Committee 
and Parliament, specifically the involvement of D. Thomson, being both a member of 
Parliament and partner of the dominant group.
86
 The Colonial Government had no problem 
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with the non-disbursement of the settlement award.
87
 This communicates a cynical view of 
the whole matter.  
Awarding the new guano monopoly after consideration of a number of key factors was not 
wholly a matter of objective decision-making. Personal and political influence and patronage 
played a critical role in favouring the Ichaboe monopolists. The company of De Pass, Spence 
& Co. was particularly influential given their links to municipal politics and their status as an 
economic innovator. Its founder, Aaron de Pass, was an influential member of the former 
Anti-Convict Committee during the crises of the 1840s that nearly rendered Cape Town 
ungovernable. He also served on the Cape Town Municipality as a Municipal Commissioner 
during 1861. He was therefore part of the local political leadership that not only created the 
general seditious atmosphere twenty years earlier, but also actively participated in the 
aggressive agitation for increased power for the local government of political institutions. 
Furthermore, his company led the way in the development of important economic 
infrastructure, especially improving harbour facilities in Cape Town and Simon’s Bay. In the 
run-up to the Ichaboe Select Committee process and the finalisation of the Committee’s 
recommendations, the company provided the local maritime industry with its first two 
slipways in Simons Town (1859) and in Table Bay (1861). The inauguration of the latter 
event was deemed so important that the Colonial Legislature went into recess in order to 
allow its members to be present. In addition, the company erected the first ice manufacturing 
plant in the Cape Colony.
88
 In reality, the Murison campaign had very little chance of 
succeeding. These relationships survived the Ichaboe settlement due to the fact that they also 
had historical business relationships. Following the formal annexation of Ichaboe, Governor 
George Grey ordered the annexation of the remaining islands on the Namib coast in August 
of 1861. The resource-rich group had therefore once again outmanoeuvred their competition. 
4.6. Restructuring the Trade: From Special Dispensations to a System of Leases  
Despite the establishment of a single Africa guano trade by virtue of the annexation of 
Ichaboe and the surrounding islands in mid 1861, there was still no single policy position or a 
formal guano administration. Whereas Ichaboe and the surrounding islands (in terms of the 
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new settlement) were leased to the De Pass–Granger–Thomson Watson group for a period of 
seven years, the situation with regard to the islands within the Cape territorial waters 
remained unchanged. Although the Angra Pequena islands were still exempt from the terms 
of the Guano Ordinance of 1845, the local guanopreneurs made no jurisdictional distinction 
between the northern and southern part of the African guano frontier. For them these islands 
were under the same jurisdiction and they expected a uniform approach to their exploitation.  
 
In keeping with its established position, the Cape government remained unmoved by the 
plight of the local guano traders who continued their fight for free access to the resource 
within the colony’s territorial waters. As per prescribed procedure, guano could still only be 
procured by the purchase of a guano license from the Collector of Customs. At the same time, 
very little was done to overhaul the system in order to eradicate some of its internal 
deficiencies. Firstly, there were problems with the over-subscription of guano licenses and 
persistent guano theft.  Secondly, the Bird Island Agreement and the special dispensation that 
John Owen Smith of Algoa Bay continued to enjoy, particularly its exemption from the rules 
pertaining to the Guano Ordinance, also added new challenges.
89
 This and certain of Smith’s 
business practices irked the authorities and set a chain of events in motion that would 
eventually lead to the first formal restructuring of the local trade. 
 
Despite its apparent simplicity, the guano license system remained significantly flawed. It 
was undermined by its own internal deficiencies. Given the seasonal nature of guano deposits 
and its dependence on migrating seabirds, the colonial authorities were not always able to 
accurately map the volume of guano. Nor were they able to effectively police the various 
islands as a result of a serious lack of human resources within the ranks of the customs 
authorities and other geographically dispersed delegated colonial officials responsible for 
managing the exploitation of the islands. As a result, the colonial administration continued to 
experience oversubscription and guano theft. Awarding leases in error and subleasing without 
government knowledge caused additional problems. Andrew Farquharr, Richard Barkley and 
Richard Fryer, lessees of Elephant Rock near Lambert’s Bay, are cases in point. Fryer and 
Barkley held a guano licence for the area but when they erected stages to remove the same, 
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Farquharr accused them of theft and disturbing sealing operations and demanded clarification 
of their rights.
90
 Upon investigation, it was found that the Farquharr tender was granted in 
error and was subsequently annulled.
91
 When this decision was appealed, the Colonial 
authorities back-pedalled and allowed Fryer limited time to remove guano to rectify the 
bureaucratic oversight before awarding a new tender.
92
 Similarly, illegal subleasing without 
government approval was aggravated by a clash in the sealing and guano seasons, poor 
climate conditions, and limited deposits. This also led to clashes between the sub-lessee and 
the official leaseholders, which further complicated the task of the colonial officials tasked 
with administering the mining of the guano islands.
93
 Furthermore, the constant need to repay 
unused licenses or to grant remissions in cases where there was no more guano also created 
additional work. When companies such as De Pass, Spence & Co. (who collected guano from 
Paternoster and Jutten Islands in Saldanha Bay) were allegedly threatened by the crew of the 
John Woodall to “take forcible possession of the islands”, they indicated to Government that 
in the event of them losing their rights, they expected fair compensation.
94
 The Collector of 
Customs formally rejected this expectation, stating unambiguously that no party was granted 
the right to superintendent guano collection and loading and that the customs authorities were 
under the impression that De Pass & Co. played such a role itself.
95
 In addition, undeterred by 
fines, imprisonment, or the possible confiscation of their boats and other equipment, 
disgruntled Cape citizens continued to remove guano illegally and without the required 
licenses.  
 
In order to remove these inherent inadequacies and to ensure profitability, it was necessary to 
reconsider the existing pseudo-guano administration and to formulate a long-term plan and 
uniform approach for its management.  The introduction of a fully-fledged system of long-
term leases (as in the case of Ichaboe) seemed to offer the best option. The first precedent in 
this regard was awarding a 21-year lease over Malgas Island to the company of De Pass, 
Spence & Co. on 1 January 1861 after a process of public bidding on the Commercial 
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Exchange. In exchange for an annual rent of £570 they were allowed to collect guano, 
feathers and any other related and useful island products.
96
 This action represents the first and 
the most significant deviation from its long articulated policy as manifested by the Guano 
Ordinance (1845) and undoubtedly was motivated by the urgent need for additional 
government income. The award to De Pass & Co., however, caused a great deal of 
unhappiness amongst those who had rallied for the introduction of such a system, but had 
been denied access to the two most significant guano locations. The time for a new and 
deregulated system of guano exploitation had therefore arrived, driven by individual 
entrepreneurial initiative, with the colonial government as policing authority. It also 
coincided with a significant financial crisis within the Cape Colony, which once again pitted 
the colonial bureaucracy (as the representatives of the Imperial Government), against the 
popular representatives of the people. This gave further impetus to the role of guano as a 
political factor.  
 
4.7. Guano, Colonial Finance and Governance, 1861 - 1872  
Soon after the implementation of representative government, the newly installed Colonial 
Legislature led by Sir John Molteno had to review the Cape Colony’s financial systems, 
which included aspects such as the colonial budget, tax collection system as well as critical 
constitutional oversight structures such as a Public Accounts Committee to oversee public 
expenditure. By 1861 Rawson, the Colonial Secretary, announced the existence of a serious 
financial crisis and possible bankruptcy as a result of escalating public debt and a shortfall in 
government revenue, brought about by a defective tax collection system.
97
 Before a 
comprehensive rescue plan could be formulated, Sir George Grey was recalled and replaced 
by Sir Phillip Wodehouse as Governor of the Cape Colony. This event marked the beginning 
of a new chapter in the history of the Cape guano trade. 
In addition to inheriting a huge financial deficit, at the start of his term of office Wodehouse 
was informed by his principals that he would receive a significantly reduced allocation of 
£20 000 for the government, administration, and defence of the Colony and its adjacent 
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dependent territories. This amount was exactly half of what his predecessor had received and 
was reduced further during the subsequent years of Wodehouse’s term of office.  By the third 
year of his term it had reached an all-time low of £10 000, one quarter of what had been 
awarded to his predecessors.
98
 In order to remedy this situation, it was quite clear that a new 
means of strengthening the position of the colonial treasury had to be devised. As a 
newcomer Wodehouse was not necessarily familiar with all the nuances of Cape colonial 
politics, especially the determination of the elected public representatives to place their stamp 
on colonial affairs. Wodehouse and his administration introduced new legislation, specifically 
the Land Tax Bill and Land Boundaries Bill, aimed at widening the tax net and ensuring 
accurate land description and measurements for tax purposes. When the bills were tabled for 
discussion, the majority of colonial parliamentarians supported the argument by F.S. 
Watermeyer that the real problem was political rather than technocratic [as proposed by the 
new legislation] and therefore required a political solution.
99
 As a result, both pieces of 
legislation were rejected based on an assessment that since government had failed to 
adequately spend the normal allocation, it could therefore not be entrusted with the greater 
responsibility that accompanied a system of comprehensive taxation. This left the Wodehouse 
government with very few alternatives with regard to finding a long-term solution for its 
persistent financial problem. To aggravate matters, Boer–Basotho hostilities in Bechuanaland 
subscribed to a scorched-earth policy, which included the destruction of huts and other 
possessions. This caused a total breakdown in the colonial hut tax system, which deprived the 
Colony of a vital source of finance for the administration of this particular area.
100
 Under 
these circumstances, guano income inadvertently became the source of emergency funding 
for the financing of Bechuanaland’s administration – a move that placed further pressure on 
the strained relationship between the Cape Colony and London.  
During the first quarter of 1869, Governor Wodehouse directed a memorandum to the 
Imperial authorities requesting permission from his principals to use income obtained through 
guano sales and the rental of the guano islands for the administration of Bechuanaland.
101
 
Much to Wodehouse’s displeasure, he was accused of promoting colonial interests to the 
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detriment of the imperial cause.
102
 Caught off-balance by the accusation, Wodehouse had to 
defend himself and explain his tactical and strategic approach. He also attempted to change 
the perception that he had failed to make progress with regard to the financial health of the 
Colony.
103
  
 
When the permission finally arrived in April 1869, it was accompanied by a range of 
conditions. For example, in case annexation failed, revenue from the guano islands would be 
paid to the Exchequer, and a special vote submitted to the British parliament. Fully realising 
the danger of such a procedure, Wodehouse submitted an appeal for a different approach to 
ensure that guano income would remain accessible for colonial purposes and there would be 
no confusion with regard to the origins and the intended use of such income.
104
 When he 
finally succeeded in persuading his superiors only one condition remained, namely that prior 
to re-annexation all rents due to the Imperial government had to be paid over to the 
Exchequer.
105
 The Imperial authorities realised the value of the Cape Town model of guano 
island management and by the mid 1870s they decided to apply it in Western Australia where 
sizeable resources were being exploited. They requested the Cape Government to furnish the 
Colonial Office with all the regulations regarding guano collection and the terms and 
conditions for the industry’s regulation.106 The comprehensive package of information 
regarding law and the practices of the local trade, provided by the Office of the Collector of 
Customs in Cape Town, was eventually dispatched in December 1876 to the benefit of the 
Imperial cause.
107
 As far as the Wodehouse-administration was concerned, the permission to 
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use guano income for governance could not have come at a better time. They were now 
finally at the point where they could begin to transform guano income into a regular income 
and establish a uniform system, free from the drawbacks of special dispensations. The new 
arrangements were crucial for the future treatment of guano and other similar colonial income 
within the context of the Imperial budget and its allocation and accounting procedures. The 
new arrangements also assisted in refining the policy and institutional transfers and the 
accompanying relationship that had to accompany the movement towards responsible 
government. 
 
For a short while, the political contest regarding the uses of guano income and Wodehouse’s 
efforts to win the Imperial government over to his position shifted the focus away from 
mapping the future of both the colonial and northern islands. Once these differences were 
resolved, the focus shifted back and a decision had to be made, given the fact that the original 
leases over the Ichaboe-group had lapsed in 1868. Guano income from the existing leases 
such as Ichaboe already amounted to £800 per year whilst the smaller neighbouring island 
contributed a somewhat smaller amount of £31-5s-0d.
108
 In comparison, the selling price of 
guano on the British market amounted to £12-10s-5d per metric ton,
109
 meaning that with a 
formal, structured system, the colonial authorities could gain much more than what the 
original ad hoc leases brought in. The effects thereof were quite clear considering a guano 
yield of an estimated 79,8 metric tons obtained from a small island such as Elephants Rock at 
the mouth of the Elephants River on the Cape West Coast for the year 1871.
110
  At the above-
mentioned selling price, the estimated income would have added a healthy sum of at least  
£1000 to the Colonial Treasury for that particular season.
111
  
 
When the colonial authorities finally decided to call for tenders for the lease of guano islands 
within territorial waters in 1867, there were more than enough interested entrepreneurs.
112
 In 
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terms of the new arrangements the islands were to be leased under the supervision of the 
Collector of Customs subject to specific conditions, namely to preserve the birds connected 
with the trade and that guano collection be restricted to the proper season.
113
 Despite the 
Colonial Government’s original attempt at uniformity in the further exploitation of the Cape 
guano islands, they were forced to allow at least one exception to the rule. Given the 
continued presence of guano deposits on Bird Island (Algoa Bay) and government’s own 
failure to accurately measure the volumes to properly manage their contractual agreement 
with J.O. Smith, the special dispensation could not be terminated immediately, even though it 
denied Government a legitimate source of income.
114
 Smith was still one of the most 
prominent citizens of the Eastern Province who continued to fulfil important functions within 
the colonial administrative network. As will be described in Chapter 5, this matter remained 
unresolved until Smith’s death in 1871.   
 
The Island of Ichaboe, controlled up to that point by Granger, De Pass and Thomson under 
the terms of the 1861 agreement, was somewhat different. The company of De Pass, Spence 
& Co. had secured the Malgas Island concession in early 1861 and, through skilful 
negotiation and the strategic use of its control over certain strategic infrastructure, secured an 
extension of their contract. In exchange for a lease of 26 years and 11 months, the company 
offered the Colonial Government ownership of its Cape Town slipway in Table Bay (valued 
at £7500) and an additional amount of £800 per annum for the lease of the island.
115
 Given 
the income-generating potential of the slipway and Cape Town’s status as a maritime city and 
port, control over such a facility offered clear financial advantages. This offer was therefore a 
mutually beneficial offer that the cash-strapped colonial authorities could hardly refuse. 
Through this agreement, the first official guano monopolists of the African trade were 
formally installed. As guano island leaseholders, their formal relationship with the new 
Responsible Government (from 1872 onwards) continued to be affected by the new policy 
and institutional innovations of the recently installed political dispensation. 
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4.8. Conclusion 
 
The establishment of the first formal and government-awarded guano monopoly in Africa and 
the introduction of a system of guano island leases in the Cape Colony by the end of the 
1860s resulted from the convergence of a number of events. Key among these were persistent 
policy problems, the threat of an aggressive American guano imperialism, the needs of 
British agriculture and the need of the colonial executive to access additional funding for 
public expenditure. 
 
The continued exploitation of Ichaboe and her neighbouring islands (by Cape Town-based 
businessmen) continued to involve the Colonial authorities in an area where they had no 
formal political jurisdiction. Establishing control over offshore islands was complicated by 
the intense rivalry between local individuals and groups and the possibility of American 
interference. This created problems for the naval authorities, the Imperial Government, and 
the Cape Colony (the closest political authority). Armed intervention by the naval authorities 
in particular created a false impression that British sovereignty was being established. This 
forced the authorities in London to find an urgent solution. Their decision to annex Ichaboe 
and to place it as a dependency under the direct control of the Cape Colony proved 
problematic since it failed to involve the Cape authorities at a time when the relationship 
between the different spheres of government within the context of greater self-government 
was still being established. This kept the struggle for responsible government on the agenda 
and afforded guano a key role in the unfolding constitutional drama, which was further 
complicated by the changing strategic imperatives of the Colonial administration, especially 
with regard to the utilisation of guano income. 
 
Faced with a vastly reduced budget, Governor Wodehouse gradually began to appropriate 
guano income for administrative purposes with the approval of the Imperial Government. 
This elicited further resistance from local businessmen who were excluded from long-term 
control over the guano source. Local businessmen were forced to accept monopoly control by 
a select group with strong government links and adequate resources. In order to maximise its 
income and minimise the administrative problems of a geographically dispersed resource, the 
authorities finally decided to implement a system of guano leases in the hope of streamlining 
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the industry. This arrangement, however, had unintended consequences since it created new 
supply issues that directly impacted the Cape farming community. 
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CHAPTER 5 
‘TURNING (GUANO) TO PROPER ACCOUNT’1 – FARMERS AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR FAIR GUANO ACCESS; 1872 – 1910 
 
5.1. Introduction  
During the first half century of its existence, certain guanopreneurs with their roots firmly in 
the United Kingdom and their businesses in the Cape Colony dominated the local guano 
trade. Over this period, the role of the Colonial Government in this trade changed from the 
issuing of collection licenses to the granting of fixed-term guano island leases to interested 
businessmen as discussed in the previous chapter.
2
 Due to the export orientation of local 
guano traders, Cape farmers and their needs were inconsequential to the trade [and rarely 
considered]. This was in contrast with the situation in the American antebellum South where 
businessmen were ignored and treated as secondary to the planting culture.
3
 The position of 
Cape farmers was further compounded by a lack of unity within their own ranks (composed 
of Afrikaans/Dutch and English) as manifested by the existence of separate Boer or English 
farmer’s associations.4 In addition, mortgage debt, high labour costs and unpredictable 
agricultural yields resulting from the variation in soil fertility made certain types of 
agriculture less economically viable and even downright unattractive.
5
 Export activity, 
according to Gorman, tends to mobilise formerly marginalized sections of the population to 
enter the political system as competitors.
6
 This is particularly applicable to the situation in the 
Cape Colony where farmer-politicians with a direct interest in agricultural progress and 
guano fertilisation gradually became the voice of a larger collective who demanded a 
                                                          
1
This title is derived from the statements made by the Attorney General of the Cape Colony during the attempts 
in the 1880s to change the Bird Island (Algoa Bay) Agreement. See KAB:AGR 230/2153: Assistant 
Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works – Attorney General, 15/6/1886 
2
At the onset of the Cape guano trade the Colonial authorities charged entrepreneurs £1 per occasion for a 
license to remove guano from offshore island within the territorial waters of the Colony. From 1868 with 
termination of the system of guano licenses, interested parties could bid for a long-term guano island lease. 
3L. Schwelkart,  “Antebellum Southern Bankers: Origins and Mobility,” Business and Economic History 14, 
(1985): 79 
4
P. Van Breda, “Ontstaan van die eerste Landbou- en Boereverenigings in die Kaapkolonie tot 1883,” Contree 
14 (1983): 21 
5J. Wilson, “Rural Revolution – Wheat, Wool and Politics in the Overberg,” Contree 31 (April, 1992): 3 
6Gorman, “The State, Elite, and Export in Nineteenth Century Peru”: 412 
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government who were sensitive to their needs. Following the establishment of new farmers 
associations to overcome the “sterility” of some of its predecessors and the vocal support of 
their public representatives in the colonial legislature from 1879 onwards, the situation 
started to change for Cape commercial farmers demanding cheap guano.
7
  
 
The re-orientation of the guano trade from being an entrepreneurial-driven enterprise to a 
public service was complicated by a series of critical political events including the 
establishment of German business interests on the coast at Angra Pequena. This resulted in a 
full-scale diplomatic battle between Great Britain and Germany and the outbreak of the South 
African War (1899 – 1902) between Britain and the Boer Republics. The interplay between 
these events and the inevitability of shifting relationships fundamentally impacted on the 
political system.
8
  
 
In this chapter, the interaction between traders, farmers, bureaucrats and colonial politicians 
will be explored to determine its effect on the further development of the Cape guano trade. It 
will be argued that the 1890s witnessed the last attempts of profit-driven entrepreneurs, such 
as the Executors of the estate of J.O. Smith and Captain Henry Jackson, to resist the final 
appropriation of guano by the colonial state. Notwithstanding his position as Government 
Guano Agent tasked with the management of the new guano management system, Jackson in 
particular acted as the archetypical guanopreneur by subverting the colonial administrative 
system and defying the colonial parliament by delaying price reductions beneficial to farmers 
in order to extract maximum commission from guano mining and sales. Thanks to sustained 
protest led by farmers and their public representatives, the system was fully bureaucratised 
and a full system of state control established. Despite the defeat of the guanopreneurs, the 
unity of farmers (Western and Eastern Province) was far more difficult to achieve. Only 
when the thinking of both groups and that of commercial-orientated public representatives 
converged, were they able to make progress towards a common agenda and to take 
appropriate decisions beneficial to the majority of farmers. Amongst these was the 
promulgation of legislation regulating minimum standards for guano and other fertilisers and 
                                                          
7
Van Breda, “Ontstaan van die eerste Landbou- en Boereverenigings in die Kaapkolonie,”: 23 
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the protection of guano-producing seabirds. By the time the Union of South Africa was 
established and the basic interests of farmers had been secured, politicians could turn their 
attention to the protection of other birds and animals as a moral imperative.  
 
This discussion will begin with a short overview of some of the key developments in Cape 
agriculture (e.g. land reform, abolition of slavery and rural enclosure movement) since the 
beginning of the 19
th
 century up to the introduction of responsible government. The transition 
from a private to a state-run enterprise advanced the commercialisation of landed resources, 
the farmers industry and eliminated the ‘waste and sloth’ of local farming.9 Not only was 
commercial farming in the nineteenth-century an inherently insecure occupation, it was also 
up against the dominance of merchants in the political economy of the Cape.
10
 This 
exploration is aimed at uncovering the links between certain mainstream agricultural 
developments and the events surrounding the consolidation of the trade with the reintegration 
of the Bird Island and Angra Pequena questions which preceded the restructuring of the trade 
under government control.  
 
5.2. The Commercialisation of Cape Agriculture, c.1800 - 1872 : An Overview 
Right from the start of the second period of British rule at the Cape, the optimal utilisation of 
the available land to increase the yield of grain (wheat, barley and oats) and other products 
occupied the minds of key government officials and agriculturists.
11
 As early as 1813, 
Governor Caledon and his administration initiated a land reform programme, aimed at 
determining the intrinsic value of a particular portion of land and what resourceful people 
could do with it to boost productivity. At the heart of this exercise was an attempt to set a 
benchmark to determine taxes and rent and to reduce waste.
12
 Although this scheme was 
aborted in 1822 as a result of farmer resistance, those with a poor record of agricultural 
productivity were systematically excluded from obtaining further land and even forced out of 
                                                          
9
 J.C. Weaver, “Exploitation by Design: The Dismal Science, Land Reform, and the Cape Boers, 1805 – 22.” 
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 29, no. 3 (September 2001): 7 
10
 W. Dooling, “The decline of the Cape gentry, 1838-c.1900,” Journal of African History 40 (1999): 215 
11
 R. Ross, “Emancipations and the economy of the Cape Colony,”: 132 
  <https://www.openacces.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/1887/4235/1/1246876_067.pdf> ( September 20, 2008)  
12
 Weaver, “Exploitation by Design”: 5 
University of Stellenbosch http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 120 
 
the agricultural sector. In this process the idea of matching land and capital for increased 
production became firmly established.   
The emancipation of the slaves in 1834 followed shortly after the land reform programme and 
presented Cape agriculture with a new challenge. With the cultivation of slave-grown crops 
such as grain and wine, being both labour intensive and using traditional implements and 
practices, expansion of these sectors was minimal. The new situation necessitated a 
fundamental reconfiguration of the way in which agricultural labour and production was to be 
organised. Dooling suggests that Cape farmers in the main wheat-growing areas overcame 
the labour shortage and achieved higher production by using casual wage labour and 
embarking on a programme of mechanisation in the 1850s.
13
 Similarly, Ross suggested that 
in addition to the increased use of new agricultural technology, improved yields were also 
achieved by the increased use of guano fertiliser, which was purchased with the 
compensation paid for freed slaves.
14
 Van Breda noted a three-fold increase in wheat 
production in the Colony between the years 1838 – 1888 and even observed that a relatively 
poor area such as the Overberg District around Caledon managed to achieve an average 
increase of 0,6% in the yield and were able to secure a harvest of 224 000 muids of wheat by 
the end of the century.
15
 Although it is difficult to reconstruct the domestic use of guano for 
this period due to a lack of custom records,
16
 one can use verbal evidence from farmers to 
demonstrate that a local guano market existed for both chemical and natural fertilisers. The 
1865 Cape population census also indicated that nearly 48 percent of the working population 
was active in agricultural production and that the mineral revolution created new markets for 
grain in the interior of South Africa.
17
 
 
The development of a rural enclosure movement in the Cape Colony represents an equally 
important milestone on the road to establishing a fully capitalist agricultural sector. A system 
of open landholdings allowing freedom of movement for both humans and animals was a 
distinctive feature of life in the Cape Colony far into the 19
th
 century. It was thus impossible 
                                                          
13
  Dooling, “The decline of the Cape gentry”: 233 
14Ross,  “Emancipations and the Economy of the Cape Colony,” :140  
15
 Wilson, “Rural Revolution.”: 3 
16
Van Sittert, “Historical reconstruction of guano production on the Namibian islands”: 14 
17R. Ross, “The origins of Capitalist agriculture in the Cape Colony: A survey,” in Putting a Plough to the 
Ground, ed.  W. Beinart, P. Delius and  S. Trapido (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), 56 - 57 
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to pursue intensive cultivation or to implement scientific farming methods aimed at 
maximising returns from land and livestock for commercial purposes. By the late 1860s, 
following the discovery of gold and diamonds and the establishment of a substantial market 
for agricultural produce, services and labour, some stock farmers and cultivators with ready 
access to water wanted fencing.
18
 The first fencing legislation was tabled in the Cape 
Parliament in 1872 as an aid to improved fertilisation of arable land by providing a safe area 
for animals to graze, thereby assisting in the natural process of giving back manure to the 
soil. Enclosing grazing land was deemed useful to eliminate the need for the physical 
collection and storage of manure.
19
 The first fencing legislation, however, met with strong 
resistance from a significant group of farmers who could not afford the cost associated with 
enclosure. Furthermore, since it also projected the power of those with control over 
agricultural resources and industry and their network of influence spatially, individual and 
group relations were fundamentally altered.
20
  Its full implementation therefore had to be 
placed on hold.  
 
These processes collectively contributed to the commercialisation and adoption of capitalist 
farming methods amongst Cape farmers. Their understanding of the interdependence or inter-
linkage of new technology, fertiliser and fencing for commercial success was particularly 
important and provided an important impetus for further attempts by the colonial authorities 
to streamline and consolidate the local trade.  
 
5.3.  Towards a Consolidated Cape Guano Trade, c. 1872 - 1890 
The new responsible government of the Cape Colony inherited the dual task of finalising the 
integration and consolidation of the Cape guano trade to benefit the local farming sector. 
Given the political background of the special dispensations associated with the exploitation of 
Bird Island (Algoa Bay) and Ichaboe Island as discussed in Chapter 3, this process had its 
own pitfalls. Whereas the Bird Island agreement could be attributed to strategic 
miscalculation on the part of colonial officials, the Ichaboe agreement was the result of the 
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workings of political and social influence and patronage within the colonial power network. 
There was also no guarantee that those who benefited from these arrangements would 
volunteer to give up their control of a highly sought-after commodity. This further impacted 
on the still evolving nature of guano administration under the new governing regime. First on 
the agenda was the Bird Island Agreement, leased and managed by J.O. Smith of Algoa Bay. 
 
5.3.1. Bird Island – The Search for a ‘Judicious Compromise’  
The review of the Bird Island Agreement coincided with the dismissal of the Molteno 
Ministry by the Cape Governor in February 1878 – an event that Lewsen dubbed the first 
crisis of responsible government.
21
 This constitutional issue came about as a result of serious 
differences between the Prime Minister, J.C. Molteno and the Colonial Governor Sir Bartle 
Frere over the Sixth Frontier War (1877-78) in the Eastern Province and also gave new 
impetus to the further unfolding of the guano trade. 
 
In their first legislative act, the newly installed government of Gordon Sprigg imposed an 
excise duty on Cape spirits to relieve the financial pressures brought about by the war.
22
 
Similarly, income from the guano trade was used in the 1840s and 1860s to advance 
infrastructural development in the Cape Colony and to finance the administration of 
Bechuanaland as explained in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. Incensed by this action wine 
farmers, who were the primary clients of the guano trade together with wheat farmers, 
immediately closed ranks and established the South African Farmers Protection Association 
(SAFPA) or Boeren Bescherming Vereeniging (BBV) in October 1878 to fight the new duty. 
This signalled the emergence of a much more activist farming community in the Cape. 
Although BBV was initially established to oppose the excise duty, it eventually embraced 
broader objectives such as protecting the political and economic interests of farmers, the 
advancement of the general farming interests and the promotion of farming 
entrepreneurship.
23
 It also adopted a strategy of supporting suitable political representatives 
and opposing “legislation oppressive to the farming community.”24 This, according to 
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Tarmarkin, was a natural development since wine, wheat and sheep farming were all equally 
vulnerable to government taxation.
25
  
 
By the second attempt at revising the Bird Island Agreement in 1885, the BBV had gained 
political control over the parliamentary caucus of the Afrikaner Bond, a broad-based political 
formation established in 1880 to represent Afrikaner interests. As a political formation they 
favoured a protectionist economic policy to ensure greater competitiveness of Cape farmers 
against their foreign counterparts.
26
 The review process therefore restarted against the 
backdrop of a greatly changed political situation. 
 
Although J.O. Smith died in 1871, no immediate effort was made to terminate the Bird Island 
agreement. The colonial authorities had previously also failed to stop the transfer of his 
guano rights to his relatives upon his departure for England in 1861.
27
 This was not 
surprising since the Bird Island product was generally regarded as being low quality 
compared to those from Ichaboe and Malgas Island. In addition, difficulties with the removal 
of guano from the islands added to the existing problems. Its collection was not only 
dependent on external human/economic factors such as the availability of labour, but also the 
state of the guano market. Other factors included the natural breeding and migration cycle of 
the birds. With the passing seasons and the shrinking and expansion of the guano market, 
new guano deposits were continually added to the remainder or ‘old guano’. This resulted in 
a fluctuating deposit of the product on the island. Revising the original agreement therefore 
was not a simple matter since it was to remain valid and in force until such time as all of the 
original guano was removed. This stipulation was, however, inherently flawed.  
 
In order not to prejudice the case of the colonial state, given the difficulty to prove that the 
terms of the original agreement were fulfilled, the Attorney General advised the colonial 
government to desist from taking any action for the time being. As the new Cape parliament 
and government were still being established and lacked party tactics and strategy, caution was 
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advised.
28
 The constitutional dispute also affected the ordinary business of government. All 
government business also had to take a backseat pending a new election and the 
reorganisation of government. No further action with regard to changing the status of Bird 
Island was therefore taken. The colonial authorities thus had to endure a situation in which 
they were prevented from actually reaping the potential benefits of guano.
29
   
 
In September 1886 the authorities gave formal notice to the Smith Executors of its intention 
to reclaim full administrative and political control over Bird Island with effect from 1 April 
1887. In addition, in a notice dated 19 October 1886, all the access and exploitation rights of 
the original leaseholder were terminated.
30
 This was followed by an instruction to the 
Surveyor-General to advertise new tenders for the award of a five-year guano lease over Bird 
Island.
31
  
 
The Executors of Smith’s Estate fiercely resisted the attempt to eject them from the trade. 
However, they made a tactical mistake when the colonial government offered to undertake a 
chemical analysis of all guano on the island and to sell suitable volumes for their joint 
account. Rather than treating the offer as an amicable compromise, they regarded it as a sign 
of weakness and attempted to extract further concessions. They tabled a tough counter 
proposal for the continuation of the original agreement including the abolition of the guano 
license system and full government control over guano collection and marketing.
32
 As 
expected, the Colonial Government rejected this offer when they sensed that a “judicious 
compromise” as proposed by the Assistant Civil Commissioner would meet with little 
success. They therefore proceeded with the process of re-establishing official control over the 
island.
33
 Significantly, no member of organised agriculture in either the Eastern or Western 
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Province or from the ranks of guano leaseholders came out in support of the Smith Executors.  
The reason for this was soon to become clear. 
 
Under Resolution 2, on 2 July 1889 whilst the dispute still dragged on, the Cape Legislative 
Assembly resolved to place all guano islands under the direct control and management of the 
Department of Agriculture to benefit colonial farming.
34
 This could be attributed to certain 
positive developments during the term of the Second Sprigg Ministry that lasted from 1886 to 
1889. According to Grundlingh, this period of “exceeding calm” also witnessed a 
“remarkable fraternisation” between the English and Afrikaners that lead to much improved 
relations. In addition, the Sprigg government implemented a new policy of positive 
government that put colonial interests first.
35
 Given the importance of Guano affairs to the 
farming community, it therefore formally ceased to be a matter between private entrepreneurs 
and government alone. The voice and views of the farming community from that point 
onwards also had to be considered.   
 
Upon the refusal of the executors of the Smith Estate to abandon their rights, the Cape 
colonial government took their case to the Cape Supreme Court. Although the Court forbade 
the authorities from arbitrarily alienating the rights of the defendant, it ruled that the existing 
agreement would end on 21 May 1895. As a concession, as from 1 July 1892 the Smith 
Estate was entitled to buy guano from government at £30 per annum, where after all claims to 
the guano on Bird Island would lapse.
36
 Thanks to the specifics of this court verdict, 
especially setting a date for the final termination of the Bird Island agreement, it signalled the 
beginning of the end for local guanopreneurs. It also enabled the formal establishment of full 
                                                          
34
KAB: COGH: Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 2 July 1889: Resolution 2 reads as follows: 
“that in view of the increasing demands by farmers for the ‘manure’ called guano, this House is of the opinion 
that the guano islands should not be leased after the expiration of the several contracts or leases entered into, but 
that they should be placed under the direct control and management of the Agricultural Department, so as to 
provide purchasers with a good article at a reasonable price, and by this means encourage production, chiefly of 
grain, to a greater extent.” 
35Grundlingh, “The Parliament of the Cape of Good Hope”: 213  
36
Reports of Cases decided in the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope, Vol. VII, no 1, The Colonial 
Government vs. Smith’s Executors, (Cape Town, December 3, 1889), 132. The Court in particular ruled that the 
1845 Agreement “...merely called upon the defendants to remove the guano from the islands. There is no 
provision in the agreement, however, entitling the plaintiff to call upon the defendants to remove the guano. The 
plaintiff might have seen to the sale of the guano himself, and had the guano been sold, might have handed over 
one half of the proceeds to the defendants and then (own emphasis) claimed that the agreement was at an end.” 
University of Stellenbosch http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 126 
 
administrative and political control over all of the guano islands and rocks within and outside 
the territorial waters of the Cape Colony.  
 
5.4.  The Establishment of the Guano Agency 
Although the Cape Legislative Assembly decision to establish full government control over 
the guano trade was taken by a majority decision, its implementation revealed deep-seated 
differences between key public representatives from the Eastern and Western Provinces. 
These differences were rooted in years of distrust and a long-standing fear that once in power, 
the Afrikaner majority would advance ethnic rather than the general economic interests of the 
Colony to the financial detriment of the British community.
37
 There were, however, also 
internal differences within these groupings, especially from non-parliamentarians. The latter 
was firstly concerned about government entering a relatively unknown field, and secondly 
about the effect of this decision on the operations of independent businessmen in the guano 
trade. Critically, the authorities also had to find or develop an appropriate management model 
to organise the new undertaking and the necessary human resources to operate the system. 
Resolving these issues was critical for the success of this venture. 
  
During the debate in the Assembly, questions about issues around operational efficiency, the 
effect of a government enterprise on private contractors and demands for free allocations, 
enjoyed centre stage. For MLA Jones, the only route to low guano prices was the 
achievement of high operational efficiency in exploitation and keeping the overhead costs as 
low as possible. In his assessment, the colonial administration lacked the ability to work the 
guano islands economically and he was therefore sceptical about its chances of success.
38
 
The better option therefore was to leave it in the hands of private entrepreneurs. Thos Louw 
on the other hand, and with due consideration to the established interests of private guano-
sellers, feared that a government operation would cause “hardship” and financial ruin to 
guano contractors who had traditionally serviced the farming sector.
39
 He thus supported the 
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cause of these men and therefore argued for their accommodation rather than exclusion. 
Schermbrucker in turn cautioned that with the establishment of a government-controlled 
system, a new sense of entitlement might have developed amongst farmers, which in the 
future may have resulted in demands for free guano.
40
 
 
Despite these concerns, the Colonial Government put an administration together, which they 
believed would assist in achieving their objective of providing a more affordable and 
accessible product. Central to a profitable working of the islands was the need for trade-
specific knowledge of the inner workings of the guano trade, especially its collection, 
shipping and marketing practices. The Department of Crown Lands & Public Works 
(DCLPW), under which the islands were placed for administrative purposes, was not only 
newly-formed but was also staffed by office-based professionals who lacked intimate 
knowledge of trade. This forced the authorities to recruit from the ranks of those who had 
actually worked and lived on the various islands. This lack of institutional expertise implicitly 
exposed the organisation to administrative manipulation and abuse. Based on a model 
proposed by J.H. Van Heerden in 1861, the Department created the position of Government 
Guano Agent to take full responsibility for the supervision and management of all aspects of 
guano collection on Dassen and Bird Island (Lambert’s Bay) and Elephant’s Rock at the 
mouth of the Elephant’s River with effect from June 1890.41 Northwest Rock, Paternoster-; 
Marcus-; Jutten-, Skaap-; Meeuwen- and Foundling Islands as well as Jacob’s Rock in 
Saldanha Bay and Duiker Klip (Hout Bay) and Seal Island (False Bay) were to follow on 30 
June 1891.  
 
Mr. H.H. Macnaughton, the Assistant Commissioner of the DCLPW, appointed Captain C.H. 
Jackson, a veteran of the trade as Guano Agent. Jackson, whom it appeared subtly lobbied for 
the position,
42
 was well aware of the benefits of controlling the guano resource. He therefore 
willingly gave up his business to accept the offer (albeit for an initial period of only two 
years) based on a verbal agreement and a set of very specific pre-conditions that differed 
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substantially from the rules guiding appointments in the colonial bureaucracy. Instead of 
receiving a salary, he was offered a commission on guano sales in addition to being given a 
free hand to organise the management of the islands based on commercial principles.
43
 
Additionally he could reclaim all salary expenses from the colonial state, inclusive of worker 
salaries, administrative costs and provisions incurred for the management of the trade. By his 
own admission, he accepted the position to derive “some income or benefit out of it.”44  
Service to farmers was therefore only a secondary concern. Based on this combination of 
factors, the new system started off with certain inherent weaknesses, which had the potential 
to gradually undermine the strategic agenda underlying its creation. As such, this 
employment contract and its associated stipulations became a topic of contestation between 
Jackson the colonial functionary acting as a guanopreneur, and the state for control over the 
resource. 
 
In accordance with his mandate of providing a regular supply of guano to interested farmers, 
Jackson created the necessary infrastructure for the new administration. Given his freedom to 
act and his profit-orientation, he used this opportunity to embed certain profit-generating 
systems and mechanisms within the larger management system. To ensure a continuous 
supply of guano, the system of maintaining a regular island workforce was continued. In 
addition, a central guano depot with a capacity of 300 tons was established in Cape Town. At 
this facility, the different guano types were to be mixed, weighed and despatched after sales 
were concluded. Despite his attempts to reduce operational costs by insisting that buyers 
provided their own transport, he was overruled by his superiors and had to transport guano 
purchases by railway trucks at £8 less 5% discount net cash as per departmental arrangement. 
In addition, sale by analysis was strictly based on request.
45
 These affected not only his 
operational budget but also impacted on his commission. To overcome some of the 
constraints of the internal market on his profit-making arrangements, Jackson deliberately 
cultivated markets in Lorenzo Marques, Transvaal and the Orange Free State. He also 
appointed his own marketing and monitoring agent in London to exploit the long-established 
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European and British market. This was contrary to the accepted practice of working through 
the General Agents in London or through officially appointed Crown Agents whose task it 
was to advise, mobilise support and act as a link between colony and investors.
46
 
Furthermore, exporting guano to neighbouring states and abroad over time also became a 
bone of contention given the healthy local demand for the product.  
 
Although Jackson succeeded in putting in place a workable administrative structure, putting 
his own interests before that of the farming community for whom the new guano regime was 
meant to serve, soon caused friction with his principals. The demand for lower prices and 
equal treatment in provisioning by Eastern Province farmers was central in this regard.  
5.5. Fair Access, Regional Interests and Defeating the Guanopreneur, 1890 - 1898 
Once the Cape guano administration became operational, the local demand for guano 
escalated. Orders from individual farmers, institutions and organised groups were received 
from all regions of the Colony. In addition to the individual orders from farmers in the nearby 
Swartland
47
 and Breede River regions
48
 that were received by the central depot in Cape 
Town, early orders were received from the Knysna Political Association (KPA) in the 
Southern Cape and the Lower Albany Farmers Association (LAFA) from the equally distant 
Eastern Province. From the onset, the latter also insisted on paying the same price as 
applicants from the Western Province.
49
 Given the long distance from Cape Town, the 
Knysna Divisional Council also proposed the establishment of a small guano depot in the 
Southern Cape region to service local farmers with payment guaranteed by the Council.
50
 
Given the fact that the new administration was still in its first collection season and lacked 
sufficient stock, it was fairly difficult to set prices that farmers could afford.
51
 Most of the 
early orders therefore had to be declined. In addition, high transport costs added more 
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complications for those located far from Cape Town. The lowest fee for transporting large 
volumes of guano to Lower Albany for example came to 115s-10d.
52
 Given the poor state of 
roads, the railway department recommended shipping via Port Alfred and the Kowie River as 
the best option.
53
 Both the opening and maintenance of a satellite depot and the provision of 
long-distance transport had serious cost implications, adding significantly to the overhead 
costs for mining and marketing of the product. It also negatively impacted on determining 
commissions at the end of the financial year. Jackson therefore opposed the proposal by the 
Divisional Council of Knysna
54
 and suggested provisioning the Southern Cape region (and 
potentially also Lower Albany) from the islands along the coasts of Mossel Bay and Port 
Elizabeth.
55
 In addition, he declined the LAFA request for equitable provision by shifting the 
responsibility for transport and reduced tariffs away from the Guano Agency and informed 
them that haulage pricing was the responsibility of the railway department.
56
  Other than that, 
no further official action was taken to find an acceptable compromise or a more practical 
solution to the problems raised. These actions speak of indifference and a strong sense of 
partiality instead of a willingness to devise ways and means to be of greater service to the 
farming sector.  
In addition to the logistics of guano supply, the issue of cost became a perennial issue. At the 
time of the establishment of the guano administration, the sales price of guano was set at 
£7.12s per ton. This was calculated using the average local price of £8, allowing a 5% 
discount for cash.
57
 For most farmers, this was too expensive.
58
 By June 1891 W. Basson 
MLA gave notice of his intention to request parliament to consider a price reduction. The 
Commissioner, McNaughton, however, responded negatively by indicating that since there 
was already an intention to sell guano by analysis, which would generate its own additional 
costs, a price reduction was not foreseen.
59
 The Government Guano Agent was as a matter of 
principle strongly opposed to any price reduction and argued that the product was already 
                                                          
52
KAB: AGR: 231:141, Commissioner of Crown Lands & Public Works – Assistant General Manager of  
    Railways, 29/11/1892 
53
KAB: AGR: 231: 141, Assistant General Manager – Secretary to Public Works, 1/12/1892 
54
KAB: AGR:231:2153, Capt. C.H. Jackson – Assistant Commissioner, 6/5/1893 
55
KAB:AGR: 231:2153, Capt. C.H. Jackson – Assistant Commissioner, 9/7/1891 
56
KAB: AGR: 231:2153, C.H. Jackson – Assistant Commissioner, 17/11/1892 
57
KAB: AMPT PUBS CCP 1/2/2/1/48: SC. A.12 – ’97: Testimony of  Capt. C.H. Jackson, 1/6/1897: 4 – 5 
58
 KAB: AGR153:667, S. Du Toit – A. Fischer, 2/5/1892 
59
KAB: AGR: 231: 2153,  McNaughton Report, 25/6/1891 
University of Stellenbosch http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 131 
 
sold at 50 cents lower than market value.
60
 This over time became his standard response to 
any demand for a lowering of the guano price. One again this was related to Jackson’s direct 
interest in high prices for commission purposes.  
Notwithstanding the obvious flaws in the guano administration system, Jackson and his team 
recorded a net profit of £2973-12s-50d for the sale of guano, penguin eggs and seal skins by 
May 1891.
61
 Based on this performance, the colonial authorities offered Jackson a formal 
written contract on 21 March 1892. In terms of this new contract, commission on guano sales 
were calculated on a sliding scale on the following basis: 15% on sales up to £8000; 5% on 
sales between £8000- £15000; and 3% on sales between £15000 - £20 000. In addition, he 
could submit claims for office and other entrepreneurial expenses.
62
 This new contract came 
with a series of measures clearly aimed at benefiting Cape agriculture. Firstly, it was 
determined that credit and discounts of 5% on cash sales (rail freight included) had to be 
extended to local farmers. Secondly, the product was dispatched by rail to a station closest to 
the buyer. Thirdly, the cash sale price was fixed at £7-12s-5d per ton. Fourthly, in line with 
the European standard, the client could request a chemical analysis of his or her purchase. 
This significantly reduced his future commission and gradually undermined his ability to use 
cost-cutting measures as a means to improve his income. The new contract was based on an 
improved understanding of how the guano trade actually operated and was unashamedly pro-
agriculture. In this way it bears a close resemblance to events during the first phase of the 
granting of the Peruvian concession earlier in the century. There was, however, still more 
than enough space for Jackson to continue to extract profit through his agency role.  
 
The change in the administrative regime was not to Jackson’s liking. He therefore opposed 
credit sales, provision of cheap or free transport, chemical analysis and fixed prices. He also 
favoured bulk guano sales without any differentiation in an effort to outperform the 
remaining leaseholders and to get rid of excess guano in storage in various points of retail 
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within the Colony.
63
 The colonial authorities however stood firm and insisted on total 
compliance with official orders.  
 
Following an extremely wet season in 1892/3, which affected both guano volumes and 
quality, new demands were made. As had become customary, the first concerned a general 
reduction in the existing guano price and the second, most important one, an immediate 
termination of any exports.
64
 The Colonial Government was, however, reluctant to consider 
another price reduction so soon. Although it was fortunate for Jackson from a commission 
perspective, farmers were left greatly dissatisfied and resolved to ensure a system geared 
towards their needs. As it turned out, their growing dissatisfaction was also directed against 
the manner in which Jackson ran the guano agency. This effectively turned the contestation 
between the guanopreneur on the one hand and the farmers on the other hand into a public 
affair. 
 
The next phase of the struggle for an affordable product saw the emergence of protest action 
led by farmer-politicians - a development that took the struggle for fair access to a higher 
plane.  Malmesbury farmers in conjunction with their public representatives protested at a 
meeting held in late 1892 and resolved to push parliament towards lowering the guano price 
to £6 per ton.
65
 They also demanded credit sales, the appointment of official guano-sellers, 
the elimination of private sellers, use of convicts as guano labour as a cost-cutting measure 
and, significantly, the termination of the guano commission system.
66
 Spearheading this 
protest in January 1893 from the Cape Colony’s principal wheat-growing areas around 
Malmesbury and Paarl was a group of high-profile farmer-politicians, namely A. Louw 
(MLA for Malmesbury), D. De Waal (MLA for Cape Town), Z. De Villiers (MLA for Paarl), 
J. Van der Spuy (MLA for Koeberg) and S. Walters (Piketberg). This effectively divided the 
Legislative Assembly and its diverse group of public representatives along economic and 
regional interest lines. The government delegation led by Sir Pieter Faure was therefore left 
with few options. Since he was in no position to order an immediate price cut without the 
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consent of parliament, he undertook to propose a price reduction to legislature in 1895 when 
the Ichaboe lease expired and the island returned to full government control. Louw, the MLA 
of Malmesbury, vowed to continue to fight for a price of £5 per ton, much to the annoyance 
of the Guano Agent. In typical entrepreneurial fashion, Jackson felt that such actions and 
statements “had no weight except that they mislead the more ignorant.”67 There was, 
however, to be no respite from the actions of these progressive but also normally fiercely 
independent individuals, who through the persistent struggle of their compatriots, recognised 
that their destinies were inextricably intertwined. As a result they were persuaded to 
exchange their individual identity for a collective one.
68
   
The phenomenon of the activist parliamentarian or farmer-politicians was not a new 
development in Cape Colonial history. The organic unity displayed between farmers and their 
public representatives and the skilful use of both extra-parliamentary (e.g. petitions and 
delegations) and parliamentary means (e.g. special investigation commissions or Select 
Committee hearings) to pressurise the colonial government was also previously used to 
advance the farmers interests in the protests against the wine excise duty (1878), the rural 
enclosure movement (c. 1865 – 1910) and the Anti-Scab Movement (1894). In addition to 
adhering to a growing party political organisational discipline, public representatives of 
organisations such as the Farmers Protection Association (FPA), BBV, Africander National 
Party (ANP) (est. 1889) and Afrikaner Bond were also constitutionally compelled to act 
against state legislation and policy that militated against the general farming interests. In the 
founding proposal to establish the Afrikaner Bond, it was explicitly stated that this particular 
organisation would be one “which guards politics and keep traitors out of Parliament and sees 
that the true friends of the Fatherland take their place.” Furthermore, they would promote 
commerce and industry and guard against the enrichment of speculators.
69
 Similarly, the rules 
and regulations of the BBV stipulated that such members “will generally oppose all measures 
calculated to press unduly on the farming population.”70 The ANP in its Programme of 
Principles declared emphatically that it stood for the promotion of agriculture and other 
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economic sectors by all legitimate means.
71
 It is significant that these formations, especially 
the AB according to Tamarkin, became the ‘political Cinderella’ of Cape politics and the 
arbiter of political power without which no government could be formed or have survived.
72
 
Against this background, Jackson faced a formidable opponent. 
Shortly after the first protest, the colonial government was confronted by a new set of 
demands by Eastern Province farmers. In addition to the lowering of the guano price, they 
continued to demand the equitable distribution of the product to all farmers in the Colony. 
They also mandated their MLA, J. Trower, to raise the matter during the sitting of the House 
of Assembly on 4 July 1893 and to demand “that the government be requested to allow guano 
to be delivered at any railway station on the Colonial system of railways at actual cost of 
carriage” (author’s emphasis).73 This convergence of thought and action for the first time 
raised the possibility of united farmer action based on a common agenda in the near future. 
The Guano Agency and its accompanying commission system run by a guanopreneur in the 
colonial government bureaucracy, was thus placed under further pressure. 
Despite the encouraging signs of the emergence of a common farmer agenda, the struggle for 
fair guano access was far from over. At the heart of the problem was a combination of 
practical matters such as high transport costs, regional interests, parliamentary divisions, 
bureaucratic indecision and the resistance of the Guano Agent. All these factors not only 
prevented them from engaging in unhindered capital accumulation but also increased their 
inability to influence the value of their commodity.
74
 When the matters aired by the farmers 
were raised in parliament, the Assistant Commissioner of Crown Lands reiterated the 
departments standard position, namely that the product was already being sold at 50% below 
market value and that the Eastern Province’s demand could not be acceded.75 A number of 
politically irresponsible statements by Jackson did not help matters. He considered the 
Western Cape market as sufficient for the purposes of his mandate and he could not see any 
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reason for further price reductions.
76
 As a final insult to Trower and his constituency, Jackson 
also insisted that the existing guano supply was not even enough to satisfy the requirements 
of the Western Province farmers.
77
 The resultant refusal to lower the rates for farmers in the 
Eastern Province left Cape farmers further divided and put further strain on the relationship 
between the Colonial Government and farmers and greatly increased the divide between the 
latter and the Guano Agent.  
Although Jackson succeed in establishing a functioning guano administration, problems 
concerning the price and quality of guano as well as the Guano Agent’s treatment of farmers 
and colonial officials continued to emerge and strained relations further. Jackson’s own 
inclination to treat the legitimate complaints of clients as “inconsequential” and the low 
guano quality as an issue “not worth mentioning” won him few friends.78 This also applied to 
his off-hand statements in response to the demand for lower transport rates.  He argued that 
haulage had nothing to do with the price of guano, “it was simply the fact of their [farmers] 
living so many miles from Cape Town.”79 Matters were certainly not helped by the tendency 
of certain sections of the colonial administration to side with the Guano Agent during these 
disputes. Such conduct did nothing to improve trust in the colonial authorities’ promise of 
delivering a proper service to the farming community. It rather acted as a stimulant for more 
organised action by farmers interested in obtaining guano. The relationship between Jackson 
and his counterparts in other colonial departments was equally poor. Used to getting his own 
way, he had little regard for the work of others and the impact thereof on the end-user in the 
guano value-chain. In addition to bad faith towards him in the Department of Agriculture, he 
also alienated the Colonial Railways over the issue of appropriate times for the delivery of 
guano.
80
 Although Jackson once again got his way, matters came to a head in December 
1893.  
The gradual reduction of the guano price and variations in the quality of the product due to 
wet winter seasons directly affected sales and implicitly impacted on Jackson’s commission. 
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Although the situation improved somewhat after June 1891 with the addition of the islands in 
Saldanha Bay, Hout Bay and False Bay, which brought the number of islands and rocks 
under government control to thirteen, growth in his direct benefits from the enterprise was 
slow. To reverse the situation and boost his own income, Jackson introduced a guano buyers 
list, seemingly as part of his administrative responsibilities to better organise his service to 
clients. As a result, farmers not on the list would have been forced to purchase either from 
third parties or from the guano agency at a price to be determined by Jackson or to use 
alternative fertilisers. Either of these options had cost implications. When the public was 
officially informed of the closure of the list with effect from 1 January 1894 and that guano 
would be sold as cargoes arrived, matters reached boiling point.
81
 Since this measure 
discriminated against all farmers, irrespective of ethnic, ideological or geographical origin 
and threatened to reverse the gains they had made, this served as an impetus for their 
mobilisation. Farmers also correctly identified the implications of a closed list, namely 
possible price manipulation by some middlemen and others, including the Guano Agent. 
They therefore protested their dissatisfaction with the short notice and poor advertising of the 
new measure in the outlying areas that preceded the closure of the list to the colonial 
government. A particular cause of concern was uncertainty about government’s plans with 
regard to late applications. In response to this campaign, fronted by farmer-politicians, the 
colonial government extended the application period to 15 January, ordered the issuing of 
new notices throughout the Colony, and prohibited the use of private guano intermediaries.
82
 
This effectively pushed back Jackson’s agenda to further demonstrate the value of united 
action for the achievement of shared objectives. Despite winning this concession, farmers still 
had to overcome the larger issue of parochial regional and self-interest.   
5.6. From Protest and Commissions to the Guano Islands Division 
As the concessions won by the various delegations generally only benefited Western 
Province farmers, Eastern Province parliamentary representatives began to question formal 
measures and actions that placed their constituency at a distinct disadvantage. Captain E.Y. 
Brabant in particular questioned the discount sale of guano to Western farmers, which he 
                                                          
81
 KAB: AGR: 231:2153, C.H.  Jackson – Office of the Commissioner of Public Works, 8/12/1893 
82
KAB: AGR: 231:2153, Report of  N. Janusch – Secretary for Public Works, 25/12/1893 
University of Stellenbosch http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 137 
 
regarded as a blatantly unfair form of cross-subsidisation
83
 and tantamount to getting a 
present from Government.
84
  He demanded that the authorities at least consider reducing 
transport charges in order to accommodate eastern farmers.
85
 Brabant further denounced the 
export of guano to the Transvaal and Orange Free State as foreign states and particularly 
questioned the fact that these states received the product at the same rate as Colonial 
farmers.
86
 As far as he was concerned Guano had to be reserved for the exclusive use of Cape 
farmers. Continued divisions within the ranks of parliamentarians, however, delayed the final 
resolution of the matter and the status quo remained and continued to benefit the Guano 
Agent at least until the beginning of 1895, six months prior to the expiration of the Ichaboe 
lease. 
By January 1895, under pressure from the unrelenting agitation of farmer-representatives and 
their organisations, the colonial authorities publicised their intention of honouring their 1893 
promise of granting yet another price reduction. In terms of Government Notice no. 45, the 
price of ordinary guano was to be reduced to £6-10s per ton of 2000 pounds or 13 shillings 
per bag of 200 pounds and that of rock guano to £6-17s per ton of 2000 pounds or 13s-9d per 
bag of 200 pounds.
87
 This attack on the guano commission system signalled the last stand of 
the guanopreneurs. The Guano Agent, consistent with his previous position, did not support 
this measure and refused to implement it. This resulted in another protest to parliament and 
the DCLPW in March 1895 in defiance of a government order. They also accused Jackson of 
deliberately manipulating the guano supply. Governor Gordon Sprigg conceded to the 
farmers’ request and ordered a price reduction backdated to 1 January 1895. A refund to 
buyers who formerly bought stocks at the old price, a reduction in the waiting period
88
 as 
well as the immediate execution and despatch of all orders to their agreed destinations was 
also ordered. The repayment of the first batch of remissions cost Jackson £4 384-16s, which 
directly affected his former and future commission.
89
 To prevent possible manipulation of 
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this process, all subsequent remissions were to be handled through the offices of the various 
Civil Commissioners.
90
 These actions set a new precedent since this moves significantly 
beyond mere tinkering of the system that Jackson constructed. 
 
Jackson resented the undermining of his powers and the reduction of his commission and 
refused to fully implement the new measures. In an act of open defiance he continued to sell 
at the old price of £7-1s-5d and calculated his commission on the same basis. When 
questioned, he explained: “I went in with the idea of deriving some income or benefit out of 
it. I would not have gone into the undertaking otherwise.”91 He also accused the Colonial 
Government of a breach of contract since they excluded Ichaboe from his contract.
92
 These 
events caused a lot of public resentment amongst farmers who continued to insist on nothing 
less than the full enforcement of Sprigg’s order.  
 
As has become customary, farmer-politicians assisted by their constituents pressurised 
parliament to appoint a commission to investigate the management of the guano 
administration system in general and the position of Guano Agent in particular. This was 
particularly urgent given the diversity of opinions that preceded the appointment of the 
commission. Chief amongst these were a fear that the Colony may lose a lucrative industry, 
especially since some of the disaffected farmers during the dispute resorted to purchasing 
artificial fertilisers from the emerging chemical fertiliser market as an alternative to the 
natural product.
93
 J.M. Peacock (MPL) in particular, argued that there were certain 
advantages in exporting all the guano to England and importing chemical fertiliser instead.
94
 
This was, however, no real option for the majority of farmers who already struggled to pay 
cash for their purchases and who throughout lobbied for the granting of credit. It also became 
a vicious cycle since the Commissioner for Public Works deemed it too risky since they were 
dealing with trust money.
95
 Parliamentarians D.P. Van den Heever and F.J. Van Eeden 
argued that the colonial authorities needed to sell guano as cheaply as possible as a means to 
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develop the country
96
 or risked being labelled as non-progressive and obstructionist.
97
 Based 
on this diversity of views, it was clear that the end of the guano agency was in sight. It was 
thus important for the Select Committee to prioritise the needs of Cape agriculture. To stress 
their commitment to the cause, the colonial authorities terminated the existing contract with 
Jackson with effect from June 1896. The age of the guanopreneur therefore officially came to 
an end. All that remained to be resolved was the challenge of overcoming the still divisive 
issue of regional interests. 
 
The Commission of Investigation under the Chairmanship of Thos Louw which started their 
work on 28 May 1897 included parliamentarians from both the Eastern and Western 
Provinces of the Colony. This was extremely significant since the balancing of the regional 
interests of both groups ha been a long-standing point of dispute and a source of division 
within the ranks of Cape farmers. After taking evidence, the majority of the members of the 
Commission recommended maintaining the existing administrative system and taking official 
steps to ensure the delivery of guano at the same price at all of its ports.
98
 This 
recommendation was potentially an important victory for farmers in the Eastern Province. 
The committee could not reach unanimity over other critical aspects of the local trade. 
Representatives Frost and Brabant, although partial to the interests of the eastern farming 
sector, were vocal supporters of the principles of free trade and tabled a minority report 
calling for a total free market system with sales on the open market with no government 
intervention and, alternatively, for commission based on the original price.
99
 Louw and 
Marais, important spokespersons for western farming interests, opposed Frost and Brabant in 
a minority report of their own and recommended that a uniform selling price be implemented; 
commission be based on a net price of £6-10s-5d; that an amended commission or fixed 
salary be paid to the Guano Agent; and that the industry without exception be converted into 
a fully state-run operation.  
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Following the recommendations of the Commission, the guano islands were placed under the 
Guano Island Division (GID), a new sub-department of the Department of Agriculture 
(DOA) with effect from 1 July 1898. Despite the adverse findings of the Commission about 
the general conduct of Jackson, they still offered him the new position of Superintendent of 
Government Guano Islands. This was ironic since his former assistant, Captain John Spence 
whom he appointed during his former tenure as Guano Agent, was equally experienced in the 
management of the system. While Jackson’s re-appointment may be interpreted as an 
admission that the existing system was the most workable, it strongly pointed to the existence 
of strong political support amongst parliamentarians. Whilst farmer–politicians such as 
Marais, De Vos and Hofmeyer supported the unrestricted provision of farmers with a product 
that was affordable and of a high quality so as to advance grain farming as previously 
indicated, the sentiments of people such as Jones, Louw and Schermbrucker, were closer to 
that of Jackson since they supported the sale of guano on the open market and the pro-active 
prevention of a sense of entitlement amongst farmers. Another critical voice was that of A. 
Wilmot MLA who had consistently argued that all farmers and not only those involved in 
grain farming had to benefit from a beneficial guano price regime.
100
  Jackson’s relationship 
with his new department and the farming sector would determine the further development of 
the local trade, especially the question of the extension of credit on guano sales.  
 
5.7.    The Obstructionist Superintendent of Government Guano Islands, 1898 - 1904 
Jackson’s new employment contract as the Superintendent of the Guano Islands Division 
(GID) differed significantly from those applicable to his former position as Government 
Guano Agent. Although his position was fully bureaucratised (e.g. he had to obtain prior 
permission from the Secretary of Agriculture before any expenditure was incurred),
101
 he still 
maintained certain discretionary powers (e.g. the acceptance of different forms of payments 
such as postal orders, mail orders, cash or acknowledgement of debts).
102
 As a service to the 
local farming community, the colonial administration originally made provision for the 
extension of credit to those purchasers who had registered such a need. Under the new 
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dispensation this discretion was never exercised. Instead, following an increase in the number 
of dishonoured cheques, cash sales became the norm because they were less of an 
administrative problem.
103
 Despite its administrative benefits, this change did not enjoy 
universal support since a significant number of buyers also preferred payment by cheque. 
Those that needed credit were equally frustrated. This resulted in a new stand-off between the 
Office of the Superintendent and the farming sector. In the wake of his continued refusal to 
consider using alternative methods of payment, farmers once again appealed to their 
representatives in the colonial parliament, demanding a change in the system.  
 
In addition to frustrating the farming sector, Jackson both openly and subtly undermined the 
general administrative system since he resented the bureaucratisation of his position. 
Nowhere was this resistance more visible than in his refusal to manage the administration of 
the guano service in accordance with the prescribed rules. In addition to an unfriendly 
attitude towards customers interested in buying guano on the prescribed terms, he on different 
occasions deliberately refused requests to certify particular transaction documentation such as 
accounts or the required approvals prior to concluding particular transactions that had to be 
submitted to the Auditor General.
104
  In another act of open defiance, he also ignored the 
explicit rule that prohibited the export of guano without prior permission from the Agent 
General by selling cargo to Bechuanaland and Rhodesia.
105
 This was particularly cynical 
given the growing local agitation for the maintenance of a guano reserve and lower prices.  
Given this combination of factors, Jackson was suspended and his service terminated on 30 
June. 
 
Following the aforementioned events and since guano was a key commodity for Cape 
farmers, parliament was compelled to order an investigation into the operations of the guano 
administrative system. Particular attention was given to lowering the guano price, 
administration expenditure, customer service and the position of Superintendent since 
Jackson’s dismissal.106 The Committee, however, did not succeeded in investigating these 
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matters fully due to the looming war between Britain and the Transvaal and Free State 
colonies. Hearings were suspended in order to submit a report to the legislature before the last 
sitting. The Committee found that service management left much to be desired; there was 
total non-compliance with regard to the adherence to the standard audit regulations; and there 
were serious weaknesses in the marketing and sales system that used an overseas-based 
private agent. One of the key recommendations was therefore to replace the London Agent 
with a government-appointed agent.
107
 The outbreak of the Anglo Boer War (or South 
African War, 1899-1902) delayed the implementation of most of its key recommendations. 
Placing the guano island division in new hands was problematic since Jackson had possessed 
critical administrative knowledge and experience. This forced the colonial authorities to re-
appoint Jackson despite the severe criticism relating to the management of the trade up to that 
point. As a result, he continued as Superintendent until he passed away in 1904. The farmers’ 
frustration with regard to their central needs therefore continued and had to wait until after 
the South African War (1899 – 1902) to be addressed. 
 
5.8. War, Depots, and Guano Quality Standards, 1899 - 1910 
As expected, the South African War placed new strain on the guano trade and further 
complicated the process of bringing the product within easy reach of its local clientele. The 
maintenance of an adequate reserve could also not be realised immediately as a result of 
limited storage facilities in Cape Town at the central depot and the priority given to the war 
effort. Instead, the authorities were compelled to keep the reserve guano on the islands ready 
for shipping. In addition because wagons, storage space and labour had to be hired, factors 
such as high transport, storage and labour costs combined to make it nearly impossible for the 
colonial government to achieve its goal of providing an affordable product to colonial 
farmers. The military authorities that commandeered all small sea craft for the transport of 
soldiers and provisions also disrupted transport by sea. In addition, new restrictions to 
regulate coastal shipping and to control access to the most important harbours further 
disrupted the trade. Similarly, overland transport was constrained by both the blockage of rail 
tracks by both the warring parties and a general shortage of sufficient rail carriages and 
trucks. On the labour front, the guano trade was no exception and suffered serious staff 
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shortages because the military authorities paid higher salaries.
108
 Collectively, these 
constraints caused long delays in product delivery and heightened frustrations amongst its 
customers. The war itself also further widened the gap between the Eastern and Western 
Province farmers. 
  
Following the war, the colonial authorities instituted a system of guano depots located at 
selected railway stations in the heart of the Cape’s wheat growing areas of the Overberg and 
Swartland districts to aid the farming sector. Depots were established at towns such as 
Malmesbury, Kalbaskraal, Mooreesburg, Piketberg (Swartland), Worcester, Caledon 
(Overberg). To supply the wheat and vine growers in the northwestern part of the Colony and 
the wine-growing areas outside of Cape Town, single stores were opened in the Boland 
(Paarl) and the Elephant’s River Valley (Clanwilliam). In terms of this system Station 
Masters were assigned the responsibility of supervising the sale and dispatch of guano. In 
return, they were paid an additional allowance to compensate for the extra tasks assigned. To 
ensure uniformity throughout the system, all guano orders had to be placed at the various 
depots before being transmitted to the central depot in Cape Town from where the correct 
load was despatched by railway carriage to the destination the order originated from. The 
buyer therefore had the convenience of taking possession of the order from the station closest 
to their home or farm. To overcome delays and to ensure the delivery of the product to the 
farmer within the shortest possible time, the decentralised depots gradually took over the 
seller’s role from the central depot. This measure went a long way to effectively address 
some of the longstanding grievances of farmers in the Western Province but continued to 
discriminate against those in the Eastern Province. As such, the guano management system 
did not really contribute towards restoring relations in the post-war reconstruction era. 
Furthermore, the issue of pricing and Jackson’s opposition to the guano depot system 
remained contentious issues.  
 
Consistent with his past behaviour, Jackson opposed the new depot system. He particularly 
questioned its effectiveness and, given the seasonal nature of the demand for guano and a 
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planned expansion of storage space at the Cape Town store, he argued that the depots were an 
unnecessary expenditure that would soon became obsolete.
109
  These plans, however, were 
not realised by the time of his death in 1904 when John Spence was appointed as the new 
Superintendent.  Guano depots therefore remained an integral part of the Cape’s agricultural 
landscape and the debate about its usefulness and relevance for the promotion of local 
agriculture, in turn, advanced the cause of farmers in general. The most significant decision 
that emanated from this and the continuous agitation of Cape farmers was the Colonial 
Government’s decision on 1 January 1906 to reduce the guano price to £5 per ton. Another 
significant decision was to provide free rail transport of the product to any station within the 
boundaries of the Colony.
110
 This decision meant that for the first time all Cape farmers were 
treated equally, irrespective of geographical location, and went a long way towards restoring 
relationships. Simultaneously, the authorities decided to institute a new Commission of 
Inquiry into the guano trade and the depot system in 1907 to map their long-term plans for 
the sector.  
 
The repeated appointment of commissions of inquiry created the impression of a government 
lacking a coherent strategy. However, a close analysis of the debates within the confines of 
the colonial legislature suggests that the Cape colonists used the commissions as a tool in an 
attempt to achieve political compromise between different interest groups within the ranks of 
colonial parliamentarians. As previously alluded to, various public representatives were also 
farmers in their own right and therefore had a direct interest in the further development of the 
local guano trade. On the other hand, their fellow parliamentarians involved in other retail 
and commercial activities were logically defenders of their class rights. As a result, the two 
groups engaged in long debates about the twin issues of lower prices and workability of state 
control over the trade. 
 
The differences between those who favoured government control and price regulation and 
those advocating the establishment of a free market must, however, not be overstated as they 
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also displayed a robust unity of purpose with regard to other equally serious matters. These 
included matters such as the need for uniform guano standards and equal treatment of all 
agricultural areas and sectors. Most of the price reductions awarded over the years mainly 
benefited the farmers around Cape Town and not the whole of the Colony as intended. This 
situation was only rectified following prolonged and sustained pressure and support from 
public representatives committed to serving their constituents, and forming issue-alliances 
and the necessary workable compromises. The issue of product standards was an outstanding 
matter that was to be investigated further. 
 
Against this background, the Colonial Government’s new Commission of Inquiry under the 
chairmanship of James Searle started their work on 24 September 1906. As previously 
mentioned, they were tasked with investigating the general administration and management 
of the guano trade including the future of depots, the feasibility of yet another price 
reduction, the need for product standards and the extent of chemical fertiliser use within the 
Colony. Of particular importance was the investigation of the effect of the personnel structure 
and administrative deficiencies on the price structure of guano.
111
  The Commission found 
that that most of the administrative deficiencies with regard to staffing, provisioning and 
compliance with the state procedures identified by previous Commissions continued to exist 
under the tenure of Spence and therefore directly affected the product price. Their 
investigation also revealed that chemical fertilisers had been gaining popularity and could 
displace natural fertilisers such as guano within the foreseeable future. Proposals were thus 
made to ensure a uniform guano standard beneficial to most soil types and to issue 
certificates of analysis to assist farmers in making informed decisions on the expected 
benefits under the right conditions.
112
 The Commission also recommended closing certain 
guano depots with the exception of those located close to guano islands or rocks in the 
Western and Eastern Province, which would remain functional on a temporary basis. This 
report and its recommendations provided the colonial government with the first scientific 
basis on which to formally structure and manage a sustainable Cape guano trade. The real test 
was to be found in its formal implementation.  
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Early in 1907 and following directly from the Commission’s work a member of the colonial 
legislature, Ryan, formally tabled a motion proposing that Act 5 of 1890 (Sale of Food and 
Drugs and Seeds Act) be amended to also provide for the regulation and sale of guano and 
other fertilisers within the boundaries of the Cape Colony.
113
 Based on the established needs 
of Cape agriculture, the House published a draft bill to give effect to Ryan’s motion on 5 July 
1907. This bill provided for the appointment of qualified persons as chemical analysts, 
trademarks and registration of product types, guarantees with regard to chemical composition 
and purity, regulation, contamination, prevention of price manipulation, regular analyses, and 
compulsory provision of samples to the authorities, raids and penalties for breaches as well as 
annual reporting to parliament.
114
  The stipulations of the bill clearly indicated that the 
colonial authorities had listened to the voices of the farming community and had learned the 
administrative lessons of the preceding 64 years. The bill was passed and was finally 
promulgated on 17 September 1907 as the Act to Regulate the Sale of Fertilisers, Farm 
Foods, Seeds and Pest Remedies (Act 20 of 1907) to herald a new era in the Cape guano 
trade. Of particular interest was the fact that the act made provision for a maximum prison 
sentence of 6 months with or without hard labour for false representations and non-
compliance in the areas specified. Given the harshness of imprisonment under colonial rule 
and the prospect of hard labour, a meagre diet and capital punishment meant that this 
provision acted as a real deterrent. In terms of the Act the offending party was also compelled 
to compensate the plaintiff by paying all costs connected with a particular transaction, 
including postal and rail costs.
115
 
 
Setting quality standards for the guano trade was, however, not enough since its availability 
was still dependent on continued production by certain seabirds. It was therefore also 
important for the Cape authorities to protect both the birds and their environment. These 
actions had major implications for both guano birds and nature conservation. 
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5.9. Sea Bird Protection, Economic Bounty and “Preventing a Silent Wilderness” 
The Cape Colony had a long interaction with and dependence on wild and domesticated 
animals for either food or power, to the extent that the rhythms of its social life were attuned 
to its relationship with animals.
116
 A broader sensitivity for the protection of the environment 
was, however, largely absent in the early 19
th
 century South Africa.
117
 Van Sittert 
summarised the attitude of the Cape colonial elite during this time as one of environmental 
indifference and antipathy, manifested by the preference for exotic plants and avoidance of 
indigenous species.
118
 It is therefore no surprise that indigenous wild animals (including 
seabirds) were regarded as economic bounty, whose slaughter and exploitation were morally 
acceptable.
119
  
The Guano Ordinance (Ordinance 4 of 1845) made payment for guano-collection mandatory 
and omitted any reference to the protection of seabirds, which, according to Cushman, were 
the most valuable birds in the 19
th
 century world.
120
 Other than declaring guano to be the 
property of the British monarch, it failed to explicitly declare seabirds as subjects entitled to 
royal favour and protection. At that point, the trade was all about mining an economic 
resource such as guano in the case of seabirds or feathers in the millinery trade.  
Since Great Britain had never owned any guano islands that were explicitly mined to service 
the fertiliser industry,
121
 the official protection of seabirds for commercial reasons was never 
an issue of governance. Like other birds, seabirds were therefore regarded as legitimate 
objects for target shooting, a leisure past-time practised by the well-to-do in the Victorian 
world. In 1868, after a particularly bad season of slaughtering on the Yorkshire coast, a group 
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of interested people under the leadership of the Reverend Henry Frederick Barnes - 
Lawrence, Vicar of the Priory Church of Bridlington, established the Association for the 
Protection of Sea-Birds, a broad alliance of local landowners, prominent clergyman and a 
number of Members of Parliament.
122
 On 26 February 1869, one of its members in the House 
of Commons, Christopher Sykes M.P, tabled a Bill for the Preservation of Sea Birds in order 
to give further impetus to their declared commitment. On this occasion and in support of the 
new legislation Sykes made two claims. Firstly, that his actions enjoyed the support of all 
classes of his constituents and secondly, that he was acting in the national interest (on behalf 
of the “thoughtless pleasure seekers” as he put it) in order to prevent the English coast from 
being turned into a ‘silent wilderness’.123 The significance of Sykes’ actions, more than the 
veracity of his statements with regard to broad-based support, is the issue here. This act is 
significant as the first measure ever promulgated in Britain to facilitate the protection of 
seabirds. The motivation behind its formulation– “preventing a silent wilderness”- clearly 
displayed what Carruthers has called a “broader environmental sensitivity” which in turn is a 
pre-condition for a long-term commitment to nature conservation.
124
  
Although local guanopreneurs participated with the same enthusiasm and greed in stripping 
the islands during the rush phase of the trade, like their South American counterparts 
centuries earlier, they soon came to realise the value of protecting the birds and the need for 
the careful management of their island environment. General apathy with regard to the 
protection of the environment amongst this particular grouping therefore soon gave way to 
new conservation awareness when there was a resurgence of the trade during the late 1840s. 
Beinart, however, cautioned that this awareness must not be confused with protection for 
moral reasons. Within the idiom of mid–Victorian thinking, it would be more appropriate to 
refer to this approach as a realisation of the need to use the existing natural resources more 
wisely.
125
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When Cape Town-based merchants such as De Pass, Spence & Co., Thomson Watson & Co. 
and Granger & Co. took control of the trade, a new approach to the exploitation of Ichaboe 
was adopted. In order to safeguard the resource and to prevent its further degradation, they 
agreed to a three-way division of the island and the implementation of a “proper season” of 
guano collection as well as treating the island as a nursery.
126
 In addition they adopted a 
system of avoidance (for when the birds returned in May or June) by restricting their 
activities and noise to the northern side of the island whilst leaving the south side 
undisturbed. They even went as far as curbing the collection of penguin eggs. Once the 
breeding season was over, the island labour force was tasked with clearing away stones and 
carcasses. The protection of seabirds was thus clearly a matter of managing an economic 
resource for long-term prosperity. 
 
The first indications of a greater sensitivity towards the treatment of animals in the Cape 
Colony became evident in the early 1880s when the colonial authorities promulgated 
legislation focussing on animals. The first notable piece of legislation that signalled a new 
direction in animal-human relations in the Cape Colony was the Police Offences Act (Act 
No. 27 of 1882). According to this act, discharging firearms in the vicinity of animals, their 
wanton irritation as well as setting dogs on other animals was prohibited. In terms of Section 
5 of the Act, a maximum penalty of £2 or 30 days imprisonment could be imposed on 
transgressors.
127
 This was followed by the promulgation of Proclamation 316 of 1891 to 
outlaw the wanton killing and disturbance of gannets, cormorants and penguins and which 
was to form part of the stipulations of the Game Act (Act 36 of 1886).
128
 Transgressions were 
punishable by a minimum of 6 months imprisonment with the option of a fine. Although this 
Proclamation was only valid until 15 November 1894, it made a significant contribution 
towards protecting the primary guano producers. After 1894, the protection of certain classes 
of seabirds was further extended under the stipulations of the Fish Protection Act (Act No. 15 
of 1893). This act prohibited unauthorised landing on the islands for the purposes of sealing 
and egg collecting. It also placed a ban on the use of firearms, nets and boats for these 
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purposes.
129
 In December 1893 the authorities published Proclamation No. 499 aimed 
specifically at the guano industry. This legislation laid down rules and regulations for the 
protection of seals and seabirds.
130
 At the dawn of Union, Proclamation No. 498 of 1909 
provided for new conditions for landing on the bird and seal islands, killing animals and 
handling unauthorised killing and disturbance of seals and birds.
131
 
 From the adoption of legislation aimed at protecting seabirds, it was just a short distance to 
the protection of birds in general as demonstrated by the promulgation of the Bird Protection 
Act (Act No. 42 of 1899). The Cape Parliament passed further legislation aimed at protecting 
a variety of animals including exotic animals, flowers and a variety of wild birds ranging 
from pigeons
132
 to the fiscal shrike.
133
 The protection of the latter to a certain extent 
inaugurated the final shift towards protection as a moral rather than an economic imperative 
in the Cape Colony.  
As the Cape Colony moved closer to political unification, it also became involved in 
diplomatic processes related to nature conservation at large. One of the more significant 
events that had long-term results was the London Convention for the Preservation of Wild 
Birds, Fish and Animals signed on the 19
th
 May 1910. This convention resolved that the 
parliaments of all British maritime colonies should introduce legislation to give effect to the 
provisions of the London Convention.
134
 Furthermore, four months prior to the adoption of 
the resolution to unify the different South African Colonies into one political entity, the 
United States Embassy in London invited the colonies to a discussion on a proposed World 
Conference for the Conservation of Natural Resources in the Hague.  Discussions considered 
“the common interest of the free countries in the conservation of their natural resources”135 
and investigated ways to restore the same wherever practicable.
136
 With the unification of the 
Cape, Orange Free State, Natal and Transvaal colonies in 1910 the new political entity, 
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“South Africa”, inherited a keen awareness of the need to conserve and restore her natural 
resources. Under Article 85 (X) of the South Africa Act, the protection of fish and game 
became a provincial matter. In addition, it formally became part of the fishing industry.   
 
5.10. Conclusion 
The reorientation of the Cape guano trade to serve the interests of local capitalist-orientated 
farming was the result of deliberate political action by farmer-politicians acting in 
conjunction with their constituency in the face of stiff resistance by guanopreneurs. Cape 
farmers initially lacked a sophisticated understanding of both plant and fertiliser science and 
continued the time-honoured practice of fertilising their lands using kraal manure.  As they 
acquired greater insight and understanding and became acquainted with the efficacy of both 
natural and chemical fertilisers, they began to demand access to cheap guano. Due to the 
relative weakness of the existing farmers’ organisations in both the Eastern and Western 
Province of the Colony and the export-orientation of the local guano trade, market forces 
however dominated. For more than four decades this left farmers at the mercy of private 
suppliers, most of whom held long-term leases over the guano islands and were therefore able 
to charge high prices. The situation only started to change when the individual voices of 
concerned agriculturalists were replaced by the collective voice of new political and 
economic interest organisations such as the South African Farmers Protection 
Association/Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, the Lower Albany Farmers Association and 
the Knysna Political Organization. When some of these organisations merged with others 
with a clear political mandate and their representatives were elected into public office (e.g. 
Afrikaner Bond & Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging), the tide began to turn for the Cape 
farming community. This led to the first act on the road towards a state-managed industry, 
namely the adoption of Resolution 2 of 1889 by the colonial parliament which placed control 
of all the guano islands back in the hands of the colonial state. 
 
Establishing a government-controlled industry, however, proved equally difficult. Lacking 
administrators with sufficient in-depth knowledge of the intricacies of the trade, the 
authorities took the right decision to employ industry veterans to structure its operations. 
However, they failed to ensure that the appointment of its chief administrator, the Cape 
Guano Agent, conformed to the standard rules and regulations applicable to the colonial 
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administration. As a result Captain Jackson, the designated appointee and a veteran of the 
trade and businessman in his own right, succeeded in negotiating an employment deal that 
differed entirely from that of his counterparts in other colonial departments. In addition to a 
free hand in organising the affairs of the Guano Agency, he was offered a commission and 
could deduct all expenses incurred in this process. Acting as a guanopreneur rather than a 
state official, Jackson effectively turned the Agency and the Guano Islands Division into his 
own private business and resisted any attempts to effect lower prices, provide affordable 
transport and equitable distribution to all regions of the Colony of a highly sought-after 
agricultural product. To compound matters further, the department and his political principals 
failed to effectively oversee both his administrative and political role – much to the detriment 
of the farming community. Jackson could therefore refuse discounts, price reductions, credit 
and methods of payment. He treated clients in an off-hand manner and answered only to 
himself. This angered both organised farming and their political representatives and provided 
a new impetus to their struggle for fair and equitable access.  
 
As a result of political pressure on their political representatives, the position of Guano Agent 
was abolished and a new department led by a Superintendent of Government Guano Islands 
was created that was fully bureaucratised and conformed to the standard rules of the colonial 
service. The fight between Jackson and his employers, like that of J.O. Smith and De Pass, 
therefore literally became the last stand of the guanopreneurs against the full appropriation of 
guano income by the colonial state. The death of Jackson in 1904 and his replacement by 
Captain Spence in terms of the new dispensation effectively brought this phase of the struggle 
to its end. The institution of lower prices, a system of decentralised depots, statutory quality 
standards and the legislative protection of seabirds following the death of Jackson therefore 
represent the final steps in prioritising the interests of Cape farmers. 
University of Stellenbosch http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 153 
 
CHAPTER 6 
A ‘SALTY’ AND PRECARIOUS ATMOSPHERE – GUANO LABOUR RELATIONS 
DURING THE CAPE AND ICHABOE GUANO TRADE, 1843 – 1910 
 
6.1.  Introduction  
The profits of contractors, merchants and the state amassed during the 19th century guano 
trade was dependent on the extraction of the physical labour of large numbers of men of 
different nationalities. Indeed, it represents the first crucial acts of the industry.
1
 The 
changing nature of labour relations within the guano trade was a critically important aspect of 
the development of the trade itself. Previous studies have pointed out the role of the trade in 
the formulations of new labour identities such as ‘guanopreneurs,’ ‘coolies’, and 
‘kanakas’(native Hawaiins). In essence, most of these are both designative and pejorative 
terms. Firstly, they describe a low status class of worker and secondly, they are racial terms 
referring to certain groups of workers, either non-white or from Asian origins. The term 
‘coolie’ in particular over time also acquired a transnational character.2 This has prompted 
Balachandran to describe ‘coolie’ as essentially indicative of “a social relationship rather than 
merely a figure, person or term, even perhaps as the characteristic relationship between 
labour and capital outside a relatively small part of the west”.3 Given the power relationships 
and labour practices prevalent in the trade, this has also prompted Phillips to describe the 
trade as ‘a new form of slavery.’4 The struggle of the labour force (both sea and non-sea 
labour) against the dictates of the various labour regimes can therefore be viewed from three 
perspectives. Firstly, it is essentially viewed as a struggle against ‘coolification’; secondly, as 
                                                          
1W.M. Mathew, “A primitive export sector”: 51. 
2M. Jung, “Outlawing “Coolies”: Race, Nation, and Empire in the Age of Emancipation.” American Quarterly 
57, no. 33 (September, 2005) 
3G. Balachandran, “Producing Coolies,(Un)making Workers: A (post) Colonial Parable for the Contemporary 
Present.”<http://hei.unige.ch/sections/hp/Documents/Balachandran_producing%20Coolies.pdf> (November 2, 
2009) 
4
Phillips, “British slavery after abolition: the Pacific trade”: 13 
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an attempt at the unmaking of the free worker
5
 and finally, as a fight to restore the 
masculinity of the men involved.
6
 As such, worker resistance also referred to acts aimed at 
mitigating or denying claims made on labourers as a class of subordinates as well as to 
advance their own claims vis-á-vis those superordinate classes.
7
  
 
This chapter argues that private businessmen and government functionaries involved in the 
Cape and Ichaboe guano trade established an exploitative and coercive labour regime 
motivated by profit considerations and characterised by the use of practices transferred from 
a variety of sectors, including mining and the broader fishing sector. These included practices 
such as deferred wages, rationing and rigid contract enforcement. This chapter will show, 
however, that guano diggers did not accept these practices passively. Indeed, they actively 
resisted their exploitation and marginalisation based on their own developing worldview and 
growing understanding of their rights, particularly their rights as British citizens. In this 
struggle, they made skilful use of both public forms of protests such as mutinies and everyday 
forms of resistance such as desertion, short-term strikes, theft and media exposés. Their 
actions will be contextualised within the larger transnational maritime sector. In addition, it 
will be shown how their struggle coincided with that of the colonial farmers (described in the 
previous chapter) and collectively led to the full bureaucratisation of the guano trade and the 
monopolisation of the trade for the benefit of the colonial agriculture. 
 
Although the Cape trade shared commonalities with the international trade, it also exhibited 
local idiosyncrasies. The nature and organisation of the Cape and Ichaboe trade and 
associated labour regime were fundamentally influenced by the location and natural features 
of the offshore islands on which exploitation was centred, the nature of guano labour itself 
and its cost structure. 
 
                                                          
5Balachandran, “Producing Coolies,(Un)making Workers”: 1 
6J.D. Glasco, “The sailor feels Him-self a man.” International Labor and Working-class History 66 (Fall, 2004) 
7
 J.C. Scott,  “Resistance without Protest and without Organization: Peasant Opposition to the Islamic Zukat and 
the Christian Tithe,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 29, no. 3 (July, 1987):  419 
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6.2.     Cost Structure, Guano Collection and the Nature of the Work Environment  
Guano mining is essentially a speculative activity since it deals with collecting and trading a 
finite product of varying quality, depending on its location. Its potency and price were 
determined by the correct combination of phosphate, ammonia and other chemical elements 
essential for the promotion of plant growth. The most effective way for guanopreneurs to 
mine a low-grade and finite product was to work the islands or portions thereof as individual 
“business” units and to position themselves as individual small producers. This method of 
operation was similar in approach to the modus operandi adopted by 19
th
 century investors in 
scattered low-grade gold deposit mining since it required a small capital outlay which was 
also a much more practical way of cutting costs and ensuring profitability.
8
  
 
The mining of guano on offshore islands in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans during the 19th 
century has been described as an essentially primitive industry based on an assessment of its 
primary extraction techniques, size, remuneration and its general labour practices.
9
 As a 
natural product with no further need for processing, the physical collection of the guano 
chunks was the primary task of guano workers. They had the aid of basic tools such as 
crowbars, spades and wheel-barrows. They also bagged and loaded it on board ship. Working 
offshore with inadequate or even absent mooring facilities and equally hazardous loading 
equipment meant that labour crews were engaged in an extremely dangerous work.  In order 
to aid their loading, the guano diggers constructed numerous improvisations such as a 
swinging platform and a primitive railway system similar to those used on the Peruvian 
islands and Isle de Mona in the Caribbean.
10
 The use of primitive and improvised technology 
further heightened the sense of danger that came to be associated with the task. Island crews 
were frequently also dependent on favourable weather conditions to effectively execute their 
task. Guano-collection was therefore often a slow, long-winded and frustrating process.
11
 To 
top it all, diggers were burdened by the omnipresent and extremely unpleasant stench of the 
                                                          
8
C. Van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900 – 1933 (London: Pluto Press, 
1976), 21 
9Mathew, “A primitive export sector”:  35 
10E.F. Frank, “History of the Guano Mining Industry, Isla De Mona, Puerto Rico.” Journal of Cave and Karst 
Studies 60, no. 2 (August, 1998) 
11Ex Member, “The African guano trade”: 623 
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centuries-old excrement. Due to guano’s high ammonia content, workers suffered from 
constant bleeding of the eyes and nostrils as a result of direct exposure to the dust. Nose-
bleeding was also one of the tell-tale signs of scurvy,
12
 meaning its occurrence could easily 
been mistaken for the onset of the dreaded disease.  
 
Contemporary witnesses described the Namib coast where the first phase of the African 
guano trade started in 1843 as a ‘healthy’ (unpolluted) but harsh living and working 
environment, “one monotonous unvaried scene of bleak barren rocks, or arid sand hills, not a 
particle of vegetation anywhere appearing to relieve the prospect.”13 The islands themselves 
were described as “bleak, barren, and unpromising beyond description” with the “desolation 
of the scene being completed by the angry surf which with ceaseless and depressing rhythms 
rolls in upon the shore.”14 The Captain of the Nautilus who visited Angra Pequena during the 
late eighteenth century remarked “it is much to be lamented that so fine a harbour, as 
Pequena should be formed by such a barren, unfruitful soil, apparently doomed to everlasting 
sterility”.15 This left one in no doubt about the general state of the environment of these 
exploitation zones. Earlier efforts from a range of visitors to drill for fresh water both at 
Angra Pequena and the mainland up to the 1840s produced only salt and brackish water.
16
 
Working and living under such desolate conditions meant that survival under such 
circumstances depended entirely on the availability of a boat and an adequate supply of fresh 
drinking water. These items thus became priceless commodities and key tools of extraction in 
the continuous exploitation of the various islands.  
 
Although the Cape colonial islands were relatively closer to Cape Town and civilisation, they 
were still located in a relatively underdeveloped territory that lacked basic mooring facilities 
and an adequate fresh water supply. Low and irregular rainfall and a lack of watering places 
on the islands meant that water had to be imported in wooden casks from Cape Town. The 
transportation and preservation of the water supply to the islands, however, posed its own 
                                                          
12C. Gordon, “Scurvy and Anson’s Voyage round the World: 1740 – 1744 An analysis of the Royal Navy’s 
Worst Outbreak,” The American Neptune  XLIV no. 3 (Summer, 1984):157 
13Ex Member, “The African guano trade”: 641 
14W.S. Fletcher, “The African Guano Islands,” The Cape Illustrated Magazine, September, 1897, 21 
15J. Kinahan, “The historical archeology of nineteenth century fisheries at Sandwich Harbour on the Namib 
coast.” Cimbebasia 13 (1991): 39 
16Ex Member, “The African guano trade”:  648  
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challenges. En route to the islands on a leaky ship and in the process of being conveyed by 
raft to the mainland, it became spoiled.
17
 Furthermore, after being in the casks for an 
extended period, it became undrinkable. Although workers eventually became used to the 
stinky smell, they generally detested it. Most were therefore in favour of replacing the 
wooden casks with either cement or iron tanks. In the period immediately preceding the era 
of government control, the crews designed a system of sun condensators to augment their 
limited supply and to overcome their immediate supply problem. The innovation was 
however only partly effective given the problem of regular foggy weather and strong winds, 
meaning that they could not produce enough to provide for all their needs on a continuous 
basis.
18
 Under emergency conditions, Guano crews on the different islands were effectively 
left with no other option but to boil seawater for a sufficient potable supply.
19
 Given the 
rocky surface of most of the islands, sinking wells was never an option. This heightened the 
sense of precariousness that characterised the African guano work environment from the 
outset. 
 
Another key challenge was the regular provisioning of the offshore islands. Given the harsh 
and generally semi-arid nature of the Namib coast and the general lack of resources to sustain 
human life on most of the islands, most of the necessities such as fresh food and water had to 
be imported from Cape Town. This long-distance arrangement presented its own particular 
challenges.  According to calculations made by Robert Granger, one of the former guano 
island leaseholders, the estimated cost for maintaining a workforce on the islands varied 
between £60 - £70 per year (salaries and provisions included).
20
 This included the provision 
of basic foodstuffs such as salted meat, biscuits, flour, Indian meal, beans, peas, barley, 
Chinese tea, coffee, sugar, lime juice, vinegar as well as fresh and preserved vegetables 
(potatoes, cabbage, carrots etc.) and meat. Fresh vegetables and limejuice, which were 
considered critical for the prevention of scorbutic, were also sourced from Cape Town. Its 
availability was therefore also subject to the vagaries of the prevailing weather and sea 
conditions and the general conditions aboard ship. Food storage in particular was affected and 
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proved to be problematic as there was nothing that anybody could have done to prevent fresh 
bread from turning mouldy or becoming filled with maggots or meat becoming rotten.
21
 
 
The isolation of the island existence was further aggravated by the lack of access to reliable 
medical care to relieve the negative results of both the climatic conditions along the coast and 
the aches and pains of actual physical labour. The constant damp weather and dew along the 
desert coast of South West Africa added to the misery by causing colds and sore throats as 
well as rheumatism and agues (a fever or shivering fit).
22
 Where medicine was available on 
board ship, it was generally transported as part of the general stores, which were inadequately 
stored in wooden chests.
 23
 As a result, it was susceptible to spoilage from leaky hulls and 
infestation by rats and vermin.
24
 Furthermore, there were generally no manuals at hand for 
the proper dispensing of medicine, nor were there any surgical instruments in case of 
emergencies or a regular supply of fresh water for cleaning wounds and sores.
25
 Bandages to 
cover and dress wounds were in short supply. Crews were forced to use any available 
materials including pieces of their own clothing or old flour bags for this purpose.
26
 Despite 
the ever-present possibility of collapsing guano heaps and the problem of broken bones, 
splints were hardly ever available. As an emergency measure, the pieces of a kerosene case 
had to serve the purpose.
27
 The general condition of both the surgeon’s mess and sick berth 
(especially the lack of recuperation space on some ships), were further cause of concern. Life 
on a damp and dirty ship, coupled with a lack of healthy food, fresh water and the general 
non-availability and ineffectiveness of anti-scorbutic and other medicines for a range of 
heterogeneous diseases exacerbated the existing hazards.
28
 In addition, hard physical labour 
and concomitant illness, physical and emotional stress and prolonged lack of fresh food 
predisposed the ship’s crew to bouts of scurvy.29  At the most, shipping crews had to rely on 
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limited and dubious medical services from individuals such as an Irishman who practiced 
medicine from a cave in Saldanha Bay at a tariff of £5-0-0 per ship.
30
  The situation was, 
however, far worse along the Namib coast with no medical services nearby. Guano crews 
were, therefore, generally dependent on a medicine chest containing the bare necessities. As 
late as the 1890s, it was common to find nothing more than a little castor oil and some salts in 
kits of this nature.
31
 Given its geographical distance from civilisation and its associated 
hazards, guano employment can therefore rightly be described as precarious, characterised by 
starvation, long work hours, fatigue, poor nutrition and disease.
32
  
 
6.3. Guano Speculation and the Ad Hoc Labour Regime, 1843 – 1845 
The foundation of the first labour regime of the African guano trade was laid by the 
shipmasters that participated in the Ichaboe Rush during the period 1843 – 1845. Their 
actions and involvement in what was effectively a speculative venture laid the foundation for 
a coercive labour relations regime and its associated practices that dominated the 
management of local trade for nearly sixty years up to the establishment of the Union of 
South Africa in 1910. From the outset and for a major part of the era beyond the rush phase, 
sailors or the sea were the primary source of labour for the collection and loading of guano. 
Their ranks were supplemented by additional groups of non-seamen who worked under the 
supervision of supercargoes to speed up the loading of specially chartered ships. This 
situation closely mirrored the situation in Peru during the early to late 1820s where sailors 
initially also constituted the bulk of the labour force before being replaced by imported 
Chinese workers and the establishment of a system of coolie or temporary contract labour.  
 
Sailors on European ships or of European descent were recruited in a variety of ways and 
their conditions of employment were regulated by law and enforced by the courts. Typically, 
as had been the case in most international ports, seamen were recruited from the ranks of 
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deserters or the unemployed and wanted to escape from society in general.
33
 All that the 
shipmaster had to do was to give notice of his need for new recruits. Therefore, it wasn’t 
surprising that some individuals ended up working on the guano islands after responding to 
the shouts of recruiters while “standing about the jetty with some mate”.34 Due to the fact that 
a fair number of recruits were out of work and “hard-up”, they were generally not in a 
position to negotiate a reasonable wage.
35
 Most were also shipped wearing only the clothes 
they had on. At the same time, the recruiters divulged very little information about the exact 
nature of the labour requirements of guano collection or about the expected living conditions 
on the islands. This strategic silence was also common to the mining industry.
36
 The guano 
industry took it one step further by failing to disclose any information about life or resources 
on the islands or the adjoining mainland. In accordance with their general contracts or articles 
of agreement, shipping crews were supposed to load and discharge all cargo if required - an 
“odious task”.37 Furthermore, it was expected that seamen demonstrated an unquestioned 
obedience to the shipmaster. These mechanisms effectively made seamen cheap labour, 
shipmasters “masters next to God”38 and the ship a workplace that alienated and 
disempowered.
39
  
6.4.   “Masters Next to God” 
On top of offering dangerous working conditions and meagre remuneration, some 
shipmasters treated their crews dishonestly and thought nothing of deferring their payments 
or even resorting to non-payment. Although they exchanged promissory notes as surety for 
the work to be done, most of these agreements were never honoured to the great disadvantage 
of the sailor or ‘digger’.40 This was, however, not surprising within the context of the 19th 
century maritime industry (or the mining industry for that matter) which guano collection 
inadvertently became part of. According to Witt, the various maritime laws, unwritten 
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practices and accepted traditions prevalent in the shipping trade empowered shipmasters to 
the extent that they virtually became “masters next to God” and were thus able to act at will. 
This was further aggravated by the fact that the guano rush took place in the midst of a 
shipping recession, with a large number of European sailors out of work. Those sailors that 
were lucky to be employed therefore found themselves at the mercy of their shipmasters and 
at the receiving end of ill-disguised attempts to turn them into cheap and irregularly paid 
labour or ‘coolies’. To add insult to injury, contracted labourers hired by certain shipping 
companies working under the supervision of supercargoes to fast-track collection and loading 
of freight were better remunerated as day workers (at a rate of 3s-5d).
41
 
These incidents, especially the deferment of wages, collectively represented a serious attack 
on the ability of seamen to negotiate as free workers and prompted them to act. The strategy 
of wage deferment has been used successfully by speculative entrepreneurs in the mining 
industry for reasons of profitability and in the hope of reducing the risk of desertion by 
withholding the workers’ wages or in the hope of a financial windfall from the enterprise.42 
Whatever the motivation behind its use, some sailors revolted and refused to work. Others 
chose the route of desertion and became free agents. Contracted to some of the supercargoes 
they worked as day workers at a much improved wage rate. The latter action is ironic since 
the average guano digger generally detested the negative aspects of the job. It is, however, 
consistent with the experience in Canadian timber ports where sailors actually deserted their 
ships to join the ranks of the shore labourers in order to utilise the higher paid opportunities 
offered by shore cargo handling. This action also conforms to the observation by Fingard that 
when it suited them, “work that sailors loathed as articled seamen, they found quite palatable 
in small doses as hired labour.”43  It also set the stage for a range of other similar actions such 
as the full-scale mutiny and the establishment of a ‘guano workers republic’ on the island of 
Ichaboe in March/April 1844 and an uprising at Malgas Island during 1845.  
 
The act of establishing a republic, even if only a guano one, represents an extreme act of 
symbolic or ideological resistance against the attempt to relegate guano labour indefinitely to 
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an inferior economic and ritual position.
44
 By deliberately constituting themselves as a 
political community and forcefully asserting their rights as citizens of their own (guano 
island) community, the rebelling seaman displayed what Scott has termed “a discovery of 
class-consciousness”.45 Thus far from merely attempting to re-appropriate the product of 
their labour, it was firstly a clear expression of their particular world view;
46
 secondly a 
radical critique of the existing arrangements
47
 and thirdly, actions aimed at reclaiming their 
status as men of worth and free labourers. Furthermore, actions such as these where sailors 
fight both a war for economic redress above (and off) deck but also a interclass war with their 
social and political leaders based on political equality of all, represents a new and different 
vision of manhood, namely one where there is no special privilege for the ruling classes.
48
  
British sailors in particular had for a long time been engaged in a struggle to elevate their 
own social status as humans and to claim their rights as British citizens. The prevalent 
attitude of seamen as “inhabitants of the imperial periphery” according to Land meant they 
were not considered “worthy of the guarantees associated with metropolitan freedom 
(‘British liberty’).”49 In the same vein, they argued that irrespective of where they thus found 
themselves, they were not only entitled to be treated like true Britons with full rights but, 
should also not be governed like (Black) slaves. From this perspective, by deferring wages 
and paying on a lower scale employers were in reality infringing on their civil rights and 
citizenship and, by implication, undermining their humanity and status as free workers. 
 
Despite the legitimacy of their actions, the rebelling seamen were still contracted maritime 
labour subjected to particular maritime laws. As far as the members of the Committee Of 
Shipmasters & Others were concerned, the sailors-turned-guanopreneurs and guano 
republicans were engaged in acts of guano theft.
50
 Similarly, their defiance of the colonial 
juridical authority at Saldanha Bay during the mutiny on Malgas Island during the course of 
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1845 could also not be tolerated. In order to deal effectively with the acts of desertion, which 
in many cases also involved theft, ship captains turned to the Cape Colonial authorities for 
assistance. According to various reports in the Shipping and Mercantile Gazette, deserters 
from some of the guano ships were either sentenced to short periods of imprisonment and a 
spare diet of rice and water or discharged from duty. In cases where there were additional 
charges such as theft of a boat, additional punishment was imposed. Those that refused to 
work on board were sentenced to either one month imprisonment or a restricted diet or had 
the indignity and displeasure of being placed back on board ship when it was ready to leave 
port.
51
 In addition, the accused individuals were also dispatched to appear in Court before the 
Resident Magistrate.
52
 It is interesting to note that most of the penalties meted out showed 
very little variation and were not particularly harsh. This may have to do with the fact that 
experienced and skilled seamen were a real asset and not easy to replace. Further reports also 
indicated that offences such as drunkenness and insolent behaviour such as using foul, 
abusive and threatening language with a ship’s officer were stamped out with the assistance 
of the law machinery of the Cape Colony. It was common for ship’s officers to leave 
recalcitrant seamen in an open boat out in the unpredictable ocean or use physical punishment 
as a means to break the spirit of resistance and to obtain submissiveness.
53
 In certain 
instances, deserters were shipped to St. Helena Island and forced to pay their own passage.
54
 
This action was heavy, given the fact that the ordinary seamen had very little spare money 
and were mostly indebted to the shipmaster. According to Scott, the use of penalties such as 
restricted diets, arrest, payment of own passage or discharge served as boundary markers to 
contain open protest and defiance and collectively constituted a regime of routine repression 
aimed at sowing fear rather than spreading terror.
55
 Seamen therefore might be 
inconvenienced by these measures, which are preferable to naked terror or capital 
punishment. Furthermore, the physical presence of the naval authorities at both Ichaboe and 
Malgas Island assisted in restoring order and enabling their final stripping. As the rush phase 
of the African guano trade ended during the late 1840s, it was clear that guano labour, though 
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cheap, was far from docile. European workers in particular were well aware of their rights 
and had a clear view of their place in the broader scheme of things. These became critical 
factors in the further evolution of the guano labour regime under the leasehold and 
government system.  
 
6.5. Guano Harvesting and the Seasonal Labour Regime; 1847 – 1890 
Those entrepreneurs acquainted with the cyclical or seasonal nature of the guano trade 
continued to monitor the state of the resource on the various African islands in the aftermath 
of the guano rushes. Those with experience of the Peruvian trade in particular were also 
aware that an adequate supply of guano would eventually become available for harvesting 
again. An important requirement, however, was the need to protect the guano-producing birds 
from human disturbance and destruction. Central to this was the need to restrict access to the 
islands and prevent any potential rivals from getting their hands on the resource. Such an 
approach and a system of seasonal harvesting had implications for the further exploitation of 
the African guano islands and its associated labour regime.   
 
With the first signs of a freshly replenished guano resource, the Liverpool firm of Gibson, 
Linton & Co. monopolised Ichaboe in 1847. To safeguard their interests, they appointed a 
supervisor/foreman for the collection and loading crew on the island.
56
 He supervised loading 
and the general activities of the manual labour crew and maintained the general peace on the 
island.  Since the company was engaged in a speculative venture, it continued in the same 
vein as its predecessors by handling guano as a finite and once-off resource to be stripped 
within the shortest possible time. The practice of using seamen as diggers was therefore 
maintained. As a result of a combination of factors as outlined in Chapter 3, by 1850 control 
over Ichaboe, the prime source of African guano, had passed into the hands of Cape 
businessmen such as Robert Granger, Aaron and Elias de Pass, and Seawright & Co.  
 
Having no better system for the exploitation of the island, the new monopolists adopted the 
same system of guano-digging by using a workforce of seasonal manual labourers under the 
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supervision of a European Headman. In addition to supervision of work operations, the 
Headman typically was tasked with receiving and controlling the island stores, maintaining a 
daily logbook, recruiting additional local labour, communicating with Head Office and 
overseeing the general well-being of his charges. In this regard he was authorised to procure 
fresh provisions such as meat from the mainland and to distribute it amongst the islands.
57
 
Those appointed as Headmen were generally chosen from the ranks of the most experienced 
seamen available. Nevertheless, Anthony Chimato and Anthony Roderick (Possession Island) 
and John Nivallo (Halifax Island) were illiterate and had to appoint assistants or 
writers/clerks to help them with key tasks such as maintaining logbooks and inventories and 
issuing and recording of provisions from the general store.
58
 Instead of a fixed wage, 
Headmen worked on a commission basis and earned an additional gratuity based on the 
loading speed of the workforce under their supervision.
59
 In addition, they could earn 
between six pence (6d) and one shilling per ton, depending on the agreement with the 
monopoly holder.
60
 This was further supplemented by a concession that allowed them to 
engage in sealing for their own account in their spare time.
61
 
 
To ensure an adequate labour supply, as previously indicated, men were recruited in Cape 
Town from the ranks of deserters, the unemployed and those who wanted to escape from 
colonial society. Among the ranks, a later government commission found carpenters, a 
former barrister, electrical worker
62
 and a former worker in the Harbour Engineers Office,
63
 
indicating the diverse nature of the guano digging population. Even prisoners with the option 
of a fine were recruited from the Roeland Street Prison by paying their fine in exchange for a 
12 month guano contract.
64
 Contemporary reports painted a picture of a recruiting system 
essentially geared towards securing as cheap a labour force as possible as long as they were 
physically fit.  
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Working as the day labourers, guano scrapers earned an average wage of £2 per month.
65
 
They could earn an extra three pence (3d) per ton depending on the loading speed. 
Furthermore, the remuneration package of the labour force was supplemented by water and 
food rations.
66
 As a general rule, a remuneration system of monthly “half pay notes” was 
used whereby half of the wages due to workers were left in Cape Town and the rest could be 
used to order goods and other conveniences, which were transported to the islands duty-
free.
67
 The worker was therefore able to leave the islands having secured some savings from 
his labour. The ‘half-pay’ system was, however, also a valuable control mechanism to ensure 
a regular labour supply. By withholding a portion of their wages, deserters faced losing a 
significant amount in accumulated earnings. This prospect thus served as an important 
deterrent for desertion and effectively forced guano labourers to see their contract out.  
 
The system of deferred wages was supplemented by extending credit to the workforce. 
Collectively, it also strengthened the labour control system constructed by the major 
leaseholders. Most of the men who joined the guano service had very few worldly 
possessions. The employer also provided nothing more than food and accommodation. Basic 
items such as basins, towels, soap, matches and blankets as well as non-food products such as 
tobacco had to be procured by workers themselves from the ship’s or company’s store.68 This 
left them open to exploitation by the employer, their supervisors (Headmen) and suppliers 
from elsewhere. De Pass, Spence & Co., one of the major guano leaseholders, ran a store on 
the mainland near Angra Pequena. This provided the only possible alternative for 
provisioning in the case of non-delivery by any of the others companies.  The company 
guarded this monopoly jealously and publicly declared that they regarded this particular 
service as their personal domain.
69
 It was thus standard practice for them to charge visiting 
ships one shilling for every ton of guano provided before they could be provisioned.
70
 De 
Pass defended himself against critics by claiming that he provided a necessary service to 
abandoned seaman left to their own devices. With no alternative, his critics had to maintain 
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their relationship with the De Pass firm. Far removed from other alternative suppliers, 
workers were left with very little choice. It literally became an issue of paying up or having 
your ablutions with nothing but a salt water guano bath or the yolk of penguin eggs instead of 
soap.
71
 This led George Fry, a guano digger on Possession Island, to lament: “we almost live 
in a salt atmosphere here; we have to wash ourself & our clothes in salt water, and eat salt 
provisions.”72 
 
Realising the worth of alcohol and tobacco in controlling the workforce, the employer 
permitted a very limited and strictly rationed amount of alcohol controlled by the Headman 
on the islands. The employers also provided a dedicated and appropriate amount for this 
purpose whereas a regular supply of tobacco could be procured from either the ship’s 
storeroom or from the De Pass establishment on the mainland.
73
 This was particularly 
necessary as a means to provide relief from the isolated existence and unpleasant living and 
working conditions on the offshore islands. Since alcohol was in short supply and with no 
real recreational activities, reading matter or games to relieve their boredom, it was therefore 
not surprising that some workers resorted to drinking friar’s balsam, paregoric and other 
medical remedies with an alcoholic basis.
74
 Overall, according to guano digger J.H. Mitchell, 
the islands were a “wretched placed for men to live at.”75 
 
Guano labour force resistance to their working conditions was effectively thwarted by the 
guano island leaseholder’s use of a combination of measures and factors, especially the 
personal circumstances of workers and a combination of civil law (contracts) and criminal 
law (“prosecution for vagrancy and deviance from a orderly life on and off the job”).76 As 
previously mentioned, like their sailor counterparts, seasonal labourers had no better 
economic opportunities or options and were generally not in a position to negotiate a 
reasonable wage.
77
 Most also had nowhere else to go or “nowhere within reach of their 
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limited or non-existent capital resources that could offer better prospects of work than they 
already had.”78 Those that were recruited with the assistance of crimps and other middlemen/ 
intermediaries as stock-in-trade labour
79
 were just as stuck, given their debts to their 
sponsors. Furthermore, the Masters and Servants Act adopted in 1873 by the first 
Responsible Government outlawed ‘careless work’, bad language or ‘neglect’ and absence 
from work and made provision for short periods of imprisonment and fines in case of 
defiance of the employers order.
80
 The guano labourers seemingly found themselves in what 
Bittermann in a different context has labelled as an “inescapable conundrum”.81  
 
Through the skilful use of these mechanisms, the Ichaboe monopolists and Colonial 
leaseholders succeeded in establishing a workable though low-cost infrastructure and 
management system for the continuous and effective exploitation of guano. This served them 
well for more than 40 years until the system was taken over by the Colonial Government in 
1890. In comparison to the rush era, the leaseholder years were characterised by a more 
subtle but equally effective system of systematic control through deferred wages, credit, 
provisioning control and more flexibility in labour management.  As a result guano workers 
were more inclined to endure the hardship of their workplace and living environment. By the 
end of the 1880s, however, the inherent deficiencies of this system slowly began to show and 
under the influence of a new extractive regime, were unable to contain the growing 
unhappiness of the seasonal guano labour force. These events form the subject of the 
discussion in the next section. 
6.6. Costs, Commissions, and the Colonial Guano Management System, 1890 – 1910 
Following Legislative Council Resolution 2 of 2 July 1889, the Department of Crown Lands 
& Public Works (DCLPW) appointed Captain C.H. Jackson on a commission-basis as 
Government Guano to handle the operational responsibility of managing the Cape guano 
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trade. This model was essentially aimed at reducing operational costs by eliminating all 
possible intermediaries from the process in order to provide an affordable product for Cape 
farmers as outlined in the previous chapter. At the same time, given the nature of his contract 
Jackson essentially became a labour intermediary for the colonial authorities. The 
commission aspect in particular had major implications for the manner in which the labour 
regime was structured. As will become clear further in this discussion, the pursuit of 
minimum input and maximum output as well as Jackson’s conditions of appointment and his 
own vested interests had definite implications for the associated labour regime established 
under the colonial guano dispensation.   
 
Based on his contract, Jackson was responsible for ensuring a functional guano exploitation 
regime. The model that he preferred and actually constructed was a hierarchy organised as 
illustrated by Diagram 1 below. To assist him in his task, he appointed Captain J. Spence, 
another veteran of the guano trade as the Assistant Guano Agent responsible for the direct 
administrative supervision of the scraping of the rocks and islands along the Namib Coast. 
Jackson himself took responsibility for the management of the central guano depot in Cape 
Town, assisted by a store man and various assistants. At this facility, the different guano 
types were to be mixed, weighed and despatched to the various destinations as per sales 
contract. To ensure a continuous supply of guano to the central store, the established practice 
of maintaining a regular work force on the islands was continued. This group was serviced by 
the department’s supply ship, the Sea Bird, whose captain was to interact with and supervise 
the island headmen and to report any incidents of misconduct.
82
 Furthermore, Jackson was 
directly responsible for the appointment of all supervisory personnel (Headmen and 
Assistant-Headmen) and manual labourers responsible for the actual scraping and collection 
of the product in addition to handling the guano island budget and its associated expenditure 
(salaries, provisions etc.).  
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Diagram 1: Guano Agency Hierarchy  
  
To satisfy their labour needs, the Guano Agent, his Assistant and the shipmaster of the 
government vessel “Sea Bird” recruited manual workers from the ranks of the unemployed in 
Cape Town and from the ranks of the labour force of the former leaseholders.
83
 In most cases 
the same recruitment practices of their predecessors were followed, precisely because of their 
effectiveness and cost-cutting features. However, contractual and payment arrangements 
differed significantly and appeared to have been formulated to effect further savings at the 
administrative level. From the outset workers were also recruited from the indigenous people 
on the Namibian mainland to perform manual labour on the islands.
84
 Females in particular 
were tasked with the removal of stones from the guano – a repetitive task at best.85 These 
female labourers were not only good and diligent workers, but also exploitable. In the words 
of John Ployer, the Headman of Pomona Island, Hottentot labour was “remarkably cheap 
labour” given their large numbers on the mainland.86 As reward for their labour they were 
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paid anything, ranging from rice and coffee
87
 to a cash wage of 5 shillings per month.
88
 Their 
recruitment did not only make economic sense, it also fitted the cost-cutting and output 
maximisation agenda of the Guano Agent perfectly. However, a serious political incident 
erupted between the Cape authorities and their German counterparts in control of the Angra 
Pequena mainland, drawing attention to the actual labour practices of the guano diggers and 
their supervisors.  
 
During the era of private control over the island’s diggers and headmen were typically 
contracted for short work periods,
89
 whereas the new system was generally based on 
contractual periods of at least twelve months. This coincided with both the breeding season of 
the birds and the collection season that followed. In some cases, longer term, open-ended 
contracts were concluded with seasoned seamen who were involved extensively with the 
trade and who preferred an island to an urban existence.
90
 These men were essential for the 
setting up and maintenance of a long-term industry and the protection of the guano-producing 
seabirds. Whereas headmen were contracted for a fixed wage of £4, ordinary working men 
were paid an amount of £2 per month. This stipulation almost immediately generated a cost 
saving as it was much cheaper than the commission-based system formerly applicable to the 
employment of headmen. Headmen were also not allowed any bargaining space regarding 
salaries.
91
 Similarly, Captain Durr of the “Sea Bird” offered 63 local male and female 
indigenous inhabitants at Lüderitzbucht a 12 month guano labour agreement on 19th 
February 1896.
92
 In return for their labour, they were promised a salary, maintenance and 
shelter.
93
 However, two months before the end of their contracts, they were dismissed and 
returned to the mainland without any payment or a permit from the Germans who were in 
control of the area.
94
 Upon discovering this, the Germans issued a note of protest to the Cape 
government and demanded compensation of between £350 (minimum) and £870 on behalf of 
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the victims based on a service period of 12 months, maintenance and loss of income 
(wages).
95
 In the interest of sound interstate relationships, both parties compromised and 
settled on a final amount of £350.
96
 When confronted about the salary matter and the lack of 
evidence that salaries were indeed paid over to staff, he cynically pointed out that “we cannot 
get receipts from every coolie...”97   
 
The ordinary European and Coloured guano workers on the Namib coast were just as 
vulnerable to exploitation as the indigenous workforce. With the new labour regime, the 
ordinary sailor had to endure a salary reduction from £2.10.0 to £2 and therefore suffered 
monetary loss.
98
 Furthermore, both supervisors and workers lost the right to collect sealskins 
for their own account. This loss was particularly painful since this additional income afforded 
them a semblance of independence from their official wage under the previous regime. The 
new administration also put an end to the system of “half pay notes” and the practice of 
allowing men to use half of their salary to procure basic necessities which were shipped duty-
free to the islands. In future, all islands and its employees were to be fully provisioned from 
Cape Town. This effectively meant that workers did not need to be paid on a monthly basis 
and forced diggers to procure non-edible provisions such as clothing and tobacco on credit 
from the stores of the Sea Bird.  Prices on items available through this source were generally 
higher and therefore workmen incurred sizeable debts, which complicated the process of 
terminating a service contract over the longer term. Even tobacco, one of the preferred 
products that seamen and a wide range of employers used as an incentive to stabilise the 
workforce and increase productivity,
99
 was not exempted. Its price increased sharply from 2 
shillings and 6 pence (2s-6d) to 4 shillings.
100
As the employer paid for all food and 
accommodation, salaries were to be repaid upon termination of service and once all expenses 
connected with credit purchases from the Sea Bird were deducted.
101
 These arrangements, 
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especially the price of items from the ship’s store, outraged the workmen and were described 
by guano digger Alfred Kaiser as “a disgrace in the nineteenth century.”102 European sailors 
in particular, had a fair sense of what constituted fair pricing and were thus fully aware of the 
extent of the exploitation they were subjected to by the Captain of the Sea Bird and De Pass 
at his shore-based store. Like their predecessors during the rush phase, they expressed their 
views based on a particular understanding of their rights and the world. As such, it served as 
an important indicator of the unhappiness that have pervaded the guano workforce. 
 
New recruits were often shipped with minimum clothing and without any form of bedding. 
They had to be content with makeshift beds on water barrels and limited ablution facilities in 
the forecastle of the ship that transported them to the islands.
103
 Some also slept in the 
lifeboats, the ship’s hold, on the deck, and “even on top of one another.”104 En route the 
recruits endured extremely wet conditions since “instead of the hatch opening aft, to keep 
clear of the spray, it opens forward, so that when the vessel dives into a head sea, the spray 
comes into the forecastle.”105 In addition, constant leaks forced the men to sleep in oilskins 
for the duration of the journey.
106
 Travelling conditions with slave-like features were 
therefore not a good introduction to life as a guano digger. This particular feature of the local 
trade also gave credence to Phillip’s suggestion of the guano trade as a new form of slavery. 
 
The total disregard displayed by the Guano Agent concerning the treatment of the indigenous 
labour force also manifested itself in his approach to and handling of the island supply 
system. As previously indicated, provisions had to be transported from Cape Town to the 
islands to enable the continued extraction of guano. As such, its unhindered and regular 
supply was a critical element in the production and labour control process. Fresh food and 
water were particularly high in demand due to the life-threatening implications of any break 
in the supply chain. However, Jackson at times displayed an illogical commitment to cost 
reduction that seriously compromised the whole guano industry. Given the expensive nature 
                                                          
102
KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897 – Evidence: Testimony of A. Kaiser, 30/7/1897 
103
KAB: AMPT PUBS 2/2/1/76: C.10- ’98: 6 
104
KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897–Evidence: Testimony of G.Haggerstrom, 
30/7/1897 
105
KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897 – Evidence: Testimony of Capt. Burr, 22/7/1897 
106
 KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897 – Evidence: Testimony of M. Pietersen, 
22/7/1897 
University of Stellenbosch http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 174 
 
of salted meat (both pork and beef) as well as the high incidents of wastage from 
contamination,
107
 all headmen were instructed to refrain from purchasing any provisions such 
as meat from the mainland. They were also not allowed to land on the mainland for any 
reason whatsoever. Any deviations or unauthorised expenditure in this regard would not only 
be for their own account– even in the case of scurvy amongst the work force – but would also 
be punishable.
108
 In addition, a ban was placed on the collection of penguin eggs and killing 
penguins for food. This resulted in a situation aptly described by guano digger Joseph 
Fletcher of Possession Island, as one where “the meat was not extra good. It was altogether 
disgraceful for an Englishman.”109 At the same time, however, the arrangement of having a 
dedicated cook at an additional cost was abandoned, leaving the tasks to the men themselves 
and not surprisingly, “a pretty mess was made of it.”110 This also had serious health 
implications since overcooking also considerably reduces food’s anti-scorbutic properties.111  
 The system of deferred payment and the retention of a portion of the workers’ wages by the 
employer, did not help matters at all as this denied workers the opportunity to procure meat 
on the mainland and from the nearby trading store in order to have access to properly cooked 
meals. These restrictions were also extended to drug foods such as tea, coffee and alcohol. 
Not only was alcohol banned from the islands, but Chinese tea was replaced by bush tea 
(according to the available evidence, not rooibos tea) which was much disliked by the 
diggers. T.L. Graham described the latter as a “nauseas beverage with nothing to recommend 
it but its cheapness.”112 The total ban of alcohol, an occasional glass or cup of which could 
have brought more than a little cheer to the men,
113
 led Gustav Haggerstrom, the Headman of 
Sinclair and Plumpudding Islands, to remark that “now the men have to live here like 
convicts.”114 It was therefore not surprising that by 1897 after weeks of the non-delivery of 
general provisions (including fresh meat and vegetables) that most men on the islands along 
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the Namibian coast suffered from scurvy and various other ailments such as dysentery and 
boils. 
 
Closer inspection of remarks and expressions used by guano diggers to describe their 
situation (general living accommodation, food, the system of payment or the provisioning 
system) clearly indicated an acute awareness of the standards of treatment and certain basic 
human, worker and citizens rights. Although most were well acquainted with the harshness of 
life in the forecastle, they generally detested life in the wooden huts provided for them as 
basic living quarters on the islands. The majority of these establishments also dated back to 
the early years and were erected when the trade was still controlled by private interests. By 
the time of the takeover by the colonial authorities in 1890, they were in a dilapidated state. 
Captain Burr was “simply horrified beyond belief: you could hardly believe that white men 
could put up in such a horrible shanty.” It was also just “disgraceful and not fit for a human 
being.”115 In Anthony Chimato’s view the accommodation was not even “fit for a nigger to 
live in.”116 Indeed, convicts appeared to live better. Guano personnel had already declared the 
condition of meat as an affront to any “British citizen” and the ship’s store system had been 
condemned as a “nineteenth century disgrace,” leaving the situation looking dismal. The final 
insult came when men wanting to claim their accumulated earnings were confronted with a 
payment system that expected of them to sign a blank claim form with no amount stipulated. 
The amount of earnings to be paid out was only added afterwards. This practice was not only 
foreign but “the likes of it would not be allowed in a shipping office in England.”117 
Unbeknown to island personnel, these problems were part of a far greater administrative 
problem. Particularly problematic was Jackson’s habit of declining to submit any detailed 
salary accounts or calculations of staff salaries to the Department of Agriculture.
118
 The 
Department, ignorant as it was of the finer workings of the guano extraction system, save for 
the reports from its top official, failed to question the ever-increasing wage bill.
119
 It 
therefore became complicit in the maintenance of what had effectively become a coercive 
and exploitative labour system. Workers detested this exploitation and the direct attempt to 
                                                          
115
KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897 – Evidence: Testimony of Capt. Burr, 22/7/1897 
116
KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897 – Evidence: Testimony of A. Chimato, 30/7/1897 
117
KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897 – Evidence: Testimony of J. Fletcher, 22/7/1897 
118
KAB:AMPT PUBS CCP 1/2/2/1/53: SC. A30 – ’99: Testimony of  C.H. Jackson: 1 
119
KAB: AMPT PUBS: CCP 1/2/2/1/48: S.C. A.12 – ’97: Testimony of  C. Currey: 34 
University of Stellenbosch http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 176 
 
devalue their labour and to undermine their status as human beings, free workers and British 
citizens and therefore entitled to fair reward for labour rendered. This also confirmed Isaac 
Land’s contention that British seamen from the 18th to the 19th century were eager to re-
establish their worth in the eyes of the greater British society based on the argument that “no 
one who possessed the sensibility of a British man should be governed like a Black slave.”120 
This response was consistent with the earlier sentiments expressed by sailors during the 
guano rush phase and during the system of private leaseholders. As free citizens they were 
able to freely negotiate a labour contract and enjoyed the protection afforded by both the 
common and maritime law. As a common citizen, the European worker also enjoyed the 
same rights and responsibilities as the ship’s captain beyond the workplace. They were 
therefore able to evaluate whether they, as workers, were treated according to both the 
codified and un-codified standards of treatment that they expected.   
  
In order to keep the system and the trade functional and to maintain their labour force, the 
guano administration resorted to intimidation. Contracts were especially strictly enforced. 
Those that threatened to leave early and not to return to the island conditions were threatened 
with six months imprisonment at the Breakwater prison in Cape Town.
121
 This was primarily 
aimed at preventing dissatisfied workers from spreading negative market intelligence. The 
authorities wished to suppress information on wages, irregularity of payment, ill-treatment in 
the workplace, workplace hazards and the state of provisioning.
122
 Dissatisfied workers were, 
however, stuck on the islands and had no other option but to work out their contracts and to 
wait for the Sea Bird to return from Cape Town. The number of complaints therefore 
increased daily. In order obtain maximum productivity and to curb “idleness” a workday 
from daybreak to sundown (or from six’ o’clock in the morning until six at night) was 
implemented. Although provision was made for a breakfast of half an hour and an hour for 
dinner, there was no provision for a lunch-break.
123
 In addition, repeated requests for a clock 
were ignored and denied diggers the right of accurately determining the length of their 
workday.
124
 There was also no provision for a legally enforceable compulsory rest day. 
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Through the strict application of these measures and the compliance with the headmen over 
the first five to seven years (1890 – 1896), the guano administration was able to collect a total 
of nearly 26000 tons, enough to justify the continued existence of the enterprise.
125
 By the 
end of the 1896 harvest and based on a close scrutiny of the expenditure items listed as 
“Commissions” in the various annual reports submitted to parliament, the Guano Agent and 
his Assistant jointly earned commissions of over  £9000 as outlined in Diagram 2 below. In 
comparison, the total income for the remainder of the labour force, in particular those 
working on the islands which the first annual report listed as 220 in number, for the same 
period amounted to just over £19000. As in all hierarchical situations, those at the top of the 
guano administration hierarchy earned the lion’s share of the income derived from guano 
collection without having to endure any of the discomforts and hazards associated with the 
trade. It therefore came as no surprise that by March 1997 members of the guano workforce 
once again decided to publicly expose the malpractices prevalent in their trade. This 
campaign and its aftermath form the basis of the discussion in the next section. 
 
 
YEAR 
ANNUAL GUANO 
AGENT 
COMMISSION 
ANNUAL ISLAND WORKFORCE 
WAGES 
AMOUNTS  IN  POUND  STERLING 
1893
126
 £1,012-2s-3d £2,528-10s-5d 
1894
127
 £1,545-9s-3d £2,425- 3s-1d 
1895
128
 £1,615-8s-1d £4,360- 6s-7d 
1896
129
 £2,035-14s-4d £5,592-18s-7d 
1897
130
 £2,486-15s-0d £4,233-6s-0d 
TOTAL £8,693-48s-11d £19,138-43s-20d 
 
TABLE 2: Comparative Income: Guano Agent Commission vs. Island Workforce Wages 
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6.7.   Worker Resistance and Reaction to the Guano Labour System  
The changes initiated by the Guano Agent to effect savings and to establish an industry along 
business lines invariably led to an exit of some of the most experienced men from the islands. 
These men almost immediately found employment with the nearby Cape Cross Guano 
Company on the mainland. In addition to good provisions, these deserters were offered a 
minimum monthly salary of £5, which was an immediate improvement on what the Guano 
Agent offered.
131
 Others simply returned to Cape Town. One of the high-profile cases was 
the Headman of Mercury Island, Anthony Hansen who (according to his crew) left because 
“trouble and the labour of collecting guano had driven the man mad.”132 Furthermore, a 
significant number of the old hands departed the islands and left the new enterprise with only 
a small group of the veterans of the islands.
133
 This trend continued throughout the period of 
state control so that by the outbreak of the South African War in 1899, an acute labour 
shortage was beginning to be felt as potential recruits preferred to join the labour and fighting 
units on both sides of the conflict.
134
 Those diggers that could not leave frequently resorted to 
loafing and excuses of an inability to work the usual way.
135
 This motivated the further 
recruitment of “Hottentot” labour from the mainland with the aid of a German, G.J. 
Hesselmann, at the price of 20 shillings per labourer.
136
 The inability of both categories of 
guano workers to negotiate better terms or to avoid so-called low wage zones like the guano 
islands is directly related to the fact that most recruits had little or no savings or other 
resources prior to their signing-up and were mostly ‘hard-up’ with very little other 
employment alternatives as previously indicated.
137
 As a result, they had to temporarily settle 
as a guano digger for a period while waiting for better employment prospects. For the 
colonial authorities, however, the cost reductions achieved through the actions of the Guano 
Agent on the administrative level came at a price. The labour system in particular was left 
extremely vulnerable and dependent on an uncertain labour supply.  
                                                          
131
KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897 – Evidence: Testimony of A. Rodericks, 
30/7/1897 
132
KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897 – Evidence: Testimony of Capt. Burr, 22/7/1897 
133
KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897 – Evidence: Testimony of P. Nelson, 30/7/1897 
134
KAB:AMPT PUBS: CCP 1/2/2/1/48: SC. A.12 – ’97: Testimony of Jackson: 6 
135
KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897 – Evidence: Testimony of F.P. Jameson, 
30/7/1897 
136
KAB: AGR 1/511: D18: Inspection of Guano Islands: W.P. Truter – Colonial Secretary’s Office, 19 October 
1905 
137
 Van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour, 229 
University of Stellenbosch http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 179 
 
 
The system of reporting through the Headman and captain of the supply ship Sea Bird, also 
failed the guano island workforce. As previously outlined, each of the headmen was tasked 
with the regular maintenance of a logbook detailing all daily occurrences. Given the high 
incidents of illiteracy amongst headmen, in some cases the records did either not exist or 
were incomplete and had to be maintained on the headman’s behalf by a designated writer or 
scribe. Such records were also regularly taken to Cape Town for inspection, supposedly for 
the purposes of remedial action.
138
 Most headmen who wanted to communicate their 
concerns, needs and wants directly to the authorities and wanted to visit Cape Town were 
dissuaded from doing so by Captain Burr of the Sea Bird who undertook to relay it on their 
behalf.
139
 By his own admission, Burr failed to report in full on his observations, never 
“exactly” submitting any written complaint to the authorities and just generally only 
“mentioned” his observations and the men’s complaints.140 This is directly related to his own 
role in the exploitation of guano workers through sales from the ship’s store. In most cases 
where a written report was indeed produced by the headman or his scribe and despatched to 
Cape Town, no response was received, nor did the Guano Agent even bother to personally 
visit the islands under his jurisdiction. To crown it all, some of his supervisory personnel 
such as John Ployer of Pomona Island claimed that they had neither met nor conversed with 
their superior.
141
 When Rodericks eventually registered some complaints with him, they were 
apparently met with insults and dismissed.
142
 The fact that Rodericks returned to his job 
despite the treatment meted out to him must therefore be regarded as a form of pragmatic 
resignation.
143
 These actions clearly displayed the features of the guano trade as a typical 
labour repressive system. In such a system, functionaries as ‘general overlords,’ displayed a 
heightened sense of their own superiority, power, importance and entitlement to deference to 
compensate for their normally relatively low status in society.
144
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The deference expected by the Office of the Guano Agent and his supervisors was, however, 
systematically eroded by its failure in providing provisions for the islands. As a result, the 
guano labour force gradually began to articulate the withdrawal of their deference to their 
superiors and forced headmen into a situation of false compliance with the stipulated 
regulations. This was particularly evident in the gap between the official records as 
represented by the island logbook and actual events on the islands that were never reported. 
During late 1896 to early 1897, for three months the guano island administration failed to 
deliver provisions to the islands in Angra Pequena. Faced with growing incidences of scurvy, 
the act of complying with the bans on visiting the mainland, killing penguins and collecting 
eggs as well as interaction with the Germans became suicidal. These rules were thus regularly 
disregarded by men facing a desperate situation, much to the frustration of the headmen 
tasked with ensuring compliance with the standing order. This led John Nivallo, the Halifax 
headman to comment: “I am supposed to be the headman, and they must do what I order. If 
they don’t do what I tell them, I might just as well not be headman at all.”145 This won 
individual Headmen the respect of their subordinates. On the other hand, some headmen  
enjoyed little or no respect within the ranks of the labour force. Remarks by T.H. Dyke were 
confirmed by similar sentiments expressed by Capt. Burr about the headman of Halifax 
Island being an absolutely “ignorant man” and indicated the growing emergence of a lack of 
deference to authority.   
 
In an attempt to maintain the respect of their men, a few of the Headmen made themselves 
guilty of false compliance with the established rules by not fully reporting all incidents and 
measures undertaken. These actions were motivated by the need to make decisions based on 
an assessment of the local conditions faced by the guano workforce.  Misunderstanding these 
dynamics, Captain F.P. Jameson, a member of the Commission of Investigation into the 
working of the guano islands, erroneously observed that in reality there was not much 
supervision at islands in the bay of Angra Pequena.
146
 According to German guano digger 
Peter Foch who worked on Halifax Island, on occasion one of his compatriots, John Kay, 
wrote a letter to their countrymen on the mainland wanting to buy milk, meat and vegetables 
                                                          
145
 KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897 – Evidence: Testimony of J. Nivallo, 21/7/1897 
146
KAB:AGR:667:0000 – Guano Island Commission of 1897 – Evidence: Testimony of Capt. F.P. Jameson, 
30/7/1897 
University of Stellenbosch http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 181 
 
on his own account. The Germans, having heard about the men’s predicament, brought fresh 
provisions as a gift.
147
 Another means of supplementing the fresh food supply was by 
maintaining own livestock. During a visit W.P. Truter, one of the Colonial government’s 
inspectors, found several pigs on Ichaboe which were fed from official stores. Upon its 
discovery, this was conveniently and strategically blamed on the captain of the Sea Bird.
148
 
Contrary to the rules, at other times the men also killed and ate sea birds. As far as could be 
ascertained, very few of these incidents were ever officially reported by the headmen. Given 
the glaring deficiencies and weaknesses in the system of record keeping, it was also not 
surprising that prior to this discovery such practices were conveniently omitted from the 
official record. Anthony Chimato went to Cape Town in October 1896 to formally complain 
about the failures of the provisioning system. The Guano Agent summarily dismissed him for 
being ‘quarrelsome’ and a ‘regular nuisance’ with a “long tongue”. In his stead, Anthony 
Rodericks was appointed in Chimato’s place and Jackson thereby unambiguously signalled 
his determination not to allow any dissent.
149
 This action contributed to the removal of the 
last shred of deference and the accusation and distancing of the supervisory staff from the 
Guano Agent encapsulated in the statement of John Ployer, the headman of Pomona Island, 
who declared: “it is not the government’s fault, it is Captain Jackson’s fault. They put all the 
blame on him as he is the manager. It is not the Headman’s fault.” 150 The assignment of such 
blame, according to Scott in a different context, also has to do with the fact that Jackson, 
somebody who was intimately acquainted with the finer workings of the trade and “within 
moral reach”, should have acted differently with more consideration to the needs of those 
who worked the islands.
151
 The grounds were thus prepared for a different form of resistance, 
i.e. open protest action. 
 
The constant grumblings, loafing and threats of work stoppages by the guano labour force, 
finally crystallised by late 1896 and early 1897 in a series of strikes on various islands. Prior 
to this series of events the provisioning system suffered a complete breakdown for unknown 
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reasons and left the work force with insufficient fresh supplies for between two weeks 
152
 to 
seven months.
153
 Although there was still food available, its quality was suspect and there 
was an inadequate supply of fresh meat, vegetables, lime juice and vinegar to counter or 
prevent the onset of scurvy. The situation also varied between the different islands. Despite 
the employment of various survival strategies, such as grounding rice to meal in order to bake 
bread, catching fish from the lagoon and extreme measures such as frying a gemsbok skin,
154
 
the majority of the workforce was struck down with scurvy. Halifax Island only received 
three tins of preserved onions and three small tins of vegetables as last provisions and had 
eight workers down with scurvy.
155
 On Possession Island, which received one bag of 
potatoes, three bags of onions and 32 cans of preserved meat in seven months, six out of 
fourteen men were down with scurvy, with one to look after the sick, another one responsible 
for the maintenance of the sun condenser, leaving only three persons remaining to do the 
work.
156
 In addition, most of the staff on Sinclair Island, Hollamsbird, Mercury and Ichaboe 
were affected by scurvy, dysentery and other illnesses. This situation effectively left the 
northern guano collection operations in disarray. When both Burr and Jackson proved 
unsympathetic, the workmen embarked on a series of 24-hour strikes involving all of the 
islands, protesting their working and living conditions. On one hand this strike was 
essentially a defensive weapon aimed at restoring the supply system to its former standard. 
On the other hand it was also an offensive weapon and a response to what van Onselen has 
called the “less visible attacks on the value of their labour”, 157 especially their conditions of 
service which, according to Burr, created a situation where “these men are reduced to penury 
and poverty before they even do start.”158  
 
Burr observed that prior to the strikes in March/April 1897, as a rule white diggers were 
foremost in articulating grievances around wages and provisioning. The islands on which the 
majority of these workers were congregated also experienced the bulk of the labour problems. 
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This gave a distinct racial dimension to the events. Prior to the 1890s and the existence of the 
Masters and Servants Act of 1873, strike action was illegal in the Colony.
159
 This did not, 
however, defuse or eliminated worker militancy and action during that period. Skilled foreign 
workers in Cape Town were familiar with trade unionism and the benefits of collective labour 
action and began to change this situation. In 1876 British typesetters in the service of 
politician and publishers Saul Solomon & Company went on strike in response to an attempt 
at introducing cheap female labour into the company. The railway workers at the Salt River 
works, led by a cosmopolitan leadership consisting of an Englishman, two West Indians and a 
West Indian Frenchman, followed suit in March 1884 following a wage reduction.
160
 
Similarly, Black guano workers on Navassa Island in the American Pacific resisted and killed 
six white supervisors of the Navassa Phosphate Company in Baltimore following 
longstanding abuse and neglect.
 161
  The action of the guano workers on the Ichaboe group of 
islands therefore built on an existing tradition of labour organisation and collective action to 
secure and safeguard their rights both locally and abroad. The tactic of short work stoppages 
combined with the use of the colonial press highlighted their plight and the contrast of the 
guano labour regime with accepted British practices. These tactics were precisely chosen to 
attract maximum public attention without threatening the dominant norms, laws, customs and 
political loyalty. They were also presented as a public act of compliance and conformity as 
well as, by implication, an effort to protect the “British way of doing things.” It was, 
however, also a pragmatic form of resistance given the isolation of the islands and the 
distance from Cape Town, the seat of British authority in southern Africa and its 
provisioning. This resulted in formal government intervention through the appointment of a 
special investigative commission to scrutinise the complete working of the islands. The 
damning findings against Jackson resulted in the abolishment of the position of Government 
Guano Agent as a commission-earning entity and the administration of the guano islands was 
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placed under the formal control of the Department of Agriculture. The guano labour regime 
therefore concluded its evolution from being an ad hoc operation using sailors, to a formal 
state-run operation characterised and governed by formal regulations and practices consistent 
with those in use in the Mother Country. 
6.8. Conclusion 
The Namibian part of the Cape guano trade displayed features that Phillips in another context 
dubbed as “a new form of slavery.” At the heart of the problem was the fact that when they 
took over the business Colonial authorities failed to appoint a career official with industry-
specific knowledge and respect for the public mandate to manage the offshore industry. Due 
to his profit-orientation, the Cape Guano Agent placed his interests above that of the colonial 
state, the farming community and that of the individual guano-digger. The Colonial 
Government in turn emerged from this episode with little to commend itself as both 
politicians and administrators tasked with safeguarding colonial interests failed to properly 
exercise their supervisory function. Due to their belated actions, hesitancy and failure to act 
timeously and proactively, the colonial authorities literally became a slave to Jackson’s 
“guano experience” – an experience that cares for profit and little about the integrity of the 
system and people. Thanks to the intervention of the colonial parliament, in the end the 
authorities succeeded in redeeming themselves.  
Although private leaseholders managed their labour system somewhat better by allowing 
workers to supplement their wages by sealing and fishing and ensuring a regular system of 
provisioning, they were the designers of the highly exploitative system. The hallmarks of the 
guano trade were buying from the ships stores, using a system of half-pay notes, cash 
advances, rationing and deferred payments as well as a range of other practices, which were 
simply taken over from the fishing and mining industry by the Guano Agent.  These practices 
leave one in no doubt about their part in the construction of the system. Jackson’s programme 
of “economising” in order to ensure an acceptable profit or commission was merely an 
extreme form and continuation of the practice of the wholesale appropriation of guano 
income by the guanopreneurs. 
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Thanks to an advanced worldview, aware of their rights as Europeans and world citizens able 
and willing to stand up for their rights, guano labourers never accepted their exploitation and 
acted in their own interests. Through both subtle and overt forms of resistance, they 
attempted to frustrate the system that aimed to exploit them. Whilst they had to submit to 
their employers under duress during the rush phase of the trade due to naval military 
intervention, the shoe was on the other foot by the turn of the century when guano labourers 
in the employ of the colonial state succeeded in reversing their situation with the assistance of 
the colonial media. In this regard, they had the example of co-workers in both the guano and 
other industries to follow in their struggle to be valued as co-producers of economic and 
monetary value. This awareness and willingness to physically engage their employers drove 
the evolution of guano labour from an ad hoc to a formally structured regime. The experience 
of labour exploitation on the guano islands is indeed a shared one that unites guano workers 
from South America to the northwest coast of Africa. It is therefore possible to use both the 
events locally and those elsewhere to make a final judgement about guano contribution to the 
institution of a new form of slavery, albeit for a very short time. 
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CHAPTER 7  
THE CAPE GUANO TRADE – CONCLUSIONS  
 
The Cape guano trade is undoubtedly of historiograpichal significance. As the second most 
important source of fertiliser after Peru, a fair number of its practices and policies, especially 
its precedent-setting guano legislation and policy, contributed to the further evolution of the 
international trade and the advancement of capitalist agriculture across the Western world. 
The Cape Guano Ordinance of 1845 in particular provided the basis and framework for both 
the American Guano Islands Act (1856) and the Queensland Coasts Islands Act in Australia. 
This effectively integrated the African islands of Ichaboe and Malgas, as well as other islands 
along the western and eastern coastline, with their counterparts such as the Chincha and 
Lobos Islands group on the South American coast and from there into the Pacific Ocean. In 
the end, a contiguous guano frontier as described by Firth was created. Unwittingly, the Cape 
Guano Ordinance also provided an additional impetus and provided the African trade with a 
character role in the evolution of what came to be known as aggressive American guano 
imperialism and “aberrationist” and frontier extension-behaviour as described by O’ Donnell, 
Skaggs, Benton and others.  
 
As indicated earlier in this study, Newbury also expressed a need for a record of the guano 
trade in parts of the world other than Peru, in order to allow historians to make comparisons, 
draw conclusions and to make a full assessment of the historical significance of the 
international guano trade for world history. This reconstruction of the African guano past 
attempted to draw together the disparate strings and collect the fragments of the past that lie 
scattered all over the historical landscape and to compile it in a coherent whole to serve as a 
lens into an important time and place in world history. It thus provides sufficient evidence to 
serve as a basis for the comparison of the guano trade in different parts of the world.  
 
This study has a unique focus on the social, economic and political aspects of the trade, 
especially the battle between nations, governments, interests groups, business associates, 
ethnic groups and even families to appropriate and commodify the excrement of various 
seabirds. It also contributes towards the better understanding of the link between humans and 
animals and marks a moment that went beyond what Anderson described as the ontological, 
University of Stellenbosch http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 187 
 
vitality and materiality presence of the latter in human affairs. It provides a physical record 
and instance where the animal product and body have become the arena for the display and 
interplay of human action and emotions and therefore contributes to a greater understanding 
of the complementarities of both social and environmental history.  
 
It has been common in the international historiography to refer to the Peruvian guano trade as 
the so-called “guano age.” It suggested that the trade from the Chincha and Lobos islands was 
the one and only trade and that its operations alone had an impact on international affairs. 
This study effectively challenges the notion of the existence of one over-arching guano age 
and its equation with only the Peruvian trade to the exclusion of all others. Based on the 
findings of the current study, it is more accurate to make a distinction between the existence 
of a series of individual and country-specific guano eras that collectively constituted a 
definitive Guano Age and a Guano Age specifically Peruvian in nature. This global age with 
its diverse and common regional and transnational features lasted a little more than a half-
century during which time it occupied the economic centre-stage. It would therefore be more 
appropriate to designate the whole of the 19th century as the International Guano Age with 
due consideration that aspects therefore continue to resonate right into our present age. 
 
As indicated, the guano trade also made a critical contribution to our greater understanding of 
frontiers and the factors behind their shifting. With the Peruvian offshore islands as the sole 
known source of supply during the early days, the trade effectively started as a production or 
commercial rather than a settlement frontier. When the resource was nationalised by the 
Peruvians and its proceeds secured for political purposes, the frontier became a political one. 
Central to this process was a shift in the knowledge domain when, with the advancement in 
the science of plant growth and fertiliser technology, the commercial potential of guano was 
discovered. This shift in the frontiers of knowledge directly led to a second shift, namely the 
commoditisation of guano, when it exchanged its historical and cultural role as the primary 
means through which the (Peruvian) nation was reborn to become an article of trade. This 
suggested that the different meanings that various communities over time attached to the 
product are key factors in the understanding of the process of shifting frontiers. These shifts 
lie at the heart of the launch of the Ichaboe and Cape trade. Shifts in the production location 
that moved the frontier from South America, via Africa to Oceania, however, also came about 
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as result of the finite nature of the product. Once the resource became depleted in one 
location, it was only natural for guanopreneurs to move somewhere else, meaning that relative 
scarcity also plays a role in whether frontiers shifted or not.  
 
On the social level, the Cape guano trade fundamentally impacted on the relationships 
between a wide range of individuals, groups and races due to consistent attempts by various 
parties to obtain monopoly control. Swart suggested that in the encounter between humans 
and animals, a process of redefinition based on power relations frequently takes place and that 
new identities are adopted based on the original encounters. Those private individuals or 
groups who had exercised monopoly control over most of the guano islands had variously 
been described as guanopreneurs and “cultivators of guano.” At the lower end of the hierarchy 
was the ‘Coolie’, digger or Malay who provided the labour needed to keep the trade afloat. 
The current study confirmed guano mining as a highly coercive enterprise with questionable 
labour practices. As a high-cost low-output industry, guanopreneurs had no real space for 
waste and idleness. Efficiency was the driving force behind the exploitation of the resource. 
Labour, irrespective of its origins, was ruthlessly extracted with very little regard for 
citizenship, national values or human dignity. Due to the fact that every area of work had the 
potential of becoming a serious cost–driver, meticulous planning and implementation and the 
‘coolification’ of the workforce became the preferred way of working. The labour regimes of 
the Government Guano Agent and Superintendent of the Government Guano Islands in 
particular, were highly exploitative and characterised by a total disregard for human life and 
dignity. These regimes therefore conform to some historians’ characterisation of guano labour 
trade as a new form of slavery. At the same time, the study revealed the agency of guano 
workers under extreme conditions. Fighting to protect their own interests and the fruits of 
their labour, they engaged in both informal and formal acts of resistance. In this regard they 
creatively used memorials, complaints, public newspapers and strikes to defend their rights. 
This resulted in the trade being converted to a state enterprise by 1890. 
 
Previous research formally located the roots of Afrikaner nationalism in the agricultural 
sector. Guano also contributed in this regard. The decision of the Cape Colony in 1889 to 
formally transform the guano trade into a state-controlled enterprise, complemented by formal 
quality control measures, price fixing and a subsidised transport system, was motivated by the 
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concern of farmer-politicians for the growth and development of Cape agriculture and 
followed a long period of sustained agitation. Any form of price control, which was regarded 
as an unnecessary constraint on the development of free trade, was opposed. This was coupled 
with a concern about the inequitable distribution of the benefits that followed price reductions 
since farmers in the Eastern Province were consistently denied the benefits of cheap guano. 
These differences effectively prevented the unification of farming interests and unnecessarily 
prolonged their fight for fair access to their preferred fertiliser. Despite their separation, but 
due to their unrelenting pressure, farmers as a collective succeeded in securing credit sales, a 
system of regional guano depots, regular price reductions and more affordable public 
transportation of their purchases. The consistent agitation of Afrikaner politicians, supported 
by regular deputations who represented both their own individual interests and that of their 
constituency within the wheat-growing and other farming areas of the Western Province, 
raised both the profile of themselves and that of the organisations that they represented.  Due  
to their involvement with a diversity of agricultural enterprises such as sheep and wine and 
the fact that farmers were oftentimes involved in all or at least two of these industries, it now 
is possible to add guano as an important factor in the rise of Afrikaner political consciousness 
and political organisation. 
 
In addition to having to deal with aggressive American guano imperialism, the promulgation 
of legislation connected with the guano trade, such as the Guano Ordinance, served as a 
policy precedent for the exploitation of the product in other parts of the British Imperial 
world. The Cape Colony provided the government of Western Australia with both the 
regulation and governance model to structure the handling of mining activities along its coast 
and in the Pacific Ocean. Locally, the trade in the Colony also coincided with a period of 
intense contestation between Britain and her colonies about greater powers of self-
government and the right to formulate independent policy. This study, although not a study 
into the history of constitutional development in the Cape Colony, however, illuminated and 
added to our further understanding of developments in this regard. It also provided new 
perspectives on the tension between the Imperial and Colonial governments around the issue 
of policy transfer subsequent to awarding representative and responsible government. In 
addition, it served as a lens into the local-imperial tensions experienced during this prolonged 
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process of policy transfer and the development and consolidation of a system of political 
parties and the evolution of parliamentary institutions and practices during the early period of 
constitutional development of the country. It also clearly revealed the need for new research 
and perspectives on the self-government movement in South African history. 
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